Constructing self-enforcing federalism in the early United States and modern Russia

Publius: The Journal of Federalism

Volumn 37, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 160-189

  De Figueiredo, Rui J P ^a   McFaul, Michael ^b   Weingast, Barry R ^b,c   Krebs, Ward C ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 44849095179     PISSN: 00485950     EISSN: 17477107     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/publius/pjm002     Document Type: Article

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