Electoral design and voter welfare from the US Senate: Evidence from a dynamic selection model

Review of Economic Dynamics

Volumn 11, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 1-17

  Gowrisankaran, Gautam ^a,b   Mitchell, Matthew F ^c   Moro, Andrea ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

^b NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

^d FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK   (United States)

Author keywords

Elections; Incumbency advantage; Selection; Senate; Tenure; Term limits

Indexed keywords

EID: 37049034712     PISSN: 10942025     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2007.04.005     Document Type: Article

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