Choosing agents and monitoring consumption: A note on wealth as a corruption-controlling device

Economic Journal

Volumn 118, Issue 532, 2008, Pages 1552-1571

  Tella, Rafael Di ^a   Weinschelbaum, Federico ^b  

^a HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

^b UNIVERSIDAD DE SAN ANDRÉS   (Argentina)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CORRUPTION; INCOME;

EID: 52749094068     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: 14680297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02180.x     Document Type: Article

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