Foundations of mechanism design: A tutorial Part 2 - Advanced concepts and results

Sadhana - Academy Proceedings in Engineering Sciences

Volumn 33, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 131-174

  Garg, Dinesh ^a   Narahari, Y ^b   Gujar, Sujit ^b  

^a IBM INDIA RESEARCH LAB   (India)

^b INDIAN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE   (India)

Author keywords

Auctions; Game theory; Mechanism design; Social choice functions

Indexed keywords

AUCTIONS; MECHANISM DESIGN; NETWORK ECONOMICS; SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTIONS;

COMPUTER SCIENCE; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; GAME THEORY; PROBLEM SOLVING;

KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEMS;

EID: 44349084823     PISSN: 02562499     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s12046-008-0009-2     Document Type: Article

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