Modeling compromise at the international table

Conflict Management and Peace Science

Volumn 21, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 159-177

  Butler, Christopher K ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 4644310502     PISSN: 07388942     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/07388940490487243     Document Type: Review

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