Moral hazard and background risk in competitive insurance markets

Economica

Volumn 75, Issue 300, 2008, Pages 700-709

  Ligon, James A ^a   Thistle, Paulo D ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA AT BIRMINGHAM   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION (ECONOMICS); INSURANCE SYSTEM; RISK PERCEPTION; STOCK MARKET;

EID: 54049104405     PISSN: 00130427     EISSN: 14680335     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0335.2007.00650.x     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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