The formation of mutual insurers in markets with adverse selection

Journal of Business

Volumn 78, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 529-555

  Ligon, James A ^a   Thistle, Paul D ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 21144458956     PISSN: 00219398     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/427637     Document Type: Article

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