What should egalitarians believe?

Philosophy and Public Affairs

Volumn 36, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 119-156

  O'Neill, Martin ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 49549117150     PISSN: 00483915     EISSN: 10884963     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1088-4963.2008.00130.x     Document Type: Article

References (69)

1. For comments on earlier versions of this article, or for useful discussion of the issues that it treats, I am very grateful to Richard Arneson, Duncan Bell, David Birks, Paul Bou-Habib, Christopher Brooke, Kimberley Brownlee, Clare Carlisle, Ian Carroll, Richard Child, Sarah Fine, Marc Fleurbaey, Axel Gosseries, Simon Hailwood, Alan Hamlin, Daniel Hill, Nien-hêHseih, Robert Jubb, Mary Leng, Stephen McLeod, Lionel McPherson, Ed Miliband, David Miller, Kieran Oberman, John O'Neill, Charles Parsons, Phil Parvin, Simon Rippon, John Salter, Andrea Sangiovanni, Christian Schemmel, Stephen de Wijze, Thad Williamson, Jonathan Wolff, and audiences at the Nuffield Political Theory Workshop at Nuffield College, Oxford, the Stapledon Philosophy Colloquium at the University of Liverpool, the MANCEPT Research Seminar at the University of Manchester, and the 2008 APA Central Division meeting in Chicago. For extremely helpful written comments, I am especially grateful to Waheed Hussain, Seth Lazar, Shepley Orr, Rodney Roberts, Hillel Steiner, Zofia Stemplowska, Adam Swift, Andrew Williams, Gabriel Wollner, and the Editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs. I would also like to register my particular thanks to Serena Olsaretti, with whom I co-taught a seminar on 'Justice and Equality' at the University of Cambridge in Michaelmas 2004 that greatly advanced my thinking on these issues; to T. M. Scanlon for guidance and encouragement; and to Derek Parfit for richly illuminating responses to several drafts. I am pleased to acknowledge the generous research support of St. John's College, Cambridge, and of the Hallsworth Fund of the University of Manchester.
2. Derek Parfit, "Equality or Priority?" Lindley Lectures Delivered at the University of Kansas (Lawrence, Kansas: 1991). Reprinted in The Ideal of Equality, ed. Matthew Clayton and Andrew Williams (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), pp. 81-125. All subsequent references to Parfit's article are to this reprinting.
3. See Parfit, "Equality or Priority?" p. 84.
4. Ibid., p. 84.
5. Ibid., p. 90.
6. See Parfit, ibid., p. 90: "We can now redescribe my two kinds of Egalitarian. On the Telic view, inequality is bad; on the Deontic view, it is unjust."
7. Ibid., p. 88.
8. Ibid., p. 90.
9. Ibid., p. 90.
10. See, for example,
11. Dennis McKerlie, "Equality," Ethics 106 (1996): 274-96
12. See T. M. Scanlon, "The Diversity of Objections to Inequality,"delivered as the Lindley Lecture at the University of Kansas (Lawrence, Kansas: 1996), reprinted in his The Difficulty of Tolerance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 202-18. Scanlon also gives two further kinds of considerations in favor of reducing inequality, both of which are more purely Deontic, in Parfit's sense. These egalitarian reasons are given by the fact that "some forms of equality are essential preconditions for the fairness of certain procedures"(p. 205) and because "procedural fairness sometimes supports a case for equality of outcomes"(p. 207). That both types of consideration involve a version of Deontic egalitarianism is clear from the connection drawn between equality and fair or just procedures. See also T. M. Scanlon, "When Does Equality Matter?,"unpublished manuscript, where he characterizes these kinds of reasons under the headings 'Procedural Fairness' and 'Unequal Benefits', respectively.
13. See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 131.
14. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, pp. 130-31 (§39, "Comments on Equality"). Like Scanlon, Rawls also gives more purely Deontic considerations in favor of reducing inequality, relating to the significance of fair procedures. See also John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), pp. 244-48. Rawls acknowledges his indebtedness to Scanlon with regard to his treatment of "the reasons for regulating social and economic inequalities"(Justice as Fairness, p. 130) in both books. (See Justice as Fairness, p. 130, fn. 48; Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, p. 246, fn. 6.)
15. Rawls also addresses the ways in which the effects of inequality can be bad in The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), §16.1, "Equality among Peoples,"pp. 113-15. Here, Rawls retains the focus on suffering and basic needs (i.e., consideration [a]), and on the deontic idea of procedural fairness, as well as on self-respect, servility, and deference (i.e., consideration [b]). It is interesting to note, however, that, as against the discussion in Justice as Fairness, Rawls does not emphasize the badness of inequality in terms of its giving rise to relations of domination in The Law of Peoples. One may speculate that, had Rawls allowed the particular significance of considerations of relations of domination in his discussion of equality among 'peoples', then, given the prevalence of such relations in the interactions of wealthy 'peoples' with poorer 'peoples', it would have been much more difficult for him to maintain his objections to more robustly egalitarian or redistributive forms of international distributive justice. But I shall not pursue this thought within the bounds of the present discussion.
16. Parfit, ibid., p. 86. See also Thomas Nagel, "Equality,"in his Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 106-27, esp. at p. 106.
17. Ibid., p. 86. See also Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 131.
18. See Nagel, "Equality," p. 108, where he says that: "There are two kinds of argument for the intrinsic value of equality, communitarian and individualistic. According to the communitarian argument, equality is good for a society taken as a whole. It is a condition of the right kind of relations among its members, and of the formation in them of healthy fraternal attitudes, desires and sympathies." Having identified the 'communitarian' argument for equality, Nagel then moves on in his essay to devote his attention solely to 'individualistic' arguments. As Parfit rightly points out (Parfit, ibid., p. 86), Nagel's terminology is somewhat misleading here, as he takes himself to be discussing different kinds of argument for the intrinsic value of equality. It would be more natural to think of these 'communitarian' considerations as supporting an instrumental or non-intrinsic understanding of the value of equality.
19. We may, for example, share Rousseau's belief that equality is necessary for the preservation of freedom. As Rousseau famously puts it at the start of Chapter 11 of Book 2 of The Social Contract: "If one inquires precisely into what the greatest good of all consists in, which ought to be the end of every system of legislation, one will find that it comes down to these two principal objects, freedom and equality. Freedom, because any individual dependence is that much force taken away from the State; equality, because freedom cannot subsist without it." (See Rousseau, "Of the Social Contract," 2: 11.1, in The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings, ed. Victor Gourevitch [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997], p. 78.)
20. Alternatively, we might believe that distributive equality is important because the distribution of property rights within the economy has a deep effect on the distribution of (negative) freedom. For example, consider G. A. Cohen's convincing argument that the distribution of money (or, more generally, of sets of property-entitlements) in an economy amounts to a particular distribution of freedoms and unfreedoms. If Cohen is right about the relationship between money and freedom, then it might turn out that the best way to maximize overall freedom within a society would be to equalize individuals' economic position. This would generate another potential line of argument in favor of distributive equality. See Cohen's important paper on "Freedom and Money," published online at http://www.utdt.edu/Upload/_115634753114776100.pdf (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Universidad Torcuato di Tella, 2001); see also G. A. Cohen, "Capitalism, Freedom and the Proletariat," in The Idea of Freedom: Essays in Honour of Isaiah Berlin, ed. Alan Ryan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979); G. A. Cohen, "Appendix: On Money and Liberty," in Equality, ed. Jane Franklin (London: Institute of Public Policy Research, 1997); and Jeremy Waldron, "Mr. Morgan's Yacht," in The Egalitarian Conscience: Essays in Honour of G. A. Cohen, ed. Christine Sypnowich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). I shall not pursue these 'freedom-based' lines of argument within this article, but merely note them as potential alternative ways of arguing for distributive equality from premises that are not themselves fundamentally egalitarian.
21. See Scanlon, "The Diversity of Objections to Inequality," p. 204.
22. Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 131.
23. In which claim Rawls takes himself explicitly to be echoing the Rousseau of the Discourse on the Origins of Inequality. See Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 131, fn. 50.
24. Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 131. See also Rawls's discussion of Rousseau's ideas on equality, in John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, pp. 244-48.
25. As Rawls puts it, this "suggests Rousseau's solution, followed (with modifications) in justice as fairness: Namely, the fundamental status in political society is to be equal citizenship, a status all have as free and equal persons. (See Rousseau, Social Contract [1762])." See Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 132; and also Rawls, Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, pp. 246-48.
26. See Rawls, Justice as Fairness, pp. 23-24; or, for Rawls's earlier usage of "self- originating sources of valid claims," see
27. John Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): 515-72,
28. For elaboration of a general conception of respect for persons as involving an irreducibly 'second-personal' element, see
29. Stephen Darwall, "Respect and the Second-Person Standpoint" Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 78(2004): 43-59
30. As Rawls puts it at Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, p. 248: "Given our needs as persons and our natural indignation at being subject to the arbitrary power of others (a power that makes us do what they want, and not what we both can will as equals) the clear answer to the problem of inequality is equality at the highest level, as formulated in the social compact" [my emphasis].
31. Scanlon, "Diversity of Objections to Inequality," pp. 204-05.
32. There is therefore a sense in which Non-Intrinsic egalitarianism is itself a Rousseauvian position. A detailed discussion of Rousseau's views on equality, and of his endorsement of the Non-Intrinsic egalitarian considerations (b)-(f), is outside the scope of the current discussion. But we should not be surprised that considerations (b)-(f) should occur together in the work of an egalitarian political theorist like Rousseau; for these five kinds of egalitarian reasons intersect with one another, and find a common home in a plausible egalitarian vision of the characteristics that a society of equals must have. For Rousseau's views, see Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men, Or Second Discourse," in The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); "Of the Social Contract," in The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings, ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and Emile, Or On Education, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979). For instructive discussion of the relationship between equality, domination, status, and amour-propre in Rousseau's writings, see Christopher Bertram, Rousseau and the Social Contract (London: Routledge, 2004), esp. chaps. 2 and 5; Nicholas Dent, Rousseau (London: Routledge, 2005), esp. pp. 39-41, 57-74, and 104-07; and John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, pp. 189-248, esp. pp. 231-35 and 244-48. On the wide view of amour-propre defended by both Dent and Rawls, amour-propre is, in Kant's terms, "originally a desire merely for equality." See Rawls, ibid., pp. 198-99; Dent, ibid., pp. 104-05; and Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, ed. Allen Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), Book I, Section 1, Ak: VI: 27, p. 51.
33. On equality as a social ideal, see also
34. Elizabeth Anderson, "What Is the Point of Equality?" Ethics 109(1999): 287-337
35. Samuel Scheffler, "What Is Egalitarianism?" Philosophy & Public Affairs 31(2003): 5-39,
36. "Choice, Circumstance, and the Value of Equality," Politics, Philosophy and Economics 4(2005): 229-53
37. Recall that, as Parfit puts it, "we may think it bad for people if they are servile or too deferential, even if this does not frustrate their desires, or affect their experienced well being" (Parfit, ibid., p. 86).
38. I therefore certainly agree with A. J. Julius, in his claim that "the opposition between deontological and teleological or consequentialist ethical views does not offer a notably stable or informative map of many of the disagreements that are routinely referred to it" (see
39. A. J. Julius, "Basic Structure and the Value of Equality," Philosophy & Public Affairs 31 [2003]: 321-55,
40. See Parfit, "Equality or Priority?" p. 84.
41. See Scanlon, "Diversity of Objections to Inequality," esp. pp. 205-12; and Scanlon, "When Does Equality Matter?" esp. pp. 9, 15-30, 34-35. See also Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 131; Rawls, Law of Peoples, pp. 114-15; and Rawls, Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, p. 246.
42. As Rawls puts it in Justice as Fairness, p. 131: "Monopoly and its kindred are to be avoided, not simply for their bad effects, among them inefficiency, but also because without special justification they make markets unfair. Much the same is true of elections influenced by the dominance of a wealthy few in politics."
43. See Scanlon, "Diversity of Objections to Inequality," esp. pp. 205-08, 210-12; and Scanlon," When Does Equality Matter?" esp. pp. 9-13, 35.
44. See Scanlon, "When Does Equality Matter?" pp. 10-11.
45. This example occurs at Parfit, ibid., p. 87.
46. See, for example,
47. Michael Blake, "Distributive Justice, State Coercion and Autonomy," Philosophy & Public Affairs 30(2002): 257-96
48. Thomas Nagel, "The Problem of Global Justice," Philosophy & Public Affairs 33(2005): 113-47
49. Andrea Sangiovanni, "Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State," Philosophy & Public Affairs 35(2007): 3-39.
50. I am grateful to an Editor of Philosophy & Public Affairs for pushing me towards greater clarity on this point.
51. See Thomas Nagel, "The Problem of Global Justice," ibid.; and
52. Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel, "Extra Rempublicam Nulla Justicia?" Philosophy & Public Affairs 34(2006): 147-75.
53. Cohen and Sabel, "Extra Rempublicam Nulla Justicia?" p. 148.
54. On the distinction between "globalism" and "internationalism," see Andrea Sangiovanni, "Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State," pp. 6-7. Non-Intrinsic egalitarianism does not fit easily on either side of this distinction.
55. We might say that, according to Non-Intrinsic egalitarianism, the (degree of) badness of distributive inequalities is (in part) determined by the nature of social relations. But this does not mean that Non-Intrinsic egalitarianism is a "relational view" of equality, in the sense introduced by Andrea Sangiovanni. Relational views hold that "the practice-mediated relations in which individuals stand condition the content, scope, and justification" of distributive principles (see Sangiovanni, "Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State," pp. 5-6). It is no part of Non-Intrinsic egalitarianism that the "content, scope or justification" of the demands of equality are themselves generated by social relations; rather, social relations are significant with regard to the application of egalitarian considerations. Thus, although it is centrally concerned with social relations, Non-Intrinsic egalitarianism is, in Sangiovanni's terminology, a nonrelational view.
56. Parfit, "Equality or Priority?" p. 99.
57. As Scanlon puts it ("The Diversity of Objections to Inequality," p. 203): "Opponents of equality can seem most convincing when they can portray equality as a peculiarly abstract goal-conformity to a certain pattern-to which special moral value is attached." I would contend that (pure) Telic egalitarianism portrays equality as just such a peculiarly abstract (and correspondingly fragile) goal.
58. Parfit, ibid., p. 98. For earlier presentations of versions of the Levelling Down Objection, see Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), chap. 9; and Larry Temkin, Inequality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), chap. 9.
59. Parfit, ibid., p. 99.
60. As Parfit puts it (ibid., p. 99): "If we are impressed by the Levelling Down Objection, we may be tempted by the Deontic View."
61. Parfit, ibid., p. 116.
62. I am grateful to an Editor of Philosophy & Public Affairs for pushing me towards greater clarity with regard to the content of Deontic egalitarian views.
63. I cannot defend these claims in detail within the bounds of the current discussion, but simply make the point that, given the force and significance of egalitarian considerations, both on their own terms, and in terms of their place within an overall concern with social justice, we should not be unduly concerned that adopting 'pluralist egalitarianism'involves marginalizing the place of equality. One might say that, once one gives one's attention to the content of such considerations, one thereby also sees their considerable force. I am grateful to an Editor of Philosophy & Public Affairs for pushing me to address these concerns.
64. On the distinction between personal and impersonal reasons, see T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), chap. 5, sec. 7, pp. 218-23.
65. I am grateful to Seth Lazar, Adam Swift, and Andrew Williams for helpful discussion of the personal and impersonal aspects of the value of equality.
66. For the claim that Non-Intrinsic egalitarianism can be seen as a broadly Telic egalitarian view, given that it appeals to the ways in which states of affairs can be valuable or disvaluable, see Section I above.
67. It should be emphasized that nothing here turns on the precise magnitude of well-being for individuals in (6) being less than in Situation (4). The distribution of individual well-being, as such, could be identical in the two cases. What is salient to the difference between the two sets of situations is the difference in the overall description of the two cases, including their instantiation of the impersonal aspects of the values embedded in egalitarian considerations (b)-(f).
68. I am grateful to an Editor of Philosophy & Public Affairs for very helpful comments relating to these kinds of Levelling Down cases.
69. Parfit, "Equality or Priority?" p. 103.