The European arrest warrant in the Italian republic

European Constitutional Law Review

Volumn 4, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 251-273

  Marin, Luisa ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Arrest Warrant; Corte Costituzionale; Corte di Cassazione; Counter limits doctrine; Double criminality; Framework Decision; Fundamental rights; Italy; Judicial review; Justice and Home Affairs Council

Indexed keywords

EID: 51849106923     PISSN: 15740196     EISSN: 17445515     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1574019608002514     Document Type: Article

References (108)

1. Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002, OJ [2002] L 190/1, 18.7.2002.
2. See also the Commission's reports on the implementation of the Framework Decision, COM(2005) 63 final, of 23.2.2005; COM(2006) 8 final, of 24.1.2006; COM(2007) 407 final, of 11.7.2007.
3. See E. van Sliedregt, 'The European Arrest Warrant: Extradition in Transition', European Constitulional Law Review (2007), p. 249 et seq.
4. On the European reaction to 9/11, see Conclusions and Action Plan of the extraordinary European Council of 21.9.2001, .
5. For a comment on these measures, see B. Gilmore, 'The Twin Towers and the Third Pillar: Some Security Agenda Developments', EUI Working Paper LAW No. 2003/7, .
6. The Italian Minister for justice, Mr. Castelli, preferred abolition of the double criminality check on a shorter list of crimes, such as the six serious crimes of the Treaty between Italy and Spain of 28 Nov. 2000. See, e.g., V Grevi,'Il "mandato d'arresto europeo" tra ambiguità politiche e attuazione legislative', 51 Il Mulino (2002), p. 122
7. M. Plachta and W. van Ballegooij, 'The Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and Surrender Procedures Between Member States of the European Union', in R. Blekxtoon and W. van Ballegoo? (eds.), Handbook on the European Arrest Warrant (The Hague, T.M.C. Asset Press 2005), p. 13 et seq.
8. This paved the way to some remarks on the contradictory positions taken by the Ministry of Justice and the Prime Minister. See V. Grevi, supra n. 5, p. 119 et seq.
9. See V. Caianiello and G. Vassalli, 'Parere sulla proposta di decisione-quadro sul mandato di arresto europeo', 42 Cassazione penale (2002), p. 462-467, which concentrate especially on Art. 2 of the Framework Decision.
10. In a nutshell, the jurists argued that the Framework Decision was in breach of constitutional norms concerning the principle of 'sufficient certainty' (tassativitá) of criminal norms and the principle of 'legal prerogative' (riserva di legge) in criminal matters as to the list of thirty-two crimes; violation of constitutional principles on personal freedom, contrast with constitutional discipline of extradition. They also argued it violated Art. 31 letter e) and Art. 34(2) letter b) of the EU Treaty. For a different and equally authoritative position, tackling similar problems and refuting them, see A. Cassese, 'Mandato ch arresto europeo e Costituzione', 24 Quaderni costituzionali (2004), p. 129 et seq.;
11. V Grevi, supra n. 5, p. 123 et seq.
12. The statement is: 'Per dare esecuzione alla decisione quadro sul mandato di cattura europeo il governo italiano dovrá avviare le procedure di diritto interno per rendere la decisione quadro stessa compatibile con i principi supremi dell'ordinamento costituzionale in tema di diritti fondamentali, e per avvicinare il suo sistema giudiziario ed ordinamentale at modelli europei, nel rispetto dei principi costituzionali'.
13. See V. Onida, La Costituzione (Bologna, Il Mulino 2004) p. 55 et seq.
14. S. Bartole, Interpretazioni e trasformazioni della Costituzione repubblicana (Bologna, Il Mulino 2004) p. 353-355.
15. More generally, the reform of the judiciary has been a political target of the parliamentary majority during the XIVth legislature (2001-2006). This declaration stresses the accent on (constitutional) reforms of the judiciary: One might get the impression that the Italian government was willing to take some impetus from the EAW instrument to push this political goal. Cf. V. Grevi, supra n. 5, p. 119 et seq.
16. Minister of Reforms and Devolution Bossi (Lega Nord) defined the European Union as 'gallows-land', the land of gallows (in Italian, 'Forcolandia); Mr. Berlusconi, at the Laeken European Council of mid-Dec. 2001, expressed concerns about an international conspiracy (internazionale giacobina') of magistrates. See V. Grevi, supra n. 5, p. 120 et seq.
17. F. Impalà, 'The European Arrest Warrant in the Italian legal system. Between mutual recognition and mutual fear within the European area of Freedom, Security andjustice', 1 Ulrecht Law Review (2005), p. 56-78, .
18. It is common knowledge that his political friends considered the personal problems with justice of Berlusconi to be the result of a plot hatched by a lobby of left-wing judges.
19. As is witnessed by list of 'ad personam acts' ('leggi ad personam') passed since 2001; see for instance Legislative Decree 61/2002 (scrutinized by the ECJ in its judgment of 3 May 2005, joined cases C-387/02, C-391/02, C-403/02, Berlusconi et al.); Act 248/2002 ('Legge Cirami', providing for the transfer of proceedings to a different court than the one by law if there is 'legitimate suspicion' about the impartiality of the first court); Act 140/2003 ('Lodo Schifani'), granting impunity to the five highest dignities of the State. This last act has been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court (decision No. 24 of 2004).
20. Unlike in France, where the Constitution was changed by adding a paragraph to Art. 88-2 ('Statutes shall determine the rules relating to the European arrest warrant pursuant to acts adopted under the Treaty on European Union). See R. Errera, 'The Relationship of Extradition Law in International Treaties with the European Arrest Warrant and its Application in France', in E. Guild (ed.), Constitutional challenges to the European Arrest Warrant (Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishers 2006 ).
21. This paragraph analyses parliamentary documents which can be found on the official website of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Republic ( and ).
22. A useful collection of the relevant material can be found in L. Kalb (ed.), Mandato di arresto europeo e procedure di consegna (Milano, Giuffré 2005) p. 536 et seq.
23. For the United Kingdom, see N. MacCormick, 'A Common Approach to Crime? Observations on the European Arrest Warrant and the Democratic Deficit', in Festschrift für Heike Jung (Baden-Baden, Nomos 2007) p. 536.
24. During the drafting phase, the Chamber of Deputies' Justice Committee agreed on 13.11.2003 to adopt the Draft Bill presented to Parliament by Mr. Kessler and other MPs (AC 4246-private member's bill) as a basis for the discussion, according to the proposal of its Chairman, Mr. Pecorella. See the documents collected in L. Kalb, supra n. 15, p. 536 at p. 593-594.
25. E. Marzaduri, Libertà, personale e garanzie giurisdizionali nel procedimento di estradizione passiva (Milano, Giuffré 1993) p. 157-158, p. 101 et seq., p. 141. Indeed the doctrine of extradition in the 1930s fascist code, which remained in force until 1988 despite the entering into force of the new Constitution in 1948, conceived extradition as a form of interstate collaboration and co-operation, as demonstrated by the strengthening of the function and powers of the Minister of justice within the procedure. The lack of means to question the legality of measures establishing custody and the absence of release from prison for exhaustion of maximal time limits, just to mention two aspects, made personal freedom nothing but a chimera for the individuals whose extradition was requested from the Italian Republic. The 1988 Code of Criminal Procedure eliminated the aforementioned provisions that were in breach of the Constitution. See E. Marzaduri, supra in this note, p. 123 et seq., p. 141 et seq., p. 149 et seq.
26. See P.-Y. Monjal, 'Le droit dérivé de l'Union européenne en quête d'identité. A propos de la première décision-cadre du Conseil de l'Union européenne du 29 mai 2000', 36 Revue trimestrielle de droit européen (2001), p. 335-370
27. ECJ 16 June 2005, Case C-105/03, M. Pupino; on this decision and its implications, see E. Spaventa, 'Opening Pandora's Box: Some Reflections on the Constitutional Effects of the Decision in Pupino', European Constitulional Law Review (2007), p. 5-24.
28. See F. Bilancia, 'Lo spazio di libertà, sicurezza e giustizia tra realtà intergovernativa e prospettiva comunitaria', 14 Rivista italiana di diritto pubblico comunitatio (2004), p. 359 et seq. This approach to integrationin the criminal law sector seems to be an(other) example of the neo-functionalist method of dealing with procedures referred to extradition mixed with a sectoral perspective. On the relationship between harmonisation and mutual recognition, see the recent decision on the European Arrest Warrant of the European Court of justice: C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld, paras. 55-61.
29. See the case note of E Geyer, in this journal, 2008, p. 149 et seq.
30. Furthermore, the arbitral settlement laid down by Art. 35(7) EU, did not prove to be effective in practice. See A. Weyembergh and S. de Biolley (eds.), Comment évaluer le droit pénal européen? (Brussels, Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles 2006).
31. Act 22 April 2005, No. 69: 'Provisions to implement framework decision 2002/584/JHA (...) on EAW and surrender procedures between member states.' ['Disposizioni per conformare il diritto interno alla decisione quadro 2002/584/GAI del Consiglio, del 13 giugno 2002, relativa al mandato d'arresto europeo e alle procedure di consegna tra Stati membri'], published in the Gazzetta Ufficiale [2005] No. 98, 29.4.2005.
32. This doctrinal position is also taken by the German constitutional courts. Both the Italian and the German constitutional courts reject the monistic approach followed by the European Court of justice. See G. Itzcovich, 'Sovereignty, legal pluralism and fundamental rights: Italian jurisprudence and European integration (1964-1973)', 10 European Public Law (2004)
33. G. Martinico, 'Complexity and Cultural Sources of Law in the EU Context: From the Multilevel Constitutionalism to the Constitutional Synallagma', 8 German Law, Journal (2007), p. 205 et seq.
34. Among the Constitutional Court's case-law, see especially judgments No. 170 of 1984 ('Granital'), and No. 232 of 1989 ('Fragd').
35. For a doctrinal reflection on this theory, see M. Cartabia, Principi inviolabili e integrazione europea (Milano, Giuffré 1995).
36. To be precise, clauses 12 and 13 of the Preamble of Framework Decision 2002/548/JHA. Although they are not legal provisions in themselves, statements in preambles of legal texts can confirm the interpretation of a legal provision. See, interestingly, Corte di Cassazione, Sezioni Unite, judgment 30.1.2007-5.2.2007, No. 4614, para. 7, 'in diritto'. Even if read juncto with Art. 1(3) of the Framework Decision, this public policy exception looks limited and minimalist. Art. 1(3) states as follows: 'This Framework Decision shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union.'
37. The literature on this aspect is abundant. See, ex multis, J. Wouters and E Naert, 'Of Arrest Warrants, Terrorist Offences and Extradition Deals: An Appraisal of the EU's Main Criminal Law Measures against Terrorism after "11 September"', 41 Common Market Law Review (2004), p. 909-935, especially p. 924-925
38. S. Alegre and M. Leaf, European Arrest Varrant. A solution ahead of its fime? (London, Justice 2003), p. 14 et seq.
39. Among the first authors to write on this aspect, see N. Vennemann, 'The European Arrest Warrant and its Human Rights Implications', 63 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (2003), p. 103-121.
40. This initiative faced serious troubles: The first version, presented by the Commission [COM(2004)328 final], was shelved by the Council of Ministers, reluctant to adopt a EU piece of legislation on this matter. For a comment, see R. Lööf,'Shooting from the Hip: Proposed Minimum Rights in Criminal Proceedings throughout the EU', 12 European Law Journal (2006), p. 421-430.
41. A second and less ambitious version presented by the German presidency in Feb. 2007, has now been definitively abandoned for the lack of political will to adopt it, as ascertained in the last summit held under the German Presidency. See the Presidency Conclusions of Brussels European Council of 21-22 June 2007, especially para. 27, available at .
42. I.e., statement on respect for human rights in the Preamble, and lack of a ground for refusal based on the risk of breach of fundamental rights in the legal text; grounds for refusal enumerated at Art. 3 and 4 of the Framework Decision.
43. See on the concept of 'conditionality' of the mutual recognition principle L. Marin, Il Principio di mutuo riconoscimento nello spazio penale europeo (Napoli, Editoriale Scientifica 2006) p. 65-74. The principle of mutual recognition goes beyond the single measure to be recognised, but implies to some extent a 'systemic' recognition of foreign legal systems, including criminal law, procedural rules, and also enforcement institutions, such as the judicial power and its role within the constitutional system. I therefore argue that in an area of law with a high impact on personal freedom, mutual recognition can only be based on a shared legal culture and judicial practice. In any case, corrective mechanisms, such as the possibility of refusal of the Framework Decision on human rights grounds, work as antibodies that help keep the system healthy.
44. See also M. Poiares Maduro,'So Close and Yet So Far: The Paradoxes of Mutual Recognition', 14 Journal of European Public Policy (2007), p. 814-825, especially p. 823.
45. Cf. on this aspect, E. van Sliedregt, supra n. 3, p. 249
46. S. Alegre and M. Leaf, supra n. 26, p. 15 et seq.
47. See the letters a), e), f), g), h) of Art. 18.
48. Such as letters b), c), q), and u) of Art. 18.
49. See also M. Del Tufo, 'Il rifiuto della consegna motivato da esigenze di diritto sostanziale', in G. Pansini and A. Scalfati (dir.), Il mandato d'arresto europeo (Napoli, Jovene 2005) p. 146 et seq.;
50. A. Damato, 'Il mandato d'arresto europeo e la sua attuazione nell'ordinamento italiano (II)', 10 Il Diritto dell'Unione Europea (2005), p. 203-251.
51. See, for this purpose, Sections 10 and 26 of the Constitution. For a comment, see A. Cassese, 'Ardcolo 10', in AA. VV., Principi fondamentali. Art. 1-12, in G. Branca (ed.), Commentatio della Costituzione (Bologna, Zanichelli 1975) p. 544 et seq.;
52. N. Mazzacuva, Articolo 26', in AA. VV., Rapporti civili. Art. 24-26 in G. Branca (ed.), Commentatio della Coslituzione (Bologna, Zanichelh 1981). Furthermore, the doctrine interpreted the possibility of refusal implicitly provided in the Framework Decision as expression of the non-discrimination clause. At the same time, the doctrine stressed the evolution of the European political context, i.e., with reference to 'de-politicisation clauses' contained in many treaties. Through these clauses, contracting parties reciprocally engage not to consider a given set of crimes of a political nature for the purpose of extradition. See S. Buzzelh, 'Il mandato d'arresto europeo e le garanzie costituzionali sul piano processuale', in M. Bargis and E. Selvaggi (eds.), Mandato d'arresto europeo. Dall'estradizione alle procedure di consegna (Torino, Giappichelli 2005) p. 97.
53. Not to be confused with the double jeopardy principle, also known in Europe as ne bis in idem principle.
54. L. Salazar, 'La lunga marcia del mandato d'arresto europeo', in M. Bargis and E. Selvaggi (eds.), supra n. 35, p. 21.
55. See ECJ 3 May 2007, Case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld, paras. 55-61, in particular paras. 57-58.
56. In the Italian legal order, the doctrine has formulated those principles as 'tassatività' and 'determinatezza' of the criminal norm, which are corollaries of the legality principle. For a similar doctrine, see the judgment ECtHR, 15 Nov. 1996, Case No. 45/1995/551/637, Cantoni v. France, on the principles of accessibility and the foreseeability of the criminal rule.
57. See, especially on this point, paras. 48-54, in particular 52-53, of the ECJ's decision, Advocaten voor de Wereld (supra n. 38)
58. For some references to the national debate on this issue, see E. Rosi, 'L'elenco dei reati nella decisione sul mandato d'arresto europeo: l'UE "lancia il cuore oltre l'ostacolo"', 10 Diritto penale e processo (2004), p. 377 et seq.
59. For a different position, see S. Riondato, 'Dal mandato d'arresto europeo al libro verde sulle garanzie alla Costituzione europea: Spunti sulle nuove vie di affermazione del diritto penale sostanziale europeo', 17 Rivista trimestrale di diritto penale dell' economia (2004), p. 1128-1135.
60. The reference is to Stefano Manacorda, 'L'exception à la double incrimination dans le mandat d'arrêt européen et le principe de légalité', 42 Cahiers de droit européen (2007), p. 149 at p. 167 et seq.
61. See Art. 22, co. 3, 4, 6 of Act No. 69 of 2005.
62. The provision states that 'Appeals to the Court of Cassation for breaches of law are always allowed against judgments and against measures on personal freedom pronounced by ordinary and special courts. This rule can only be waived in cases of sentences by military tribunals in time of war.'
63. Corte di Cassazione, 'Sezione feriale', judgment 13.9.2005-14.9.2005, No. 33642, Hussain.
64. For a comment, see F. Peroni (ed.), 'Osservatorio della Corte di cassazione- Processo penale', 11 Diritto Penale e Processo (2005), p. 1528-1529
65. A. Scalfati, 'Il Commento', 12 Diritto Penale e Processo (2006), p. 83 et seq.
66. Corte di Cassazione, Section VI, judgment 26.1.2006-30.1.2006, No. 3640, Spinazzola: On Articles 11 and 39 of Act No. 69 of 2005.
67. The reference is to Section 13 of the Constitution, stating. 'Personal liberty is inviolable. No form of detention, inspection or personal search is admitted, nor any other restrictions on personal freedom except by warrant which states the reasons from a judicial authority and only in cases and manner provided for by law. In exceptional cases of necessity and urgency strictly defined by law, the police authorities may adopt temporary measures which must be communicated within forty-eight hours to the judicial authorities and, if they are not ratified by them in the next forty-eight hours, are thereby revoked and become null and void. All acts of physical or moral violence against individuals subjected in anyway to limitations of freedom are punished. (5) The law establishes the maximum period of preventive detention.'
68. Corte di Cassazione, Section VI, judgment 21.11.2006-12.12.2006, No. 40614, Arturi, on Article 13 of Act No. 69 of 2005.
69. Corte di Cassazione, Section VI, judgment 21.11.2006-12.12.2006, No. 40614, Arturi, para. 2.
70. Through systematic interpretation 'secundum legem'.
71. Through systematic interpretation 'secundum jus'.
72. Corte di Cassazione, 'Sezione feriale', judgment 13.9.2005-14.9.2005, No. 33642, Hussain.
73. Corte di Cassazione, Section VI, judgment 21.11.2006-12.12.2006, No. 40614, Arturi, para. 4, 'in diritto'.
74. This intepretation has been confirmed in Corte di Cassazione, 'Sezioni Unite', judgment 30.1.2007-5.2.2007, No. 4614, Ramoci Vllaznim.
75. See H. Labayle, 'Les perspectives du contrôle juridictionnel de la confiance mutuelle dans l'Union européenne', in G. de Kerchove and A. Weyembergh (eds.), La confiance mutuelle dans l'espace penal européen, - Mutual Trust in the European Criminal Area (Bruxelles, Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles 2005) p. 123-147, especially p. 147, p. 137.
76. See ECJ 16 June 2005, case C-105/03, M. Pupino.
77. Corte di Cassazione, Section VI, judgment of 17-19.4.2007, No. 15970, Piras e Stori.
78. Corte di Cassazione, Section VI, judgment 23.9.2005-26.9.2005, No. 34355, Ilie;
79. Corte di Cassazione, Section VI, judgment 13.10.2005-14.10.2005, No. 36630, Pangrac;
80. Corte di Cassazione, Section VI, judgment 8.5.2006-15.5.2006, No. 16542, Cusini.
81. I.e., as 'esposizione logico-argomentativa del significato e delle implicazioni del materiale probatorio'.
82. This interpretation has been confirmed on many occasions: see, inter alia, Corte di Cassazione, Section VI, judgment 27.4.2007-9.5.2007, No. 17810, Imbra.
83. See Corte di Cassazione, Section VI, judgment 8.5.2006-15.5.2006, No. 16542, Cusini: This decision suggests a restrictive and literal interpretation of the provision. In a different pronouncement ( ordinanza 2.10.2006-23.11.2006, Ramoci Vllaznim) the same Section (VI) opted for an 'extensive' reading of the same provision. In a previous judgment, No. 24705, of 12.7.2006-1.9.2006, Charaf, the Court rejected the claim of maximum time limits for detention on remand pending trial, deciding on a European arrest warrant issued by a French judge.
84. Corte di Cassazione, 'Sezioni Unite', judgment 30.1.2007-5.2.2007, No. 4614, Ramoci Vllaznim; see G. Negri, 'Salvo il mandato d'arresto Ue', Il Sole-24 Ore, 31 Jan. 2007, who stresses how the Corte di Cassazione extensively interprets the Italian implementing act, achieving a more 'European' interpretation of the transnational instrument.
85. In my opinion, the principle formulated by the Corte di Cassazione is the principle of 'equivalence' among different legal orders. It is natural to find a parallelism here with the economic integration of Europe. The scholars that dealt with the functioning of the internal market argued that the mutual recognition principle implies and is strictly related to the equivalence principle. See A. Bernel, Le principe d'équivalence ou de 'reconnaissance mutuelle' en droit communautaire (Zürich, Schulthess Polygraphischer Verl. 1996)
86. more recently, Luisa Torchia, Il governo delle differenze (Bologna, Il Mulino 2006), argued that mutual recognition is one of the 'techniques' giving shape to the equivalence principle: At p. 68, note 31.
87. As argued by Poiares Maduro, mutual recognition in the context of justice and home affairs is 'systemic'. See M. Poiares Maduro, supra n. 30, p. 823.
88. This study does not aim to give a complete survey of case-law on the European Arrest Warrant.
89. The Corte di Cassazione often refers in its judgments to the principle of mutual trust, a conceptual pivot for mutual recognition instruments such as the EAW.
90. In the words of Monica Claes, The National Courts' Mandate in the European Constitution (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2006).
91. In my opinion, the Court goes beyond the duty of consistent interpretation as stated in Pupino by the ECJ. In contrast, the Court seems to apply here a kind of consistent interpretation similar to the domestic concept of interpretazione conforme a Costituzione (interpretation consistent with the Constitution). This is a peculiar interpretation adopted by the Corte Costituzionale to avoid a declaration of unconstitutionality of a piece of legislation, but thus manipulating the literal wording of the legislation. See R. Romboli, 'La natura della Corte costituzionale alla luce della sua giurisprudenza più recente', paper available at .
92. According to the author this case-law is a demonstration of the principle of the universalizability of deliberative choices. See M. Poiares Maduro, 'Contrapunctual law: Europe's Constitutional Pluralism in Action', in N. Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2003) p. 524-525.
93. See also L. Marin,'Il mandato di arresto europeo al vaglio delle cord nazionali: Divergenze e convergenze nell'interpretazione di uno strumento transnazionale europeo', in N. Zanon (ed.), Le Corti dell' integrazione europea e la Corte costituzionale italiana (Napoli, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane 2006) p. 217-238.
94. Judgment of 28.2.2007 of the House of Lords, Dabas, available at but also House of Lords, decision of 17.11.2005, Armas, available at .
95. See N. Padfield, 'The Implementation of the European Arrest Warrant in England and Wales', in this journal, 2007, p. 253 et seq.
96. Corte di Cassazione, Section VI, judgment 8.5.2006-15.5.2006, No. 16542, Cusini.
97. Order (ordinanza) of the Venice Court of Appeal, 24-25.10.2006, published in the Official Journal of the Italian Republic, No. 10 of 7.3.2007 (Constitutional Court series), at .
98. As is well-known, the constitutional courts in Germany, Poland and Cyprus, declared the national acts implementing the Framework Decision unconstitutional, thereby obliging the national parliaments to take their responsibilities, though in different ways and for various reasons. See S. Ninatti, 'Cittadinanza e fiducia reciproca fra Start membri nella sentenza della corte costituzionale tedesca sul mandato d'arresto europeo', in N. Zanon (ed.), supra n. 67, p. 239
99. et seq. and L. Marin, supra n. 67, p. 217-238.
100. I wish to recall here that the Constitutional Court does not deem itself a national judge within the scope of Article 234 EC Treaty, as stated in its order No. 536 of 1995, in . On this issue, see M. Cartabia, "'Taking Dialogue Seriously". The Renewed Need for a Judicial Dialogue at the Time of a Constitutional Activism in the European Union', Jean Monnet Working Paper 12/07 within the series ELINIS - European Legal Integration: The New Italian Scholarship, available at . More recently, the Court partially overruled this position, but only for the proceedings in via principale. See judgment No. 102/2008 and order No. 103/2008.
101. See supra n. 66.
102. Cf. at this purpose the 'Report on the Constitutional case-law of 2006', p. 22-24.
103. Furthermore, this issue was problematic because the provision of the Italian implementing act is the expression of a constitutional fundamental right. Here we are in the sensitive area of the controlimiti. See text between n. 22 and n. 24 supra.
104. The second question has been presented by the 'G.U.P.' (giudice per l'udienza preliminare) of the Tribunale di Bari (Order 27.12.2006, published in the Italian Official Journal No. 21, 30.5.2007).
105. The decision is an 'additive' judgment, according to the theory developed about constitutional adjudication in Italy. This means that in this kind of ruling, the Court, rather than striking down the statute, supplies a missing norm that is necessary to make the statute constitutional, on the basis of the indication of the referring judge (in this case: Tribunale di Bari).
106. The reference is to the famous movie of 1964 directed by Vittorio De Sica starring Sophia Loren and Marcello Mastroianni.
107. Act No. 11 of 2005, the so-called 'Legge Buttiglione', provides for a general parliamentary scrutiny reserve'; and Art. 3 of Act No. 69 of 2005 implementing the Framework Decision provides for a specific scrutiny reserve regarding the extension of the list of crimes for which the double criminality requirement is abolished. See P. Gramble, 'La partecipazione dei Parlamenti nazionali alla fase "ascendente" del diritto comunitario: Modelli stranieri e novità dell' ordinamento italiano', p. 9, Amministrazione in cammino, available at .
108. M. Poiares Maduro, supra n. 30, p. 824-825. On the key role of actors like Parliament and Recognition and the Monopoly of Force: Limits of the Single Market Analogy', 14 Journal of European Public Policy (2007), p. 773.