Too many theories, too few facts? What the data tell us about the link between span of control, compensation and career dynamics

Labour Economics

Volumn 15, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 687-703

  Smeets, Valerie ^a   Warzynski, Frederic ^a  

^a UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

Author keywords

Careers; Hierarchy; J24; J31; M5; Promotions; Span of control; Wage determination

Indexed keywords

EID: 50049095123     PISSN: 09275371     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2007.09.001     Document Type: Article

References (24)

1. Aghion P., and Tirole J. Real and Formal Authority. Journal of Political Economy 105 (1997) 1-29
2. Baker G., Gibbs M., and Holmström B. The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (1994) 881-919
3. Baker G., and Holmström B. Internal Labor Markets: Too Many Theories, Too Few Facts. American Economic Review 85 (1995) 255-259
4. Bolton P., and Dewatripont M. The Firm as a Communication Network. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (1994) 809-839
5. Fox, Jeremy (2006), Explaining Firm Size Wage Gaps with Equilibrium Hierarchies, mimeo, University of Chicago.
6. Garicano L. Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production. Journal of Political Economy 108 (2000) 874-904
7. Garicano, Luis and Hubbard, Thomas N. (2005a), Learning About the Nature of Production from Equilibrium Assignment Patterns, mimeo, Chicago GSB.
8. Garicano L., and Hubbard T.N. Hierarchical Sorting and Learning Costs: Theory and Evidence from the Law. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 58 (2005) 349-369
9. Garicano, Luis and Hubbard, Thomas N. (2006), The Return to Knowledge Hierarchies, mimeo, Chicago GSB.
10. Garicano L., and Rossi-Hansberg E. Organization and Inequality in a Knowledge Economy. Quarterly Journal of Economics 121 (2006) 1383-1435
11. Gibbons R., and Waldman M. A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (1999) 1321-1358
12. Gibbs M., and Hendricks W. Do Formal Salary Systems Really Matter?. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 58 (2004) 71-93
13. Holmström B., and Tirole J. The theory of the firm. In: Schmalensee R., and Willig R. (Eds). Handbook of Industrial Organization vol. I (1989), North Holland 61-133
14. Lazear E.P. "The Peter Principle: A Theory of Decline". Journal of Political Economy 112 (2004) S141-S163
15. Lazear E.P., and Rosen S. Rank Order Tournaments as Optimal Labor Contracts. Journal of Political Economy 89 (1981) 841-864
16. Ortín-Ángel P., and Salas-Fumás V. Compensation and Span of Control in Hierarchical Organizations. Journal of Labor Economics 20 (2002) 848-876
17. Prendergast C. The Provision of Incentives in Firms. Journal of Economic Literature 37 (1999) 7-63
18. Qian Y. Incentives and Loss of Control in an Optimal Hierarchy. Review of Economic Studies 61 (1994) 527-544
19. Radner R. Hierarchy: The Economics of Managing. Journal of Economic Literature 30 (1992) 1382-1415
20. Rajan R.G., and Wulf J. The Flattening of the Firm: Evidence from Panel Data on the Changing Nature of Corporate Hierarchies. NBER Working Paper Nr. 9633 (2003)
21. Rosen S. Authority, control and the distribution of earnings. Bell Journal of Economics 13 (1982) 311-323
22. Rosen S. Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments. American Economic Review 76 (1986) 701-715
23. Smeets V., and Warzynski F. The Internal Biology of the Firm. Team Rotation and Learning about Managerial Ability in a Multinational Firm (2007) work in progress
24. Van Zandt T. Organizations with an Endogenous Number of Information Processing Agents. In: Majumdar M. (Ed). Organizations with Incomplete Information (1998), Cambridge University Press