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Volumn 64, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 171-192

Revenue equivalence revisited

Author keywords

Ascending auctions; Bidder preferences; Endogenous entry; Private values; Sealed bid auctions

Indexed keywords


EID: 48649091628     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.01.003     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (19)

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