Hostile takeover defenses that maximize shareholder wealth

Business Horizons

Volumn 47, Issue 5, 2004, Pages 15-24

  Pearce II, John A ^a   Robinson Jr , Richard B ^b  

^a VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 4444236668     PISSN: 00076813     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.bushor.2004.07.004     Document Type: Article

References (44)

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