Ministerial weights and government formation: Estimation using a bargaining model

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 95-119

  Adachi, Takanori ^a   Watanabe, Yasutora ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 52449130890     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: 14657341     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewm040     Document Type: Article

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