Are corporate governance and bank monitoring substitutes: Evidence from the perceived value of bank loans

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 14, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 475-483

  Byers, Steven S ^a   Fields, L Paige ^b   Fraser, Donald R ^b  

^a IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Governance; Loan announcements returns

Indexed keywords

EID: 50049089754     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.06.002     Document Type: Article

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