Bureaucratic inefficiency: Failure to capture the efficiencies of outsourcing

Public Choice

Volumn 107, Issue 3-4, 2001, Pages 253-270

  Robinson, Brooks B ^a  

^a Dept of Stt/For Comml Service   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035596449     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1010300307516     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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