Modelling real P2P networks: The effect of altruism

Proceedings - P2P - 7th IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 19-26

  Vassilakis, Dimitrios K ^a   Vassalos, Vasilis ^a  

^a ATHENS UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Greece)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALTRUISTIC BEHAVIORS; EMPIRICAL EVIDENCES; INCENTIVE MECHANISMS; INTRINSIC PARAMETERS; NASH EQUILIBRIUMS; NETWORK BEHAVIORS; P2P NETWORKS; PEER-TO-PEER NETWORKS;

CLIENT SERVER COMPUTER SYSTEMS; DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS;

PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS;

EID: 47949125184     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/P2P.2007.4343460     Document Type: Conference Paper

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