Executive pay and the search for legitimacy: An investigation into how UK Remuneration Committees use corporate performance comparisons in long-term incentive pay decisions

Human Relations

Volumn 61, Issue 5, 2008, Pages 711-739

  Ogden, Stuart ^a   Watson, Robert ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD   (United Kingdom)

^b DURHAM UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Comparisons; Executive pay; Firm performance; LTIPs

Indexed keywords

EID: 44449097108     PISSN: 00187267     EISSN: 1741282X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0018726708091769     Document Type: Article

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