Aggregation of attack relations: A social-choice theoretical analysis of defeasibility criteria

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 4932 LNCS, Issue , 2008, Pages 8-23

  Tohmé, Fernando A ^a   Bodanza, Gustavo A ^a   Simari, Guillermo R ^a  

^a UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DEL SUR   (Argentina)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CANNING; DECISION THEORY; ELECTRIC NETWORK ANALYSIS; FOUNDATIONS;

ACYCLICITY; AGGREGATION PROCESSING; DEFEASIBILITY; INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM; KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS; PRE FILTERING; SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY; THEORETICAL ANALYSIS;

AGGLOMERATION;

EID: 49949109173     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-77684-0_4     Document Type: Conference Paper

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