Moral hazard, income taxation and prospect theory

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 110, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 321-337

  Kanbur, Ravi ^a   Pirttilä, Jukka ^b   Tuomala, Matti ^c  

^a Cornell University ^*  (United States)

^b LABOUR INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (Finland)

^c TAMPERE UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Finland)

Author keywords

Income uncertainty; Loss aversion; Moral hazard; Prospect theory; Redistributive taxation

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC THEORY; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; INCOME; INCOME DISTRIBUTION; OPTIMIZATION; TAX SYSTEM; UNCERTAINTY ROLE; WELFARE ECONOMICS;

EID: 48249090900     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: 14679442     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2008.00541.x     Document Type: Article

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