Transaction costs, industry experience and make-or-buy decisions in the population of early U.S. auto firms

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 66, Issue 3-4, 2008, Pages 791-807

  Bigelow, Lyda S ^a   Argyres, Nicholas ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF UTAH   (United States)

^b BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Production capabilities; Transaction costs; Vertical integration

Indexed keywords

EID: 42649101679     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2006.01.010     Document Type: Article

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