Human rights and judicial review: A critique of “due deference”

Cambridge Law Journal

Volumn 65, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 671-695

  Allan, T R S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 51249138640     PISSN: 00081973     EISSN: 14692139     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0008197306007264     Document Type: Article

References (64)

1. Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] A.C. 374.
2. de Freitas v. Benny [1976] A.C. 239, at 247.
3. See Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford 2001), chs. 5–6.
4. R. v. DPP, ex p. Kebeline [2002] 2 A.C. 326, 381 (Lord Hope of Craighead).
5. R.A. Edwards, “Judicial Deference Under the Human Rights Act” (2002) 65 M.L.R. 859, 863.
6. M. Hunt, “Sovereignty's Blight: Why Contemporary Public Law Needs the Concept of ‘Due Deference’ in N. Bamforth and P. Leyland (eds.), Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution (Oxford 2003), p. 339.
7. Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution, at p. 340.
8. J. Jowell, “Judicial Deference and Human Rights: A Question of Competence” in P. Craig and R. Rawlings (eds.), Law and Administration in Europe (Oxford 2003).
9. See also Jowell, “Judicial Deference: Servility, Civility or Institutional Capacity” [2003] P.L. 592.
10. “Sovereignty's Blight”, note 6 above, at p. 350.
11. See further Allan, “Legislative Supremacy and Legislative Intention: Interpretation, Meaning, and Authority” [2004] C.L.J. 685, and discussion of ProLife Alliance, note 27 below.
12. International Transport Roth GmbH v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ. 158
13. [2003] Q.B. 728, at [81]-[87].
14. Q.B. at para. [84] (quoting Lord Hope in R. v. Director of Public Prosecutions, ex P. Kebilene [2000] 2 A.C. 326, at p. 381).
15. A.C. at para. [83] (Laws L.J.). See further Allan, “Legislative Supremacy and Legislative Intention”, note 10 above.
16. Cf. D. Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in M. Taggart (ed.), The Province of Administrative Law (Oxford 1997). Dyzenhaus distinguishes between “submissive deference” and “deference as respect”; the latter requires attention to the reasons which might support a legislative or administrative decision.
17. See also J. Rivers, “Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review” [2006] C.L.J. 174, 202–207: the court's level of scrutiny must reflect the seriousness of the limitation of the constitutional right in point.
18. Cf. F. Klug, “Judicial Deference Under the Human Rights Act 1998” [2003] E.H.R.L.R. 125. Klug, however, places much greater weight on the scheme of the 1998 Act to regulate the respective roles of courts and Parliament than (for reasons that will be apparent) I believe it can bear.
19. R (on the application of ProLife Alliance) v. British Broadcasting Corporation [2003] UKHL 23
20. 2004] 1 A.C. 185, at [75].
21. For this interpretation of Lord Hoffmann's views, see Lord Steyn, “Deference: a Tangled Story” [2005] P.L. 346, 354–357.
22. Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Rehman [2001] UKHL 47
23. [2003] 1 A.C. 153, at [50].
24. See Allan, Constitutional Justice, ch. 5. See also D. Feldman, “Human Rights, Terrorism and Risk: The Roles of Politicians and Judges” [2006] P.L. 364, 374–377, comparing the respective bases of legitimacy of the different branches of government.
25. See further Allan, “Common Law Reason and the Limits of Judicial Deference” in D. Dyzenhaus (ed.), The Unity of Public Law (Oxford 2004).
26. R. (on the application of ProLife Alliance) v. British Broadcasting Corporation [2002] EWCA Civ. 297
27. [2003] UKHL 23
28. [2004] 1 A.C. 185. See Broadcasting Act 1990, s. 6(1).
29. [2002] EWCA Civ. 297, at [36].
30. [2003] UKHL 23, at [52]. 32 EWCA Civ. at para. [16].
31. [2003] UKHL 23, at [68].
32. See UKHL. at para. [77]. For cogent criticism, see E. Barendt, “Free Speech and Abortion” [2003] P.L. 580.
33. See further Allan, Constitutional Justice, ch. 2.
34. A and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2 A.C. 68,at [29].
35. Cf. R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. McQuillan [1995] 4 All E.R. 400, 422 (Sedley J.)
36. All E.R. at para. [132] (Lord Hope of Craighead).
37. See also R. Singh, “Equality: The Neglected Virtue” [2004] E.H.R.L.R. 141, 149–152.
38. R. (on the application of Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26, at [27] (Lord Steyn).
39. Cf. R.v. Lord Saville of Newdigate, ex p. A [1999] 4 All E.R. 860, at [37] (Lord Woolf M.R.). The Wednesbury and proportionality tests are not truly distinct modes of review, but only labels for varying degrees of judicial scrutiny along a continuum
40. see M. Elliott, “The Human Rights Act 1998 and the Standard of Substantive Review” [2001] C.L.J. 301, 311–315.
41. Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom (2000) 29 E.H.R.R. 493.
42. R.v.Ministry of Defence, ex p. Smith [1996] 1 All E.R. 257, at p. 263.
43. R. v. Ministry of Defence, ex p. Smith [1995] 4 All E.R. 427, at p. 440.
44. Hunt, “Sovereignty's Blight”, note 6 above, at pp. 344–349.
45. Sovereignty's Blight, at p. 354.
46. Sovereignty's Blight, at pp. 1418–1419.
47. For a similar assessment, see Edwards, “Judicial Deference under the Human Rights Act”, note 5 above, at pp. 881–882.
48. J. Jowell, “Judicial Deference: Servility, Civility or Institutional Capacity?” [2003] P.L. 592, 598.
49. Cf. Rivers, “Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review”, see note 17 above, at p. 192; but see also pp. 203–206.
50. See Feldman, “Human Rights, Terrorism and Risk”, note 25 above.
51. Jowell, “Judicial Deference”, note 57 above, p. 599
52. (see A. Lester and D. Pannick (eds.), Human Rights Law and Practice (London 1999), at para. 3:21).
53. R. v. Ministry of Defence, ex p. Smith [1996] 1 All E.R. 257 (considered above).
54. All E.R. at p. 262.
55. See further Allan, “Common Law Reason and the Limits of Judicial Deference”, note 26 above, pp. 299–301.
56. Lord Steyn, “Deference: a Tangled Story” [2005] P.L. 346, at p. 350.
57. P.L. at p. 352.
58. L.L. Fuller, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” (1978) 92 Harv. L.R. 353, 394–404. An economic market was polycentric, but adjudication was well suited to the task of providing rules for its proper functioning (see p. 403).
59. Harv. L.R. at pp. 365–371.
60. See Allan, Constitutional Justice, pp. 190–191. For useful discussion of the legal enforcement of social and economic rights by constitutional courts
61. see A. Brudner, Constitutional Goods (Oxford 2004), ch. 7, and
62. D.M. Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford 2004), ch. 4.
63. Cf. Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of Deference”, see note 16 above, at p. 302
64. R. v. Lichniak [2002] UKHL 47, at [14] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill).