Time inconsistency and free-riding in a monetary union

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking

Volumn 40, Issue 7, 2008, Pages 1329-1356

  Chari, Varadarajan V ^a,b   Kehoe, Patrick J ^a,b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

^b FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS   (United States)

^c NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

Dollarization; European Union; Fixed exchange rates; Maastricht Treaty; Monetary regime

Indexed keywords

EID: 52649120350     PISSN: 00222879     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1538-4616.2008.00162.x     Document Type: Article

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