Global justice, reciprocity, and the state

Philosophy and Public Affairs

Volumn 35, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 3-39

  Sangiovanni, Andrea ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33846708498     PISSN: 00483915     EISSN: 10884963     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1088-4963.2007.00097.x     Document Type: Article

References (88)

1. For many helpful comments and suggestions, I would like to thank Duncan Bell, Matthew Clayton, Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Fabian Freyenhagen, Nancy Kokaz, Matthew Kramer, Melissa Lane, Catherine Lu, Andrew Moravcsik, Glyn Morgan, Richard Tuck, and Andrew Williams. I am particularly indebted to Paul Bou-Habib, Serena Olsaretti, Martin O'Neill, Martin Sandbu, and Leif Wenar for detailed comments, criticism, and extensive discussion. I am also grateful to the Editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs for a number of extremely valuable suggestions for improvement.
2. These criteria are borrowed from
3. Thomas Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty" Ethics 103 (1992): 48-75
4. Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Cambridge: Polity, 2002), p. 95.
5. By 'equality is a demand of justice' (and related terms, e.g., 'egalitarianism'), I mean any conception of socioeconomic justice that aims to limit the range of permissible social inequalities among individuals. The term is intended to be neutral with respect to both the distribuendum (resources, capabilities, and so on) and the particular principle (priority, maximin, and so on). I return to this below.
6. By 'international' order, I mean those practices, institutions, and regimes that govern relations among states. Included are international institutions with less than global scope, such as the Council of Europe. By 'global' order, I mean both the institutions of the international order as well as transnational, transgovernmental, and supranational, formal and informal, networks and institutions that mediate relations among public and nonpublic agents beyond the state. Examples include the Basle Committee, NGOs, transnational regulatory networks, and so on. See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972).
7. I will assume that all plausible criteria of distributive justice, whether national, international, or global, must at least require raising all human beings to a minimal threshold defined in terms of access to basic goods, including clothing, shelter, food, and sanitation. Although I cannot defend this stipulation in any detail here, all of the major forms of 'internationalism' (on which more below) accept it as a starting point. Though more urgent politically, such a humanitarian minimum is less controversial among philosophers (although there is a great variety of paths to the conclusion). The philosophically more difficult and controversial question is how to identify the level or domain to which we should assign equality as a demand of justice, and, more importantly, why. Nothing I will say below, for example, should be taken as contradicting Pogge's later thesis that our joint imposition of the current global order makes us negatively responsible for massive human rights violations. See, e.g.,
8. Thomas Pogge, "Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties" Ethics & International Affairs 19 (2005): 55-83.
9. See Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983); David Miller, Citizenship and National Identity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000).
10. See, e.g.,
11. Thomas Nagel, "The Problem of Global Justice" Philosophy & Public Affairs 33(2005): 113-47
12. Michael Blake, "Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy" Philosophy & Public Affairs 30(2001): 257-96
13. Rawls writes, "The correct regulative principle for a thing depends on the nature of that thing" in A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 25. See also Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 262, and "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," in Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman, pp. 305-6. Rawls's frequent reference (after at least 1980) to the idea that basic conceptions of society and person must be drawn from the public political culture of a society suggests that he draws on both forms of relationism that I have identified (rather than simply what we might call the institutionalist variant listed in n. 7). The Law of Peoples, in particular, seems to rely much more explicitly on the idea that principles of justice must be constructed not only from an account of the institutionally mediated relations in which people stand but also from shared cultural beliefs and practices. I cannot explore this any further here.
14. The distinction between relational and nonrelational conceptions is different than Liam Murphy's distinction between 'monism' and 'dualism.' Relational conceptions are agnostic on the question of whether principles of distributive justice apply first and foremost to individual conduct (and to institutions only derivatively). Relational conceptions only say that for principles of distributive justice to apply at all, whether to individuals or to institutions, individuals must stand in an appropriate relationship. See
15. Liam B. Murphy, "Institutions and the Demands of Justice" Philosophy & Public Affairs 27(1998): 251-91
16. See, e.g., Larry Temkin, Inequality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 13, and
17. Richard Arneson, "Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism" Ethics 110(2000): 339-49
18. We will consider this nonrelational form of the Rawlsian argument in more detail below.
19. Hence, internationalism is consistent with what Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel label "weak statism"
20. ("Extra Rempublicam Nulla Justicia" Philosophy & Public Affairs 34[2006]: 147-75).
21. Nagel, "Global Justice," e.g., argues that the early Beitz and Pogge are (in his terms) "cosmopolitans," and hence hold (in our terms) nonrelational conceptions of justice. Nagel does not explicitly recognize that the distinction between relational and nonrelational views partially cuts across the distinction between globalist and internationalist conceptions of justice. For this point, see also
22. A. J. Julius, "Nagel's Atlas" Philosophy & Public Affairs 34(2006): 176-92.
23. This definition is rough, but no more precise definition is needed or given by Blake.
24. Blake, "Distributive Justice" at p. 265.
25. Blake, "Distributive Justice," at pp. 282-83. The move from hypothetical consent to the difference principle may seem too quick. Blake refers to Rawls's argument from the original position to support this inference, but why make the further claim? The best way to read Blake, I believe, is that he has established that worst-off subjects of a state are owed a special justification for the pattern of entitlements facing them that worst-off subjects of the global institutional order are not. His reference to Rawls's original position would then represent an example of how to move from hypothetical consent to a form of strong egalitarianism, but would not commit him to that conclusion. A similar strategy is pursued below.
26. On this point, see Rawls, Theory, p. 302; Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 36.
27. See the excellent discussion in Serena Olsaretti, Liberty, Desert and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), chap. 6.
28. For this distinction, I follow Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 25-27.
29. Inter-, trans-, and supranational institutions have a crucial impact on the property regime governing the distribution of benefits and burdens in any modern economy, and hence the holdings and transfers available to citizens, so it would be implausible to argue, once we no longer employ coercion as a premise, that only states exercise authority over property entitlements. Here are some examples: The TRIPS agreement sets justiciable standards for intellectual property rights, which protect inter alia patents and copyrights (e.g., to HIV-retroviral drugs, preventing the distribution of generics); international law confers legal rights to the appropriation and sale of natural resources as well as the right to borrow internationally; international antitrust law regulates cross-border mergers and acquisitions; IMF conditionality agreements fundamentally shape domestic social and economic policy. Although such norms and regulations are not backed by centralized sanctions, compliance with them is generally (and perhaps surprisingly) high. See the useful survey in
30. Beth Simmons, "Compliance with International Agreements" Annual Review of Political Science 1(1998): 75-93.
31. On the compatibility between political authority and autonomy, see Joseph Raz, "Government by Consent," in Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 357-69.
32. Nagel, "Global Justice,"at p. 128-29.
33. Nagel, "Global Justice,"at p. 129n.
34. I am indebted to Julius, "Nagel's Atlas" for the distinction between triggering a demand for special justification because one takes a certain moral attitude towards one's imposition of terms as opposed to merely imposing terms regardless of one's attitude.
35. See, e.g., "Review and Conclusion" and the end of chapter 21 of Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. R. Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). In both cases, Hobbes makes it clear that active compliance (even if it is coerced or 'nonvoluntary' in our terms but not Hobbes's) is a necessary and sufficient condition of both authorship and legitimacy. Nagel agrees with the first claim, namely that we are authors if and only if we actively comply, but disagrees with the second, namely that such compliance is sufficient for legitimacy.
36. For the second claim, see Cohen and Sabel, "Extra Rempublicam Nulla Justitia?"
37. For this argument, see Nagel, Equality and Partiality, esp. chap. 4, 7, and 10.
38. "Extra Rempublicam,"p. 161.
39. Cf. also Nagel's skepticism regarding the possibility of constructing 'continuous' theories of distributive justice, which vary in content with the character of the inter-, supra-, and transnational relations in which people stand, in "Global Justice," pp. 140-43.
40. Consider, for example, that the EU civil service is the size of a medium-sized European city; that its budget is capped at 1.23 percent of EU GDP compared with about 40 to 50 percent in each of the member states; it possesses no independent police force or army; and its competences are circumscribed, and, when compared to the modern state, quite limited (although expansive when compared to other inter-, supra-, and transnational institutions). See, e.g.,
41. Andrew Moravcsik, "In Defense of the 'Democratic Deficit': Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union," Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (2002): 603-24
42. Giandomenico Majone, "Delegation of Regulatory Powers in a Mixed Polity," European Law Journal 8 (2002): 319-39
43. RenéDehousse, "European Institutional Architecture after Amsterdam: Parliamentary System or Regulatory Structure?" Common Market Law Review 35(1998): 595-627.
44. Peter Evans, "The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization," World Politics 50 (1997):62-87
45. Rawls, Theory, p. 73. Egalitarian theories which include the argument from moral arbitrariness as a premise include inter alia Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000);
46. G. A. Cohen, "On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice," Ethics 99 (1989): 906-44
47. Richard Arneson, "Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare," Philosophical Studies 56 (1989): 77-93.
48. There is a recent debate regarding how important the argument from moral arbitrariness is within justice as fairness. See, e.g.,
49. Samuel Scheffler, "What Is Egalitarianism?" Philosophy & Public Affairs 31(2003): 5-39
50. E.g.,
51. Elizabeth S. Anderson, "What Is the Point of Equality?" Ethics 109(1999): 287-337.
52. I am indebted to Mathias Risse and Michael Blake (2004), "Two Models of Equality and Responsibility," KSG Working Paper Series, no. RWP04-032, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University) for this way of putting the distinction.
53. Cf. Rawls's own discussion of this example in Rawls, Theory, pp. 267-72.
54. See, e.g., Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 61-62.
55. See David A. J. Richards, "International Distributive Justice," in Ethics, Economics, and the Law, ed. J. R. Pennock and J. W. Chapman (New York: New York University Press, 1982);
56. Charles R. Beitz, "Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment," The Journal of Philosophy 80 (1983): 591-600
57. Cf. Nagel, Equality and Partiality, p. 113.
58. I am indebted here to discussion in
59. Allan Gibbard, "Constructing Justice," Philosophy & Public Affairs 20 (1991): 264-79,
60. There are two important differences here from classical arguments for obligations of fair play. First, RBI is used to motivate the argument from moral arbitrariness, rather than to explain why citizens have an obligation to obey just laws. Second, on the view I am defending, voluntary submission to the system of rules in question is not necessary for obligations of reciprocity of the relevant kind to apply. For the second point, and its connection to the provision of collective goods, see
61. Richard Arneson, "The Principle of Fairness and Free-Rider Problems," Ethics 92 (1982): 616-33.
62. Of course, this does not imply that I endorse that reasoning. My point is only that the argument, whatever its merits, could be given an interpretation within RBI.
63. p. 139.
64. I believe that this is the best way to understand, in turn, Rawls's reference to the distribution of natural endowments as a 'common asset.' What makes possible the benefits we can derive individually from social cooperation is only in part the use of our own natural endowments, taken in isolation; more importantly, the specialized use we can make of our natural endowments within any modern market requires the participation and cooperation of millions of others in a political, social, and economic division of labor backed up and enabled by the state. For the connection between the idea of 'common assets' and reciprocity, see Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, pp. 75-77.
65. What about people who are able but unwilling to work? If they continue to comply with the laws (and if they continue to pay taxes, assuming they have any to pay), they are participating and contributing to the maintenance of the state according to RBI, hence aiding in the mutual provision of a system of societal norms which allows me, along with others, to develop and make use of my talents and abilities. They are, therefore, rightful beneficiaries of equality as a demand of justice. This leaves open whether it would be legitimate to scale the benefits to which they are entitled by their willingness to search for work (given the ability). The important point is that such scaling would itself have to be justified in terms of a conception of distributive egalitarianism. On the notion of 'workfare' and its connection to reciprocity, see
66. Stuart White, "Liberal Equality, Exploitation, and the Case for an Unconditional Basic Income," Political Studies 45(1997): 312-26.
67. Cf. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1985).
68. Cf. the beginning of Sovereign Virtue, where Dworkin claims that equality is the "virtue of sovereigns."He writes:" A political community that exercises dominion over its own citizens, and demands from them allegiance and obedience to its laws, must take an impartial, objective attitude to them all. "He does not say why equality is a responsibility solely of "sovereigns" to their citizens, but he seems to endorse some version of coercion-based internationalism, given his reference to the demands of "obedience" and "dominion" (p. 6). The key point, however, is that the appeal to coercion could be easily replaced by an appeal to reciprocity using the armature of RBI. Appealing to the reciprocity-based view, we could say that equality of resources (through which the distinction between brute and option luck operates) only applies among those who together jointly provide the collective goods typical of life in a state. On this interpretation, the envy-test as deployed in both the initial auction and later use of a hypothetical insurance market would represent the fair return which citizens and residents owe one another for their support of the state.
69. For this point, I am indebted to
70. Samuel Scheffler, "What Is Egalitarianism?" Philosophy & Public Affairs 31(2003): 5-39
71. Harriet McBryde Johnson, "Unspeakable Conversations," New York Times Magazine, February 13, 2003. Appeals to reciprocity in the Disability Rights Movement are common. See, e.g.,
72. Steven R. Smith, "The Social Construction of Talent: A Defense of Justice as Reciprocity," Journal of Political Philosophy 9(2001): 19-37.
73. What about the very severely disabled, those, that is, who cannot contribute or cooperate in any way to the reproduction of the state, and who would not have the capability to do so under any feasible scheme? RBI would say, in this case, that they do not have any claims deriving from a conception of distributive equality. This does not mean, however, that they have no claims in justice. They have claims which derive from their equal moral worth and dignity as human beings, which include claims to the alleviation of suffering and pain, where possible. Cf.
74. Robert E. Goodin, "What Is So Special About Our Fellow Countrymen?" Ethics 98(1988): 663-86
75. Allen Buchanan, "Justice as Reciprocity Versus Subject-Centered Justice," Philosophy & Public Affairs 19 (1990): 227-52.
76. "Three Deaths in China Reveal Disparity in Price of Lives," New York Times, April 14, 2006. By considering such a 'microcase,' I do not mean to imply that one could not evaluate the justice of the Chinese basic structure as a complete system. The example is meant to elicit our considered judgments, rather than to provide an example of how to apply a conception of justice to a specific case, which would require much more information than we can provide here.
77. David Miller, "What's Left of the Welfare State?" Social Philosophy & Policy 20(2003): 92-112
78. Steffen Mau, "Welfare Regimes and the Norms of Social Exchange," Current Sociology 52 (2004): 53-74.
79. For disabled veterans, see, e.g., Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992). For workers (the so-called Soldiers of Industry), see, e.g., the 1942 Beveridge Report (discussing the idea that the solidarity of the war effort should continue in the responsibilities of the state for its citizens). See also Richard Morris Titmuss, "War and Social Policy,"in The Philosophy of Welfare: Selected Writings, ed. Brian Abel-Smith and Kay Titmuss (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987). In economics, see, e.g., Bowles and Gintis, who write, "In the advanced economies, a substantial fraction of total income is regularly transferred from the better off to the less well off, with the approval of the electorate... We find that voters support the welfare state because it conforms to deeply held norms of reciprocity and conditional obligations to others"
80. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, "Reciprocity, Self-Interest and the Welfare State," Nordic Journal of Political Economy 26 [2000]: 33-53
81. Assar Lindbeck et al., "Social Norms and Economic Incentives in the Welfare State," Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(1999): 1-35
82. Ernst Fehr et al., "Strong Reciprocity, Human Cooperation, and the Enforcement of Social Norms," Human Nature 13(2002): 1-25.
83. Cf. Miller, "What's Left of the Welfare State?"See also the distinction between the "welfare state"and a "property-owning democracy"in Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, pp. 138-39.
84. Kok-Chor Tan, Justice without Borders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 59, quoting Beitz, "Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment,"at p. 595.
85. Tan, Justice without Borders, p. 175; see also Samuel Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) on the "distributive objection."
86. Cf. Peter Singer, One World (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 169-70.
87. J. H. Carens, "Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders," The Review of Politics 49 (1987): 251-73.
88. For the last claim, see Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, chap. 7.