Tender offers and target management responses: Managerial entrenchment versus stockholder interest revisited

Financial Review

Volumn 31, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 87-104

  Thosar, Satish ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS BOSTON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041738622     PISSN: 07328516     EISSN: 15406288     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6288.1996.tb00865.x     Document Type: Article

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