Optimal multi-agent performance measures for team contracts

Mathematical Finance

Volumn 18, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 649-667

  Keun Koo, Hyeng ^a   Shim, Gyoocheol ^a   Sung, Jaeyoung ^a,b  

^a Ajou University   (South Korea)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

Continuous time model; Contracts; Many agents; Martingale method; Moral hazard; Performance measure; Principal agent problem; Team

Indexed keywords

EID: 52249085199     PISSN: 09601627     EISSN: 14679965     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9965.2008.00352.x     Document Type: Conference Paper

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