Transparency in monetary policy

Atlantic Economic Journal

Volumn 30, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 353-365

  Neumann, Manfred J M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 4644286506     PISSN: 01974254     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF02298778     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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