Spontaneous evolution of social exchange-An experimental study

Journal of Socio-Economics

Volumn 37, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 976-997

  Berninghaus, Siegfried K ^a   Güth, Werner ^b   Vogt, Bodo ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KARLSRUHE   (Germany)

^b MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN HISTORY   (Germany)

^c OTTO VON GUERICKE UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Bilateral reciprocity; Exchange networks; Mutual gift giving; Ostracism

Indexed keywords

EID: 43049159248     PISSN: 10535357     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2006.12.064     Document Type: Article

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