Implications of incomplete performance for optimal insurance

Economica

Volumn 71, Issue 284, 2004, Pages 661-670

  Mahul, Olivier ^a   Wright, Brian D ^b  

^a CEMAGREF   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INSURANCE INDUSTRY;

EID: 9444277106     PISSN: 00130427     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0013-0427.2004.00393.x     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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3. Gollier, C. (1996). Optimum insurance of approximate losses. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 63 (3), 369-80.
4. Gollier, C. (2000). Optimal insurance design: what can we do with and without expected utility? In G. Dionne (ed.), Handbook of Insurance Kluwer Academic Publishers, 97-115.
5. Hau, A. (1999). A note on insurance coverage in incomplete markets. Southern Economic Journal, 66(2), 433-41.
6. Holmström, B. (1979). Moral hazard and observability. Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 74-91.
7. Huberman, G., Mayers, D. and Smith, C. W. (1983). Optimal insurance policy indemnity schedules. Bell Journal of Economics, 14, 415-26.
8. Raviv, A. (1979). The design of an optimal insurance policy. American Economic Review, 69, 84-96.
9. Schlesinger, H. (2000). The theory of insurance demand. In G. Dionne (ed.), Handbook of Insurance. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 131-51.
10. Swiss, Re. (2001). Capital market innovation in the insurance industry. Sigma No. 3/2001, 37p.