Race-specific patents, commercialization, and intellectual property policy

Buffalo Law Review

Volumn 56, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 409-494

  Ghosh, Shubha ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

^b Southern Methodist University

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 47149109465     PISSN: 00239356     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (389)

1. For the most recent academic study critiquing the United States patent system, see JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 5 (2008) ("Overall, the performance of the patent system has rapidly deteriorated in recent years. By the late 1990s, the costs that patents imposed on public firms outweighed the benefits.").
2. See, e.g., Patent Problems, BUS. STANDARD (India), Jan. 9, 2008, at 11 ("[T]he scope for misleading the patent office to get frivolous patents or even ever-greening patents through selective information disclosure cannot be ruled out. It is, therefore, important for the patent office to provide electronic access to the proceedings leading to the grant of patent, including examination reports, so as to ensure transparency and fair play.").
3. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.").
4. See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 170 (2004) (stating that the pathologies of the patent system "undermine the very incentives it is designed to create").
5. See, e.g., Amy Barrett, Color-Blind Drug Research is Myopic; More - Not Less-Study Is Needed on the Ways Different Races Respond, BUS. WK., June 27, 2005, at 44;
6. Stephanie Saul, F.D.A. Approves a Heart Drug for African-Americans, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2005, at C2;
7. Christopher J. Gearon, The Heart of the Matter, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 15, 2005, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/ biztech/articles/050523/23eehospitals.htm.
8. 4 is not a hydrogen.
9. Id. col.17 1.53-col.18 1.57 (emphasis added). Claim 2 is a dependent claim that refers to Claim 1 but limits it to the case "wherein the black patient has a less active renin-angiotensin system relative to a white patient."
10. Id. col. 18 11.58-60. Finally, Claim 3 also depends on Claim 1 but limits it to the case "wherein the black patient has hypertension."
11. Id. col.18 11.61-62.
12. See Sabine Steimle, Critics Question BRCA2 Patent Decision in Europe, 97 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1326, 1326 (2005).
13. See Ronald M. Green & A. Mathew Thomas, DNA: Five Distinguishing Features for Policy Analysis, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 571, 586 (1998) (expressing concern over discrimination that would be facilitated by genetic identification of cancer risk).
14. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 11-53 (1958) (paralleling the history of anti-Semitism with the development of the concept of the nation state).
15. For the relationship between anti-Semitism and racism more broadly, see GEORGE FREDERICKSON, RACISM: A SHORT HISTORY 170 (2002).
16. "The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it. . . . The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
17. For an analytical discussion of the relationship between claims and specifications, see Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 70-74 (2005) (presenting patent claim interpretation methodology).
18. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (presenting a methodology for claim interpretation that mandates starting with the language of the claims and relying on extrinsic evidence when there is ambiguity in claim language).
19. U.S. Patent No. 2, 188, 292 (filed Aug. 25, 1939).
20. For a discussion of the social embeddedness of invention, see THOMAS P. HUGHES, HUMAN-BUILT WORLD 27-31 (2004).
21. See also Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481 (1985).
22. For an important prior attempt to connect patent law and race theory, see Jonathan Kahn, Race-ing Patents/Patenting Race: An Emerging Political Geography of Intellectual Property in Biotechnology, 92 IOWA L. REV. 353, 394-98 (2007) (discussing valorization of white genes).
23. For a discussion of African-American inventorship and exclusions based on race within the nineteenth century United States patent system, see JOHN SIBLEY BUTLER, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SELF-HELP AMONG AFRICAN-AMERICANS: A RECONSIDERATION OF RACE AND ECONOMICS 54-57 (1991).
24. See also PORTIA P. JAMES, THE REAL MCCOY: AFRICAN-AMERICAN INVENTION AND INNOVATION 1619-1930, at 85-99 (1989).
25. John Boyle, a patent attorney, noted an interesting exchange between the USPTO and a slave owner in 1857 over the rights of the owner's slave to patent an invention. The USPTO denied the slave the right to patent because he was not a U.S. citizen under the Dred Scott decision. See John Boyle, Patents and Civil Rights in 1857-8, 42 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 789, 791-94 (1960).
26. See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266 (1977);
27. Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 134-37 (2004) (comparing justifications for intellectual property based on incentives for creation with justifications based on incentives for marketing).
28. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 91-92 (2006) (presenting the contours of social production);
29. see also Keith Aoki, Distributive and Syncretic Motives in Intellectual Property Law (with Special Reference to Coercion, Agency, and Development), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 720 (2007);
30. Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2821, 2874 (2006) (endorsing a substantive equality norm for intellectual property);
31. Shubha Ghosh, Exclusivity - The Roadblock to Democracy?, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 799 (2006). Although not addressing intellectual property, Professor Edward Rubin has inspired me to think critically about synthesizing economic theories of intellectual property and outsider and critical race analyses of legal institutions and connecting intellectual property theory to theories of culture.
32. Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1402 (1996).
33. See, e.g., ERICH KAUFER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 19-22 (1989) (describing patents as a means to appropriate returns from investment in research and development).
34. See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 415 F.3d 44, 48-50 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (reviewing the decision by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board to cancel the Redskins' trademark as an offensive mark).
35. See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 80 (2001);
36. Aoki, supra note 16, at 722;
37. Kevin J. Greene, Copyright, Culture, and Black Music: A Legacy of Unequal Protection, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 339, 375-83 (1999) (documenting the appropriation of African-American musical culture within the regime of copyright).
38. Narrowing my analysis in this Article to the racial categories of African-American and Negro was the most difficult research choice I had to make. This decision was motivated in part by the BiDil patent's focus on "black patients," a focus that influenced my desire to study this topic more deeply. The focus on African-American and Negro as the relevant categories was also motivated by the rich set of patents I uncovered in my research. I should point out that many of the epidemiological patents I discuss also include Asian-American and Hispanic-American as racial categories to stratify the sample. Asian-Americans have been a target population for study in the bio-medical community, particularly Asian-American women. See, e.g., Denise Grady, Researchers Find Distinctive Patterns of Cancer in Five Groups of Asian-Americans, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A12;
39. Cynthia Ozawa et al., Culturally Sensitive Treatment of Metabolic Syndrome in Asian Americans, 18 HOME HEALTH CARE MGMT. & PRACTICE 394 (2006).
40. For an epidemiological analysis of health issues facing the Hispanic-American population, see CAROLINA REYES ET AL., GENES, CULTURE, AND MEDICINES: BRIDGING GAPS IN TREATMENT FOR HISPANIC AMERICANS 11-14 (2004) (a joint publication of the National Alliance for Hispanic Health and the National Pharmaceutical Council that focuses on four diseases: asthma, diabetes, heart disease, and Alzheimer's).
41. My focus on race should not be read as neglecting or minimizing the category of gender. For preliminary studies on gender and patenting, see ETHLIE ANN VARE & GREG PTACEK, PATENTLY FEMALE: FROM AZT TO TV DINNERS, STORIES OF WOMEN INVENTORS AND THEIR BREAKTHROUGH IDEAS 1-4 (2002) (presenting a context of female inventorship);
42. AUTUMN STANLEY, MOTHERS AND DAUGHTERS OF INVENTION: NOTES FOR A REVISED HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY 1-5 (1993) (documenting female inventorship throughout world history).
43. See Kahn, supra note 14 (citing epidemiological studies).
44. U.S. Patent No. 6,849,417 (filed Sept. 28, 2000).
45. Id. at [57].
46. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
47. See id. § 102.
48. See id. § 103.
49. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-36 (1966) (explicating the utility requirement).
50. 383 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1966) (explicating the nonobviousness requirement).
51. U.S. Patent No. 6,972,180 (filed Mar. 1, 2000).
52. Id. col.14 11.13-16.
53. See U.S. Patent No. 6,465,463, supra note 6.
54. U.S. Patent No. 6,784,177 (filed Aug. 2, 2002).
55. Double patenting is not allowed under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000), which states that "a" patent shall issue to an inventor whose application meets the requirements of patentability.
56. See Miller v. Eagle Manufacturing Co., 151 U.S. 186, 197-98 (1894) (establishing the rule against double patenting).
57. U.S. Patent No. 6,465,463, at [57] (filed Sept. 8, 2000).
58. Id.
59. Id. col.17 1.56.
60. Id. colli 11 ll.13-19.
61. Id. col.1 11.48-56.
62. U.S. Patent No. 4,868,179 (filed Apr. 22, 1987).
63. Id. The patent term at the time of the issuance of this patent was seventeen years from the date of issuance. The current term is twenty years from the date of application.
64. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). The patent term can also be extended under special circumstances, depending on the nature of the invention and the existence of delays in prosecution.
65. See id. §§ 155, 156.
66. '179 Patent, supra note 39.
67. See Jonathan Kahn, Patenting Race, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 1349, 1350 (2006).
68. In 1994, the National Institute of Health issued the National Institutes of Health Guidelines on the Inclusion of Women and Minorities as Subjects in Clinical Research, which outlined "a wide range of new responsibilities for clinical researchers funded by the NIH and for institutional review boards (IRBs)." Charles Weijer & Robert A. Crouch, Why Should We Include Women and Minorities in Randomized Controlled Trials?, in ETHICAL AND REGULATORY ASPECTS OF CLINICAL RESEARCH: READINGS AND COMMENTARY 171, 171-72 (Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al. eds., 2003). Under these Guidelines, "[a]ll NIH-funded clinical research must now include representative numbers of women and members of racial or ethnic minority groups."
69. Id. at 172.
70. See Kahn, supra note 42, at 1351;
71. Michael D. Ruel, Using Race in Clinical Research to Develop Tailored Medications: Is The FDA Encouraging Discrimination or Eliminating Traditional Disparities in Health Care for African Americans?, 27 J. LEGAL MED. 225, 227-29 (2006).
72. See, e.g., Ortho-McNeil Pharm, v. Kali Labs., Inc., 482 F. Supp. 2d 478, 522-23 (D.N.J. 2007) (change in dosage level not sufficient for nonobviousness)
73. (citing Merck & Co. v. Bocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 805-06, 809 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (changes in conditions for using invention, such as temperature or concentration, not enough to establish nonobviousness unless there is some unexpected result));
74. Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1362-63, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (altering chemical formulation not enough to show nonobviousness).
75. See, e.g., Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapham Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Dyk, J., concurring) (discussing the issue of patentability of species claims over genus claims in the prior art and proposing to allow such claims if there is evidence of unexpected results).
76. Memorandum from Raymond Henley, Jr., Primary Examiner, to Edward D. Grieff, Registration No. 38,898 (Dec. 5, 2001) (on file with author).
77. Memorandum from Edward D. Grieff to Raymond Henley, Jr., Primary Examiner, Registration No. 38,898 (May 6, 2002) (on file with author).
78. See id.
79. Memorandum from Raymond Henley, Jr., Primary Examiner, to Edward D. Grieff, Registration No. 38,898 (May 18, 2002) (on file with author).
80. KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741-43 (2007).
81. See U.S. Patent No. 6,004,596 (filed Dec. 8, 1997). The claims of this controversial patent were cancelled by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences in September 2006, as Appeal No. 2006-1664 as part of Reexamination Control No. 90/005949.
82. U.S. Patent No. 7,073,516 (filed Aug. 1, 2003).
83. U.S. Patent No. 763,012 (filed Aug. 25, 1903).
84. Id.
85. See U.S. Patent No. 1,425,757 (filed Dec. 30, 1920).
86. Id. col.1 11.11-15.
87. U.S. Patent No. 1,593,055 (filed Nov. 9, 1925);
88. U.S. Patent No. 1,607,674 (filed July 17, 1925).
89. See Note, Recent Statute: Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 HARV. L. REV. 684 (1965).
90. U.S. Patent No. 2,238,544 (filed July 4, 1939) (referring to Negroid and Semitic strains of kinky hair).
91. See U.S. Patent No. 3,369,970 (filed Nov. 10, 1966).
92. Id.
93. U.S. Patent No. 3,892,246 (filed Apr. 4, 1974).
94. Id. col.1 11.16-20.
95. U.S. Patent No. 4,324,263 (filed Feb. 8, 1980);
96. U.S. Patent No. 4,373,540 (filed Dec. 8, 1980).
97. '263 Patent, supra note 65;
98. '540 Patent, supra note 65.
99. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness and the Federal Circuit: An Empirical Analysis of Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911, 928-33 (2007) (assessing the thesis of the lowering of the standard for nonobviousness by the Federal Circuit).
100. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 4, at 11-13 (documenting the "patent explosion" in the last two decades).
101. U.S. Patent No. 6,264, 121 col.2 11.59-62 (filed May 13, 1997).
102. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,775,530 (filed Jan. 6, 1989).
103. U.S. Patent No. 7,073,516 (filed Aug. 1, 2003).
104. Id. col.l 11.9-19.
105. Id. col.3 11.47-53.
106. See generally ROBERT BONAZZI, MAN IN THE MIRROR: JOHN HOWARD GRIFFIN AND THE STORY OF BLACK LIKE ME 37-41 (1997);
107. JOHN HOWARD GRIFFIN, BLACK LIKE ME 190-92 (1960);
108. AN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 62 (1996).
109. For a recent account of passing and the effect on children, see BLISS BROYARD, ONE DROP: MY FATHER'S HIDDEN LIFE - A STORY OF RACE AND FAMILY SECRETS 472-74 (2007) (describing genetic tracing of ancestry by author to trace racial roots).
110. U.S. Patent No. 3,856,934 (filed Jan. 22, 1973).
111. See JOSEPH L. GRAVES, JR., THE RACE MYTH: WHY WE PRETEND RACE EXISTS IN AMERICA 86-87 (2004) (explaining the stereotypes that were associated with skin color prior to the 1960s).
112. U.S. Patent No. 2,248,148 (filed Feb. 11, 1939).
113. Id. col.l 11.1-11.
114. Here is an illustrative passage from the novel: I watched him kneel and open one of the buckets, stirring a milky brown substance. A nauseating stench arose. I wanted to step away. But he stirred it vigorously until it became glossy white, holding the spatula like a delicate instrument and studying the paint as it laced off the blade, back into the bucket. RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN 199 (1952).
115. '148 Patent, supra note 77, col.l 11.12-22.
116. Id. col.l 1.50-Col.2 1.28.
117. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 172-73 (1995) (holding that color can be protected as a trademark only if it has acquired distinctiveness in the marketplace through association with a company's product or service).
118. The treatment of colors under trademark law is a vivid reminder of how skin color itself can serve as a form of bankable property. For eloquent treatment of this point, see Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1720-21, 1768 (1993) (demonstrating how skin color is a marketable and commodifiable asset and how "protection] of the property interest in whiteness is achieved by embracing the norm of colorblindness").
119. See Richard R.W. Brooks, Incorporating Race, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2023, 2064-68 (2006) (analyzing the racial identities of corporations and identifying "race" in "legal and extralegal objects").
120. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 3,705,762 (filed Sept. 20, 1971).
121. See, e.g., Sunless Tanning Cream, U.S. Patent No. 6,630,130 (filed July 16, 2001).
122. See U.S. Patent No. 4,680,172 (filed Mar. 5, 1985).
123. U.S. Patent No. 4,765,985 (filed May 20, 1987).
124. Id. col.7 11.3-7.
125. U.S. Patent No. 3,517,105 col.l 11.24-27 (filed Apr. 6, 1966).
126. Id. col.2 11.3-6.
127. U.S. Patent No. 6,129,664 col.17 11.24-32 (filed Sept. 29, 1997).
128. U.S. Patent No. 3,856,934 (filed Jan. 22, 1973).
129. Id. col.2 11.20-33.
130. Id. col.2 11.21-22, 29.
131. U.S. Patent No. 2,188,292 (filed Aug. 25, 1939).
132. U.S. Patent No. 3,419,993 (filed May 11, 1964).
133. U.S. Patent No. 7,025,593 (filed Nov. 20, 2003).
134. U.S. Patent No. 40,740 col.l (issued Dec. 1, 1863).
135. Id. col.2.
136. U.S. Patent No. 2,419,872 col.2 11.20-24 (filed Dec. 22, 1945).
137. U.S. Patent No. 859,256 col.l 11.13-14 (filed Sept. 11, 1906).
138. Id. col.l 11.14-21.
139. U.S. Patent No. 2,188,292 col.3 11.6-8 (filed Aug. 25, 1939).
140. Id. col.4 11.6-17.
141. See William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for Combating Racial Profiling, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17, 25 n.37 (2004) (discussing racial stereotypes in video games)
142. (citing Erica Goode, With Video Games, Researchers Link Guns to Stereotypes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2002, at F1).
143. See U.S. Patent No. 3,419,993 (filed May 11, 1964).
144. Id. col.2 11.38-46.
145. Id. col.l 11.14-34.
146. One unusual mention of race in this set of patents occurs in U.S. Patent No. 3,940,863 (filed Dec. 14, 1973).
147. The patent covered a "psychological testing and therapeutic game device," id. at [54], which consisted of series of game cards and dice designed to stimulate storytelling in a patient through "iconographic stimuli."
148. Id. at [57]. The patient would roll the dice and based on the roll pick several game cards which included pictures of different things (such as a racing car, a clown, a sarcophagus, or an animal) and of people. The inventor states that images of "Negro" human figures can be substituted for the images of people included in the card deck. The mention to race is casual in the description, and the inventor seems to be suggesting that the card deck can include images of different types of people.
149. Id. col.4 11.16-20.
150. U.S. Patent No. 6,872,078 (filed Nov. 30, 2003).
151. See U.S. Patent No. 7,025,593 (filed Nov. 20, 2003).
152. Id. col.l 11.30-36.
153. U.S. Patent No. 1,343,755 (filed Sept. 30, 1919).
154. U.S. Patent No. 6,978,549 (filed June 5, 2002).
155. U.S. Patent No. 2,248,148 (filed Feb. 11, 1939).
156. '755 Patent, supra note 114.
157. U.S. Patent No. 2,294,903 (filed Oct. 5, 1938).
158. U.S. Patent No. 5,794,210 (filed Dec. 11, 1995).
159. U.S. Patent No. 6,917,926 (filed June 15, 2001).
160. Id. col.5 11.21-22.
161. U.S. Patent No. 6,978,549 col.l 11.10-21 (filed June 5, 2002).
162. Id. at [57].
163. U.S. Patent No. 2,548 col.1 (issued Apr. 11, 1842).
164. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,482,571 (filed June 21, 1982).
165. U.S. Patent No. 6,917,829 (filed Aug. 9, 2001).
166. '548 Patent, supra note 124.
167. U.S. Patent No. 246,044 (filed Mar. 1, 1881).
168. U.S. Patent No. 439,854 (filed Dec. 12, 1887).
169. '044 Patent, supra note 128,11.17-18.
170. '854 Patent, supra note 129, 1.89.
171. U.S. Patent No. 4,482,571 (filed June 21, 1982).
172. See U.S. Patent No. 4,851,816 (filed Feb. 24, 1987).
173. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,291,182, at [57] (filed Nov. 10, 1999) (methods, software, and apparatus for identifying genomic regions harboring a gene associated with a detectable trait).
174. U.S. Patent No. 6,917,829 (filed Aug. 9, 2001).
175. Id. col.2 11.26-30, col.3 11.14-23.
176. See JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 13-18 (1997) (analyzing different forms and modes of racial discrimination, but not discussing the role of race in intellectual property);
177. ROY L. BROOKS, ATONEMENT AND FORGIVENESS: A NEW MODEL FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 155-63 (2004) (detailing legacy of Jim Crow but not discussing intellectual property).
178. Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expressive Impact of Patents, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 573, 591-94 (2006) (describing expressive harms from patents).
179. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (affirming strict scrutiny standard for state use of racial category). Strict scrutiny applies whether the racial category is being used by the state government or the federal government.
180. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229 (1995)
181. (holding that strict scrutiny applies to all racial classifications whether adopted by local, state, or federal government and hence overruling Metro Broad., Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547 (1990), which applied intermediate scrutiny to racial classifications used by Congress to promote diversity in broadcasting).
182. Under the doctrine of equivalents, the patent owner can sue a party who has used, made, sold, or offered to sell an invention that does not literally fall within the language of the patent claims. The general test is that the defendant's infringement accomplished the same function through the same way to reach the same result as every element of the claim. See Warner -Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 (1997).
183. The BiDil patent and the push for personalized medicine more broadly are examples of "liberal eugenics," in contrast with the racist or nativist use of eugenics in the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries. Liberal eugenics involves genetic selection or genetic manipulation for the purposes of enhancing individual or even group attributes. See NICHOLAS AGAR, LIBERAL EUGENICS: IN DEFENSE OF HUMAN ENHANCEMENT 5 (2004) (contrasting liberal use of eugenics with the totalitarian and racist uses under the Nazi regime);
184. ICHAEL J. SANDEL, THE CASE AGAINST PERFECTION: ETHICS IN THE AGE OF GENETIC ENGINEERING 75-83 (2007) (contrasting liberal eugenics with the "old eugenics" and "free-market eugenics").
185. For an early, and simplistic, attempt to deal with the ethical and constitutional issues raised by biotechnology, see John B. Attanasio, The Constitutionality of Regulating Human Genetic Engineering: Where Procreative Liberty and Equal Opportunity Collide, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1274, 1274-77 (1986) (formulating the issues in terms of a broad tension between liberty and equality).
186. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
187. 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948).
188. 476 U.S. 79, 100-01 (1986) (White, J., concurring).
189. For an analysis of patents as a set of contractual rights, see Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain Metaphor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1328-30 (2004) (critiquing the social contract view of patents).
190. See also Jay P. Kesan & Marc Banik, Patents as Incomplete Contracts: Aligning Incentives for R&D Investment With Incentives to Disclose Prior Art, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 23 (2000);
191. Vincenzo Denicolo & Luigi Alberto Franzoni, The Contract Theory of Patents, 23 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 365 (2000).
192. Arguably, the use of racial categories in the granting of a patent would constitute constitutional state action under Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (finding state action when private discriminatory conduct was "intertwined" with the state).
193. But see Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179 (1972) (granting of liquor license did not sufficiently implicate the state in private discriminatory behavior to create constitutional state action). The Court's analysis in Shelley v. Kraemer has been questioned, but the case offers an important analogy for discussing the role of constitutional state action in patent law since the public entity is quite clearly creating private rights. For a discussion of the controversy over the Shelley decision,
194. see Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New Answers, 95 CAL. L. REV. 451, 473-74 (2007) (justifying the decision in Shelley under the Thirteenth Amendment which does not require state action). For a current discussion of the distinction between state action and private action,
195. see Mark Tushnet, State Action, Social Welfare Rights, and the Judicial Role: Some Comparative Observations, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 435, 442-43 (2002) (analyzing the place of state action in the social democratic state);
196. Cass R. Sunstein, State Action Is Always Present, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 465, 465-67 (2002) (arguing that state action also exists in the classic liberal state although the state assumes a different set of affirmative obligations).
197. See Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1880) (the state's power to regulate patented inventions);
198. James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357-58 (188l) (Congress's power to define patent rights and make use of patents).
199. See generally Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. 05-908 (U.S. June 28, 2007) (slip op.).
200. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 235 (1962).
201. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 313 (1986).
202. For a discussion of racial restrictions on patenting that were imposed in the nineteenth century, see BUTLER, supra note 14, at 59.
203. For background on liberal and critical theories of race, see Kimberle Crenshaw et al., Introduction to CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (1996), reprinted in THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 887, 889-97 (David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III eds., 2006).
204. See Lemley, supra note 15, at 135.
205. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1817-18 (2007) (discussing problem of exclusivity in defining property rights over information);
206. Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305, 326-27 (1992) (describing rent dissipation theory).
207. U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
208. See Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress's Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1835-36 (2006) (presenting a judicial theory of progress in the intellectual property clause);
209. Adam D. Moore, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Social Progress: The Case Against Incentive Based Arguments, 26 HAMLINE L. REV. 601, 628 (2003) (critiquing an incentives based theory of intellectual property).
210. This statement follows from the argument that race is irrelevant to productivity and racial discrimination will be rooted out through competitive markets without the intervention of the state. For the classic statement of this argument in the economics literature, see GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 82-107 (1957).
211. For a popular version of this argument that parallels the classic economic argument, see GRAVES, supra note 76, at 203-07. For a response by economists to these arguments,
212. see William A. Darity, Jr. & Patrick L. Mason, Racial Discrimination in the Labor Market, in RACE, LIBERALISM, AND ECONOMICS 194-200 (David Colander et al. eds., 2007).
213. The liberal theory of race is delineated below in Part II.C.l. The view that race is a veil is an example of color blindness. For an analysis of this position, see GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 112-13 (2002) (contrasting what he calls race blindness with race egalitarianism).
214. See LOURY, supra note 158, for a discussion of this position, which he calls "race egalitarianism." For the classic, economic statement that some government intervention may be needed to correct racial discrimination,
215. see Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS 3-33 (Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees eds., 1973).
216. For the history of racial bias in scientific research and experimentation, see JOHN P. JACKSON, JR., SCIENCE FOR SEGREGATION: RACE, LAW, AND THE CASE AGAINST BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 19-42 (2005);
217. EDWARD J. LARSON, SEX, RACE, AND SCIENCE: EUGENICS IN THE DEEP SOUTH 92 (1995);
218. BONNIE P. SPANIER, IM/PARTIAL SCIENCE: GENDER IDEOLOGY IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY (1995) (collecting essays on gender bias in science);
219. WILLIAM H. TUCKER, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF RACIAL RESEARCH 270-71 (1994) (history of scientific and politicized analysis of race);
220. HARRIET A. WASHINGTON, MEDICAL APARTHEID: THE DARK HISTORY OF MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION ON BLACK AMERICANS FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 105-07 (2006);
221. Weijer & Crouch, supra note 43 .
222. See LOURY, supra note 158, at 115-17 (discussing egalitarian arguments against color blindness).
223. See F. Scott Kieff, IP Transactions: On The Theory and Practice of Commercializing Innovation, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 727, 743 (2005);
224. Kitch, supra note 15, at 271.
225. See Lemley, supra note 15.
226. See Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803, 805 (1988).
227. See F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and The Norms of Science - A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 691, 693 (2001).
228. For an analysis of the racially defined markets and commercialization based on racial targeting, see EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELA P. HARRIS, WHEN MARKETS FAIL: RACE AND ECONOMICS 444-85 (2006) (describing the market for counterculture). For a striking example of race-conscious commercialization,
229. see Felicia R. Lee, Network for Blacks Broadens Its Schedule, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2007, at El (describing programming on Black Entertainment Television).
230. See, e.g., David Dante Troutt, A Portrait of the Trademark as a Black Man: Intellectual Property, Commodification, and Redescription, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1141, 1149-51 (2005) (providing an example of how a human person can become commodified through intellectual property law through an allegorical business plan). For an exegesis of the trend toward commodification,
231. see MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 79-102 (1996) (presenting conflict between markets and human flourishing).
232. See David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain, 2003 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 463, 482 (2003) (advocating public sphere of intellectual property counter to commodified uses);
233. Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783, 783-84 (2006) (identifying complexities of public domain).
234. Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 29, 31.
235. See, e.g., Tom Saunders, Case Comment, Renting Space on the Shoulders of Giants: Madey and the Future of the Experimental Use Doctrine, 113 YALE L.J. 261, 262-65 (2003) (identifying values and limits of the experimental use doctrine).
236. For an example of how far individualized genetics can be taken, see Mark Rothstein, Legal Conceptions of Equality in the Genomic Age, 25 LAW & INEQ. 429, 433-37 (2007) (arguing that individual genetic variation needs to be factored into equity analysis).
237. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Legal Constraints on the Use of Race in Biomedical Research: Towards a Social Justice Framework, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 526, 529-31 (2006) (documenting current incentives for race based research and its prevalence).
238. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698-99 (1998) (defining anticommons in scientific research).
239. See Shubha Ghosh, Globalization, Patents, and Traditional Knowledge, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 73, 78-81 (2003);
240. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 285 (1996);
241. Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 828-32 (2007).
242. BENKLER, supra note 16, at 91-130.
243. 3 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 272-74 (2006).
244. See Aoki, supra note 16, at 742;
245. Chon, supra note 16, at 2830.
246. See Holbrook, supra note 138, at 596-600.
247. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493-94 (1974) (reconciling trade secret and patent protection).
248. See Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2353, 2363 (2000) (construing "the marketplace of ideas" for the First Amendment).
249. See generally JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 4.
250. This point is an illustration of the embeddedness of economic, and legal, institutions within culture. See Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481-510 (1985).
251. See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1980s, at 99-108 (1986) (describing the transformation of racial consciousness in the 1960s against the background of national identity and racial animus).
252. See ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 113, 118, 182-83 (1992) (exploring the implications of Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson and casting a skeptical eye on "benign racial sorting");
253. John A. Powell, The Colorblind Multiracial Dilemma: Racial Categories Reconsidered, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 789, 798-800 (1997) (advocating a multiracial justification for the use of racial categories). For a discussion of race and the design of technology,
254. see Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1154-59 (1999).
255. See Peter H. Schuck, The Perceived Values of Diversity, Then and Now, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1915, 1927-28 (2001).
256. Judge Alex Kozinski illustrated this point vividly when he described an affirmative action plan in Seattle designed to racially integrate elementary schools as giving "the American melting pot a healthy stir without benefiting or burdening any particular group." Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 1162, 1196 (9th Cir. 2005) (Judge Kozinski's concurrence to majority opinion upholding the plan). The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision, with Chief Justice Roberts asserting the color-blind position: "The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race." Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2768 (2007).
257. See Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (adopting strict scrutiny for use of racial classifications by federal government and remedying past discrimination may serve as a compelling interest if narrowly tailored).
258. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-32 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003).
259. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329.
260. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005).
261. LOURY, supra note 158, at 8-11.
262. Professor Loury's early conservative position was stated in GLENN C. LOURY, A New American Dilemma, in ONE BY ONE FROM THE INSIDE OUT: ESSAYS AND REVIEWS ON RACE AND RESPONSIBILITY IN AMERICA 51, 51-52 (1995).
263. An about face can be seen in the article, Glenn C. Loury, How to Mend Affirmative Action, 127 PUB. INT. 33-43 (1997).
264. LOURY, supra note 158, at 5.
265. Id. at 148-49.
266. Id. at 150-52.
267. See id. at 152-54.
268. See, e.g., Ian F. Haney Lopez, "A Nation of Minorities": Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 993 (2007).
269. Kathleen Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713, 1714, 1716 (1988) (arguing against a civic republican view of social pluralism in favor of a structure of private voluntary associations that are independent from the purview of the state).
270. See generally Lopez, supra note 197.
271. See supra text accompanying note 157.
272. See supra text accompanying note 159.
273. See supra text accompanying note 158.
274. See supra text accompanying note 159.
275. See, e.g., Lan Cao, The Diaspora of Ethnic Economies: Beyond the Pale?, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1521, 1530 (2003) (although not using the term "rainbow commercialism," illustrating the point through an analysis of ethnic enclaves and markets in major global cities). For a striking example of this phenomenon, see American Multicultural Marketing, http://american multicultural.com (last visited Mar. 25, 2008).
276. See supra text accompanying note 172;
277. see also SUSAN SCAFIDI, WHO OWNS CULTURE?: APPROPRIATION AND AUTHENTICITY IN AMERICAN LAW 151 (2005) (proposing trademark-like protection for culture identities in commodified public spaces).
278. See WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 23-31 (1995);
279. AMARTYA SEN, IDENTITY AND VIOLENCE: THE ILLUSION OF DESTINY 149-52 (2006).
280. See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 771-72 (2002).
281. See Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1065-67 (1978) (presenting a general model of antidiscrimination law that legitimizes discrimination);
282. Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1091-1101 (1991) (critique of voting rights legislation in securing political power);
283. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1129-31 (1997) (equal protection analysis failing because status-based hierarchies reconstitute themselves in response to the law).
284. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524-27 (1980) (explaining the Brown decision in terms of interest convergence between majority and minority groups which subsequently diverged);
285. Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 372-73 (1992) (advocating a realist approach to racial politics and subordination);
286. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 166-67 (advocating the incorporation of anti-sexist norms in the debate over race);
287. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 28-35 (1991).
288. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 5-7 (1991);
289. see also Gerald Torres, Critical Race Theory: The Decline of the Universalist Ideal and the Hope of Plural Justice-Some Observations and Questions of an Emerging Phenomenon, 75 MINN. L. REV. 993, 998-99 (1991) (explaining how interest group politics undercuts the values of assimilation).
290. See Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833, 835 (2001) (describing "simple discrimination" as grounded in an individual right to be free from discriminatory conduct).
291. See AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: How EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY 11-12 (2003) (describing ethnic tensions in the Philippines, exacerbated by markets).
292. See Siegel, supra note 208, at 1120;
293. Linda S. Greene, Race in the 21st Century: Equality Through Law?, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1515, 1529-33 (1990) (questioning how anti-discrimination principles and equal protection analysis fail to promote equality across and within groups);
294. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 336-37 (1987) (continuing the presence of unconscious racism);
295. Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 362-63 (1987) (challenging CLS claims of legal indeterminacy by emphasizing goals of developing law from the bottom up).
296. For a discussion of the principle of substantive equality, see Chon, supra note 16, at 2834;
297. Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property from Below": Copyright and Capability for Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803, 805-07 (2007).
298. See DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 77-87 (2004) (establishing the economic roots of racism and need for substantive equality).
299. Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 408 (1987).
300. See Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1971, 2012-18 (1990) (analyzing the political process generated by Brown within which equal protection principles operate).
301. See LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 32-67 (2002) (presenting a critique of color-blindness and the need for power-enhancing institutional arrangements).
302. Gotanda, supra note 209, at 37-40.
303. Id. at 37.
304. Yoshino, supra note 207, at 936-37 (addressing the claim that covering essentializes based on object of cover by demonstrating how the critique of covering is aimed at the anti-essentialization).
305. Id. at 783-84.
306. Id. at 784.
307. Id. at 785.
308. Id. at 879 (analyzing racial covering through such practices as grooming).
309. See Keith J. Winstein, NAACP Presses U.S. on Heart Drug, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2007, at A20 (reporting advocacy by NAACP to obtain Medicare coverage for BiDil). For academic commentary advocating BiDil and race-specific therapies more broadly,
310. see Gary Puckrein, BiDil From Another Vantage Point, HEALTH AFF., Aug. 15, 2006, http://content.healthaffairs.org/ cgi/ content/abstract/hlthaff.25.w368vl;
311. see also Ruel, supra note 44, at 241.
312. Erik Lillquist & Charles A. Sullivan, The Law and Genetics of Racial Profiling in Medicine, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 391 (2004) [hereinafter Racial Profiling];
313. Erik Lillquist & Charles A. Sullivan, Legal Regulation of the Use of Race in Medical Research, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 535 (2006).
314. See Kahn, supra note 14, at 361;
315. Jonathan Kahn & Pamela Sankar, Being Specific About Race-Specific Medicine, HEALTH AFF., Aug. 15, 2006, http://content. healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/25/5/w375 ("Physicians should be able to prescribe BiDil, if it is appropriate, to any patient regardless of race."). For a similar position, focusing on the FDA approval process,
316. see Sharona Hoffman, "Racially-Tailored" Medicine Unraveled, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 395, 398-400 (2005).
317. Kahn, supra note 14, at 355.
318. Id. at 381. For a discussion of the current patent systems and commercialization, see supra text accompanying note 158.
319. Racial Profiling, supra note 227, at 393.
320. Kahn, supra note 14, at 391.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 393.
323. Kahn & Sankar, supra note 228.
324. See Kahn, supra note 14, at 394.
325. Id. at 395.
326. Yoshino, supra note 207, at 892.
327. RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RACIAL CULTURE: A CRITIQUE 211-14 (2005) (urging to look "beyond difference").
328. Id. at 97-124 (arguing against "racial characteristics" and the politics of difference).
329. Sunder, supra note 176, at 273-76.
330. Id. at 273-74.
331. Id.
332. See generally Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, in THE ESSENTIAL CIVIL SOCIETY READER: CLASSIC ESSAYS IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL SOCIETY DEBATE 257 (Don E. Eberly ed., 2000).
333. See supra text accompanying note 10.
334. See supra text accompanying note 10.
335. U.S. Patent No. 6,465,463 col. 17 1.57 (filed Sept. 8, 2000).
336. 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2 (2000).
337. Permutit Co. v. Graver Corp., 284 U.S. 52, 60 (1931).
338. Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
339. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 592 (1990).
340. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
341. Orthokinetics, 806 F.2d at 1576.
342. The use of the disclosure as described here is referred to as the possession requirement. The excerpt from the Permutit decision, supra text accompanying note 249, illustrates one of the values underlying the possession requirement: informing the public of the contours of the patent owner's property right. See Permutit, 284 U.S. at 60. The possession requirement also prevents the inventor from "pretending that his invention is more than what it really is, or different from its ostensible objects . . . ." Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 433-34 (1822);
343. see also Lizardtech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
344. Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 924-25 (Fed. Cir. 2004). For a discussion of the implications of the possession requirement for patent policy, see Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. Rev. 123 (2006).
345. Racial Profiling, supra note 227, at 394.
346. Kahn, supra note 14, at 379-83, 398-99.
347. The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure , or MPEP, is published by the United States Patent and Trademark Office and establishes the guidelines for patent examiners in prosecuting patent applications. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (8th ed. 2001, rev. ed. Sept. 2007). The MPEP does not have the force of law and, therefore, preventing race-specific claims through its guidelines would not have the same impact as a statutory prohibition. But such a prohibition may influence the behavior of patent agents and the quality of patenting. For example, the removal of the exception for business method patents in the 1996 edition of the MPEP contributed to the acceptance of business method patents in the late 1990s.
348. See John W. Bagby, Business Method Patent Proliferation: Convergence of Transactional Analytics and Technical Scientifics, 56 Bus. LAW. 423, 436 (2000).
349. See Racial Profiling, supra note 227, at 391-94 for a similar proposal based on the principle of color-blindness.
350. See supra text accompanying note 191.
351. See supra text accompanying notes 148-50.
352. See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317-19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (identifying two sources for patent claim interpretation, intrinsic and extrinsic evidence and not including interpretations by an individual user as an interpretative source).
353. See Vitronics, Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
354. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312 (claims given their "ordinary and customary meaning") (quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582).
355. Kahn, supra note 14, at 403-05.
356. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 381 U.S. 1, 25-26, 37 (1966).
357. See generally COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECON., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004);
358. FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf; Cotropia, supra note 67, at 912.
359. 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
360. Id. at 1739.
361. For pre-KSR cases that apply a more stringent standard for nonobviousness in the pharmaceutical area, see the cases discussed in note 45, supra. For a discussion of how the Supreme Court's decision in KSR has been interpreted, see Hal Milton & Patrick R. Anderson, The KSR Standard for Patentability, 89
362. J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 615, 628-29 (2007) (interpreting the KSR decision as a common sense selection test that removes a presumption of nonobviousness).
363. Dystar Textilfarben GMBH v. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (adopting a common sense approach to the nonobviousness inquiry in anticipation of the then pending Supreme Court decision in KSR).
364. Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1293-95 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding, also in anticipation of the Supreme Court decision in KSR, that changes in dosage form for a known pharmaceutical compound did not constitute a nonobvious invention).
365. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d. 846, 851-53 (N.D. 111. 2007) (describing the Supreme Court's decision in KSR as cautioning against a strict application of the TSM approach).
366. Sud-Chemie, Inc. v. Multisorb Techs., Inc., No. 3:03CV-29-S, 2007 WL 2669366 (W.D. Ky. 2007) (person skilled in the art would have reason to make substitution in composition absent any teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art).
367. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 4, at 34-35.
368. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000);
369. see also supra text accompanying note 33.
370. Perricone v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 432 F.3d 1368, 1373 (2005).
371. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1634 (2003).
372. See Kahn, supra note 14, at 403 (stating the argument).
373. See id. at 405 (challenging the argument). The history of the BiDil patent is a concrete example of this theoretical possibility. Nitromed pursued the race-specific patent claims in the shadow of the expiration of its earlier patent that was not racially tailored in 2003. The business plan seems to be one of expanding the patent life of the invention through racial tailoring.
374. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) ("The basic quid pro quo [of a patent] . . . is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with substantial utility.").
375. See id. ("[A] patent is not a hunting license."). It is the reward for a successful hunt.
376. The beneficial utility requirement can be traced to Justice Story's opinion in Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568) holding that an invention that is "frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society" could not be granted a patent. Courts and the USPTO have retreated from this morality limitation on patentability.
377. See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("[T]he principle that inventions are invalid if they are principally designed to serve immoral or illegal purposes has been applied broadly in recent years."). Commentary on beneficial utility has been mixed among the academic community.
378. See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The Patent System and Controversial Technologies, 47 MD. L. REV. 1051, 1062-68 (1988) (expressing skepticism towards the beneficial utility requirement as applied to technology regulation).
379. But see Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469, 472 (2003) (advocating a revival of the morality limitation on patenting for biotechnology).
380. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001) (requiring specific and substantial utility that affects a "real world" use, as opposed to an abstract or throw-away utility); In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1368, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (imposing a high standard of specific and substantial utility to deny the patenting of "express sequence tags," as being too general and speculative to constitute real world utility). Cf. Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("In the pharmaceutical arts, our court has long held that practical utility may be shown by adequate evidence of any pharmacological activity."). For race-specific pharmaceuticals, a higher standard for utility is mandated.
381. See Raj Bhopal, Race and Ethnicity: Responsible Use From Epidemiological and Public Health Perspectives, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 500, 502 (2006);
382. Morris W. Foster, Analyzing the Use of Race and Ethnicity in Biomedical Research From a Local Community Perspective, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 508, 510 (2006);
383. Margaret A. Winker, Race and Ethnicity in Medical Research: Requirements Meet Reality, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 520, 522 (2006).
384. I have been critical of morality limitations on patentability in earlier writings. See Ghosh, supra note 145, at 1362. I still agree with my earlier position in that the goal of patent law is not to police troubling technologies. I am, however, acknowledging here that in the construction of race, morality does play some role in not extending patent protection to racialized patents that may subordinate racial groups.
385. See, e.g., Douglas Loughnot, Potential Interactions of the Orphan Drug Act and Pharmacogenomics: A Flood of Orphan Drugs and Abuses?, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 365, 368 (2005).
386. See AMARTYA SEN, REASON BEFORE IDENTITY: THE ROMANES LECTURE FOR 1998, at 1-31 (1999). For a concrete example, consider the recent and ongoing debate over the identity of Barack Obama. See, e.g., Amos N. Jones, Black Like Obama: What the Junior Illinois Senator's Appearance on the National Scene Reveals about Race in America, and Where We Should Go from Here, 31 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 79, 80 (2005) (asking the question "When, how, and why did Barack Obama become black?").
387. Future research will extend the empirical analysis to include other racial and ethnic categories. A very important extension would look to the role of gender in patent law, much like other scholars have examined gender in copyright and trademark. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Fair Use and the Fairer Sex: Gender, Feminism, and Copyright Law, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 551 (2006);
388. Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721 (2004).
389. See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 259 (2007) (analyzing the role of positive externalities in intellectual property law).