The new institutional economics - A different approach to economic analysis

Economic Affairs

Volumn 28, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 15-23

  Furubotn, Eirik G ^a,b   Richter, Rudolf ^a  

^a SAARLAND UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 51949092031     PISSN: 02650665     EISSN: 14680270     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0270.2008.00839.x     Document Type: Article

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