A Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism for decentralized supply chain formation

Proceedings - The 9th IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology; The 4th IEEE International Conference on Enterprise Computing, E-Commerce and E-Services, CEC/EEE 2007

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 315-322

  Narahari, Y ^a   Srivastava, Nikesh Kumar ^a  

^a INDIAN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE   (India)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BAYESIAN NETWORKS; COMMERCE; COST FUNCTIONS; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; MACHINE DESIGN; MANAGERS; MECHANISMS; SOLUTIONS; SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT; TECHNOLOGY;

BAYESIAN; COMPATIBLE MECHANISM; COST INFORMATION; E-COMMERCE; E-SERVICES; END-TO-END DELIVERY; ENTERPRISE COMPUTING; INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY; INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES; MANUFACTURING SUPPLY CHAIN; MECHANISM DESIGN; MULTI-ECHELON; OPTIMIZ ATION PROBLEMS; SERVICE PROVIDERS; SUB-PROBLEMS; SUPPLY CHAIN FORMATION; VICKREY-CLARKE-GROVES MECHANISMS;

SUPPLY CHAINS;

EID: 44349187604     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/CEC-EEE.2007.109     Document Type: Conference Paper

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