Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and sovereign risk premia in EMU

Public Choice

Volumn 136, Issue 3-4, 2008, Pages 379-396

  Hallerberg, Mark ^a,b   Wolff, Guntram B ^c  

^a HERTIE SCHOOL OF GOVERNANCE   (Germany)

^b EMORY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

Budget institutions; EMU; Fiscal policy; Fiscal rules; Sovereign risk premia

Indexed keywords

EID: 48349089604     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9301-2     Document Type: Article

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