Attracting Attention: Cheap Managerial Talk and Costly Market Monitoring

Journal of Finance

Volumn 63, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 1399-1436

  Almazan, Andres ^a   Banerji, Sanjay ^b   Motta, Adolfo De ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX   (United Kingdom)

^c MCGILL UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 43649090497     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: 15406261     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01361.x     Document Type: Article

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