Hiroshige vs. Van Gogh: Resolving the dilemma of copyright scope in remedying infringement

Journal of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A.

Volumn 46, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 39-69

  Geller, Paul Edward ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0039991943     PISSN: 08863520     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (156)

1. BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 74 (1967).
2. See 1 INGO F. WALTHER & RAINER METZGER, VINCENT VAN GOGH: THE COMPLETE PAINTINGS 282 (Michael Hulse trans., 1993).
3. See id. at 282-85 (also including Oiran, after Kesaï Eisen).
4. See MATTHI FORRER, HIROSHIGE, PRINTS AND DRAWINGS, prints 93-95 (1997) [hereinafter FORRER, HIROSHIGE].
5. These exhibits reproduce transparencies provided by the Van Gogh Museum (Vincent Van Gogh Foundation) in Amsterdam. The legends at the bottom of the exhibits indicate in parentheses some of the variations in the designations that have been given to the corresponding works.
6. However, Van Gogh himself did have "scruples of conscience" that his elaborating on prior artists' works "might be plagiarism." THE LETTERS OF VINCENT VAN GOGH 477 (Ronald de Leeuw ed., Arnold Pomerans trans., 1996).
7. Quoted in WILLIAM P. ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 29 (1995).
8. For the state of relevant French copyright law in the nineteenth century, see ALAIN STROWEL, DROIT D'AUTEUR ET COPYRIGHT: DIVERGENCES ET CONVERGENCES 141-42, 598-99 (1993).
9. Analysis will here focus on economic rights that vary far less in scope from system to system than do moral rights, which raise a comparable, but more acute dilemma. For further analysis, see Paul Edward Geller, Must Copyright be For Ever Caught Between Marketplace and Authorship Norms?, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS: ESSAYS ON COPYRIGHT LAW 159, 194-98 (Brad Sherman & Alain Strowel eds., 1994) [hereinafter Geller, Copyright Between Marketplace and Authorship Norms?], abridged and revised in Paul Edward Geller, Toward an Overriding Norm in Copyright: Sign Wealth, 159 REV. INTERNAT'LE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR [RIDA] 2, 73-93 (1994) [hereinafter Geller, Sign Wealth].
10. Analysis will here focus on economic rights that vary far less in scope from system to system than do moral rights, which raise a comparable, but more acute dilemma. For further analysis, see Paul Edward Geller, Must Copyright be For Ever Caught Between Marketplace and Authorship Norms?, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS: ESSAYS ON COPYRIGHT LAW 159, 194-98 (Brad Sherman & Alain Strowel eds., 1994) [hereinafter Geller, Copyright Between Marketplace and Authorship Norms?], abridged and revised in Paul Edward Geller, Toward an Overriding Norm in Copyright: Sign Wealth, 159 REV. INTERNAT'LE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR [RIDA] 2, 73-93 (1994) [hereinafter Geller, Sign Wealth].
11. See GEORGE KUBLER, THE SHAPE OF TIME: REMARKS ON THE HISTORY OF THINGS 94-95, 115-16 (1962); HOWARD S. BECKER, ART WORLDS, chs. 7, 8, 10 passim (1982).
12. See GEORGE KUBLER, THE SHAPE OF TIME: REMARKS ON THE HISTORY OF THINGS 94-95, 115-16 (1962); HOWARD S. BECKER, ART WORLDS, chs. 7, 8, 10 passim (1982).
13. See 1 ERNEST F. FENOLLOSA, EPOCHS OF CHINESE AND JAPANESE ART, chs, 5-6 (Dover Publ. 1963) (2d ed. 1913); AUREL STEIN, ON ANCIENT CENTRAL-ASIAN TRACKS 17-33, 55-56, 79, 106-11, 194-96 (Jeannette Mirsky ed., Pantheon Books 1964) (1933).
14. See 1 ERNEST F. FENOLLOSA, EPOCHS OF CHINESE AND JAPANESE ART, chs, 5-6 (Dover Publ. 1963) (2d ed. 1913); AUREL STEIN, ON ANCIENT CENTRAL-ASIAN TRACKS 17-33, 55-56, 79, 106-11, 194-96 (Jeannette Mirsky ed., Pantheon Books 1964) (1933).
15. See 1 JOSEPH NEEDHAM, SCIENCE AND CIVILISATION IN CHINA, ch. 7 (1954); LUCIEN FEBVRE & HENRI-JEAN MARTIN, L'APPARITION DU LIVRE 40, 102-09 (2d ed. 1971).
16. See 1 JOSEPH NEEDHAM, SCIENCE AND CIVILISATION IN CHINA, ch. 7 (1954); LUCIEN FEBVRE & HENRI-JEAN MARTIN, L'APPARITION DU LIVRE 40, 102-09 (2d ed. 1971).
17. See SADAKICHI HARTMANN, JAPANESE ART, ch. 4 (Horizon Press, 1971) (1904); MATTHI FORRER, HOKUSAI, PRINTS AND DRAWINGS 17-19 (1991); FORRER, HIROSHIGE, supra note 4, at 19-21.
18. See SADAKICHI HARTMANN, JAPANESE ART, ch. 4 (Horizon Press, 1971) (1904); MATTHI FORRER, HOKUSAI, PRINTS AND DRAWINGS 17-19 (1991); FORRER, HIROSHIGE, supra note 4, at 19-21.
19. See HARTMANN, supra note 13, ch. 5; KLAUS BERGER, JAPONISME IN WESTERN PAINTING FROM WHISTLER TO MATISSE 6-34 passim, 48-49, 66-111 passim, 125-30, 184-89, 333-34 (David Britt trans., 1992).
20. See generally Ejan Mackaay, Economic Incentives in Markets for Information and Innovation, 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POLICY 867, 873-85, 890-96 (1990) (indicating that free-riders need to be excluded to provide incentives for creation and dissemination). But cf. WILLIAM KINGSTON, INNOVATION: THE CREATIVE IMPULSE IN HUMAN PROGRESS, ch. 3 (1977) (questioning whether economic incentives are always indispensable for creation).
21. See generally Ejan Mackaay, Economic Incentives in Markets for Information and Innovation, 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POLICY 867, 873-85, 890-96 (1990) (indicating that free-riders need to be excluded to provide incentives for creation and dissemination). But cf. WILLIAM KINGSTON, INNOVATION: THE CREATIVE IMPULSE IN HUMAN PROGRESS, ch. 3 (1977) (questioning whether economic incentives are always indispensable for creation).
22. For further analysis, see Geller, Copyright Between Marketplace and Authorship Norms?, supra note 9, at 188-90; Geller, Sign Wealth, supra note 9, at 59-63.
23. For further analysis, see Geller, Copyright Between Marketplace and Authorship Norms?, supra note 9, at 188-90; Geller, Sign Wealth, supra note 9, at 59-63.
24. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also U.K., Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710) (positing, in its title, the statutory goal: "the Encouragement of Learning").
25. For historical background, see STROWEL, supra note 8, at 89-91; Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 1005-22 (1990).
26. Cf. Ejan Mackaay, An Economic View of Information Law, in INFORMATION LAW TOWARDS THE 21ST CENTURY 43, 57-61 (Willem Korthals Altes et al. eds., 1992) (pointing out that the default position, absent intellectual property, is the free flow of information).
27. For further analysis, see François Dessemontet, Copyright and Human Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HERMAN COHEN JEHORAM 113, 116-20 (Jan J.C. Kabel & Gerard J.H.M. Mom eds., 1998) [hereinafter ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF COHEN JEHORAM].
28. Compare Pierre N. Leval, Fair Use or Foul? The Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, 36 J. COPR. SOC'Y 167, 170-75 (1989) (arguing that fair use properly excuses transformative uses), with IVAN CHERPILLOD, L'OBJET DU DROIT D'AUTEUR 143-81 passim (1985) (comparing German doctrine of free utilization with other approaches to transformative uses).
29. Compare Pierre N. Leval, Fair Use or Foul? The Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, 36 J. COPR. SOC'Y 167, 170-75 (1989) (arguing that fair use properly excuses transformative uses), with IVAN CHERPILLOD, L'OBJET DU DROIT D'AUTEUR 143-81 passim (1985) (comparing German doctrine of free utilization with other approaches to transformative uses).
30. Compare, e.g., Alain Strowel, Belgium § 8[2][a][v], in 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE at BEL-48 to BEL-49 (Paul Edward Geller & Melville B. Nimmer eds., 1998) [hereinafter INTERNAT'L COPR. LAW & PRACTICE] (noting that Belgian law excuses parody and like uses under exception if they comply with "fair practice"), and André Lucas, France § 8[2][a][iii], in 1 INTERNAT'L COPR. LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 22, at FRA-121 to FRA-122 (explaining that French law exempts "parodies, pastiches, and caricatures" if they fall into an exception specific to "this genre"), with Mario Fabiani, Italy § 8[2][a], in 2 INTERNAT'L COPR. LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 22, at ITA-59 to ITA-60 (indicating that Italian law subjects such uses to general infringement analysis).
31. Compare, e.g., Alain Strowel, Belgium § 8[2][a][v], in 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE at BEL-48 to BEL-49 (Paul Edward Geller & Melville B. Nimmer eds., 1998) [hereinafter INTERNAT'L COPR. LAW & PRACTICE] (noting that Belgian law excuses parody and like uses under exception if they comply with "fair practice"), and André Lucas, France § 8[2][a][iii], in 1 INTERNAT'L COPR. LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 22, at FRA-121 to FRA-122 (explaining that French law exempts "parodies, pastiches, and caricatures" if they fall into an exception specific to "this genre"), with Mario Fabiani, Italy § 8[2][a], in 2 INTERNAT'L COPR. LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 22, at ITA-59 to ITA-60 (indicating that Italian law subjects such uses to general infringement analysis).
32. Compare, e.g., Alain Strowel, Belgium § 8[2][a][v], in 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE at BEL-48 to BEL-49 (Paul Edward Geller & Melville B. Nimmer eds., 1998) [hereinafter INTERNAT'L COPR. LAW & PRACTICE] (noting that Belgian law excuses parody and like uses under exception if they comply with "fair practice"), and André Lucas, France § 8[2][a][iii], in 1 INTERNAT'L COPR. LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 22, at FRA-121 to FRA-122 (explaining that French law exempts "parodies, pastiches, and caricatures" if they fall into an exception specific to "this genre"), with Mario Fabiani, Italy § 8[2][a], in 2 INTERNAT'L COPR. LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 22, at ITA-59 to ITA-60 (indicating that Italian law subjects such uses to general infringement analysis).
33. See, e.g., Cambell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 598-600 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting difficulty of distinguishing parody as fair use from "just any commercial takeoff"); the French Autumn Leaves decisions, T.G.I. Paris, 3e ch., Oct. 7, 1992, 155 RIDA 222 (1993), rev'd, CA Paris, 1re ch., May 11, 1993, 157 RIDA 340 (1993) (disagreeing about whether the French parody exception applies to a takeoff without obvious comic intent); the German Asterix Persiflagen and Alcolix decisions, BGH, March 11, 1993, 1994 GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 191 and 206, respectively translated in 25 INTERNAT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPR. LAW [IIC] 610 and 605 (1994) (analyzing how the German doctrine of free utilization applies to takeoffs on cartoon characters in different cases).
34. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (1841).
35. See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair Use and How it Got that Way, The 1998 Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, 45 J. COPR. SOC'Y 634, 637-38 (1998).
36. See United States, Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1994). But see 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT §§ 10.2.2.1.c, 10.2.2.3, at 10:42-10:44, 10:54-10:58 (1998) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT] (arguing that the "nontransformative" character of a use need not preclude finding it to be a fair use and that "substantiality" need not be the same in infringement and fair-use analyses).
37. See EUGEN ULMER, URHEBER-UND VERLAGSRECHT 275-78 (3rd ed. 1980) (distinguishing the free use of public-domain materials from free utilization so transforming plaintiff's protected materials that these "fade away" [verblassen] in defendant's work); also Switzerland, Loi fédérale sur le droit d'auteur et les droits voisins du 9 octobre 1992 (Federal Act on Copyright and Neighboring Rights of Oct. 9, 1992). RS 231.1, as amended effective July 1, 1995, ROLF 1995 1776 (deeming non-infringing the use of "existing works for the creation of parodies or other analogous versions of the work" under article 11(3), but doing so outside the "limitations on copyright" set out in chapter 5).
38. Purely local analyses, for example, guiding courts in only one or few U.S. circuits or other isolated jurisdictions, will not be considered. See, e.g., 4 DAVID NIMMER & MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][1][c]-[d], at 13-36 to 13-44 (Dec. 1998) (critiquing criteria of certain U.S. circuits, such as "total concept and feel" and "structure, sequence, and organization"). Furthermore, not only doctrines such as fair use, but more basic constitutional principles remain outside the analysis undertaken here.
39. It is assumed here that both tasks, analyzing infringement and fashioning remedies case by case, remain judicial rather than legislative responsibilities in all copyright systems. See Paul Edward Geller, Legal Transplants in International Copyright: Some Questions of Method, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 199, 221-23 (1994).
40. By hypothesis, in this universe of cases, there is always access to plaintiff's prior work, which is posited as consciously taken by defendant as a basis for a later work. See generally Alan Latman, "Probative Similarity" As Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1204-14 (1990) (distinguishing criteria of access from criteria of infringement proper).
41. 2 AUGUSTIN-CHARLES RENOUARD, TRAITÉ DES DROITS D'AUTEURS 37 (1838-39). See also Lionel Bently, Copyright and Translations in the English Speaking World, 12 TRANSLATIO: FIT NEWSLETTER 491, 496-99 (1993) (explaining that the translation right was not clearly recognized in Anglo-American law until the mid-nineteenth century).
42. For further background, see Paul Goldstein, Adaptation Rights and Moral Rights in the United Kingdom, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, 14 IIC 43 passim (1983).
43. Compare KAPLAN, supra note 1, at 9-74 passim (analyzing Anglo-American case law), with CHERPILLOD, supra note 21, at 59-108 passim (comparing French and German doctrines).
44. For a critique, see Robert H. Rotstein, Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of the Work, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV 701 passim (1993).
45. Trust Company Bank v. Putnam Publ'g Group Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1874, 1878-79 (C.D. Cal. 1988). Note that Margaret Mitchell was herself sued, without success, for taking incidents in Gone with the Wind from a prior history of the Ku Klux Klan. For an account, see ALEXANDER LINDLEY, PLAGIARISM AND ORIGINALITY 108-09 (1952).
46. T.G.I. Paris 3e ch., Dec. 6, 1989, CAHIERS DU DROIT D'AUTEUR, May 1990, at 21, rev'd, CA Paris, 1re ch., Nov. 21, 1990, 147 RIDA 319 (1991).
47. Cass 1e civ., 4 Feb. 1992, 152 RIDA 196 (1992), on remand, CA Versailles, chs. réuns., Dec. 15, 1993, 160 RIDA 255 (1994).
48. But cf. Paul Goldstein, Copyright: The Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, 38 J. COPR. SOC'Y 109, 115 (1991) (ostensibly giving the benefit of the doubt to expanding copyright owners' protection "to every market in which consumers derive value from their works").
49. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
50. See 1 GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, supra note 26, § 2.3.2, at 2:31-2:37.
51. The French Pachot decision, Cass. ass. plén., March 7, 1986, 129 RIDA 136 (1986) (using the quoted phrase "constraining logic"). Compare ANDRÉ LUCAS & HENRI-JACQUES LUCAS, LA PROPRIÉTÉ LITTÉRAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE 97-104, (1994) (concluding that the scope of protection turns on potentially creative, rather than functionally determined, choices), with Ulrich Loewenheim, Das Werk, in URHEBERRECHT: KOMMENTAR 85, 97 (Gerhard Schricker ed., 1987) (indicating cases where room for creativity is restricted by technical and related considerations).
52. See David Nimmer et al., A Structured Approach to Analyzing the Substantial Similarity of Computer Software in Copyright Infringement Cases, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 625, 635-48 (1998).
53. T.G.I. Paris, 1re ch., Jan. 16, 1991, 148 RIDA 180 (1991), aff'd, CA Paris, 1re ch., Jan. 14, 1992, 152 RIDA 198 (1992) (plaintiff cannot claim an "exclusive right to linguistic and cultural materials").
54. See Paul Edward Geller, Copyright in Factual Compilations: U.S. Supreme Court Decides the Feist Case, 22 IIC 802, 804-06 (1992).
55. See Rotstein, supra note 34, at 760-76.
56. See Gunnar W. G. Karnell, The Idea/Expression Dichotomy: A Conceptual Fallacy, COPYRIGHT WORLD, 1989, no. 7, at 16; Leslie A. Kurtz, Speaking to the Ghost: Idea and Expression in Copyright, 47 UNIV. MIAMI L. REV. 1221, 1241-51 (1993).
57. See Gunnar W. G. Karnell, The Idea/Expression Dichotomy: A Conceptual Fallacy, COPYRIGHT WORLD, 1989, no. 7, at 16; Leslie A. Kurtz, Speaking to the Ghost: Idea and Expression in Copyright, 47 UNIV. MIAMI L. REV. 1221, 1241-51 (1993).
58. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 714 (2d Cir. 1991) (Sweet, J., dissenting), summ. judgment granted, 795 F. Supp. 1325, 1329-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 3 F.3d 656, 664 (2d Cir. 1993) ("there are a limited number of statistics generally considered outcome-predictive by those familiar with the sport"), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1112 (1994).
59. Cf. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1369, 1372-76 (Fed. Cir. 1998) cert. denied, 142 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1999) (rejecting prior tests for filtering out "abstract ideas" in applications for software patents, but not fleshing out any new test beyond invoking the general patent criterion of a "useful result").
60. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994). Based on this reading of "ideas" as processes rather than representations, this Article not only expressly reinterprets the "abstraction" analysis of infringement, but implicitly rejects the "pattern" and "total feel" tests. For glosses, see 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 28, § 13.03[A][1], at 13-31 to 123-40.
61. See Aristotle, Poetics, in INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE 624, 631-50 passim (Richard McKeon ed., The Modern Library, 1947).
62. See Roland Barthes, L'introduction à l'analyse structurale des récits, in L'AVENTURE SÉMIOLOGIQUE 167, 168 (1985) (referring to Aristotle in introducing new analyses).
63. Cf. Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1111-12 (9th Cir. 1998) (comparing musical scores to programs driving video games). For further analysis of basic differences between types of works, see infra text accompanying notes 72-78.
64. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
65. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
66. Compare LUCAS & LUCAS, supra note 41, at 101-02, 225-27 (explaining how criteria such as apport intellectuel [mental input] imply infringement analysis à géométrie variable), with Loewenheim, supra note 41, at 98-99 (explaining that criteria such as Gestaltungshöhe [level of formal elaboration] are inevitably satisfied to variable degrees).
67. See generally Thomas Dreier & Gunnar Karnell, Originality of the Copyrighted Work: A European Perspective, 39 J. COPR. SOC'Y 289, 291-99 (1992) (explaining Continental European sliding-scale analysis against the background of post-Feist U.S. law). Exceptionally, British copyright may eschew limiting doctrines that tend to lead to sliding-scale analysis. See, e.g., Ibcos Computers v. Barclays Mercantile, [1994] FLEET St. REP. 275 (shying away from analyzing possible merger, etc.).
68. See Loewenheim, supra note 41, at 90-91. But cf. id. at 99-100 (explaining how German jurisprudence adjusts this standard, along with corresponding tests of protectability, as creative options diminish, for example, in cases of what in German is called the kleine Münze [small change] of copyright): Gunnar W.G. Karnell, European Originality: A Copyright Chimera, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF COHEN JEHORAM, supra note 20, at 201 (questioning whether E.C. directives introducing ostensibly different standards for software and other works ought to change the law).
69. The Explosionszeichnungen (Exploded-View Drawings) decision, BGH, Feb. 28, 1991, 1991 GRUR 529. See also Adolf Dietz, Germany § 2[2], in 2 INTERNAT'L COPR. LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 22, at GER-25 (noting the fictive character of this premise of the case, in the light of limitations of German copyright in the designs portrayed in technical drawings).
70. The Power of Blue decision, OLG Hamburg, Oct. 12, 1995, 1996 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR URHEBER-UND MEDIENRECHT 315.
71. François Dessemontet, Switzerland, § 8[1][a], in 2 INTERNAT'L COPR. LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 22, at SWI-63.
72. For this definition and examples, see supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
73. For analyses on which these distinctions are based, see KUBLER, supra note 10, at 39-53, 62-82; Roland Barthes, Ecrivains et écrivants, in ESSAIS CRITIQUES 147 (1964); UMBERTO ECO, A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS 217-76 passim (1976); GEORGE STEINER, AFTER BABEL: ASPECTS OF LANGUAGE AND TRANSLATION 266, 447-49 (2nd ed. 1992).
74. For analyses on which these distinctions are based, see KUBLER, supra note 10, at 39-53, 62-82; Roland Barthes, Ecrivains et écrivants, in ESSAIS CRITIQUES 147 (1964); UMBERTO ECO, A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS 217-76 passim (1976); GEORGE STEINER, AFTER BABEL: ASPECTS OF LANGUAGE AND TRANSLATION 266, 447-49 (2nd ed. 1992).
75. For analyses on which these distinctions are based, see KUBLER, supra note 10, at 39-53, 62-82; Roland Barthes, Ecrivains et écrivants, in ESSAIS CRITIQUES 147 (1964); UMBERTO ECO, A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS 217-76 passim (1976); GEORGE STEINER, AFTER BABEL: ASPECTS OF LANGUAGE AND TRANSLATION 266, 447-49 (2nd ed. 1992).
76. For an example of appropriation art, see infra text accompanying notes 127-36.
77. For background, see RICHARD ELLMANN, JAMES JOYCE 561-64, 600-04 (rev. ed. 1982); JACQUES DERRIDA, ULYSSE GRAMOPHONE; DEUX MOTS POUR JOYCE 99-100, 121 (1987). For the observation that translating a classic work from its original into another language, for example. Shakespeare from English into German, can creatively enrich the language into which the translation is made, see STEINER, supra note 62, at 270-80.
78. See IRA GITLER, SWING TO BOP: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE TRANSITION IN JAZZ IN THE 1940s, 69-72 (1985) (quoting the guitarist Biddy Fleet); also NAT SHAPIRO & NAT HENTOFF, HEAR ME TALKIN' TO YA 337 (1955) (quoting Dizzy Gillespie on parallel origins of bebop at Minton's in Harlem in the early forties: "[O]n afternoons before a session, Theolonius Monk and I began to work out some complex variations on chords and the like, and we used them at night to scare away the no-talent guys. After a while, we got more and more interested in what we were doing as music, and, as we began to explore more and more, our music evolved.").
79. See IRA GITLER, SWING TO BOP: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE TRANSITION IN JAZZ IN THE 1940s, 69-72 (1985) (quoting the guitarist Biddy Fleet); also NAT SHAPIRO & NAT HENTOFF, HEAR ME TALKIN' TO YA 337 (1955) (quoting Dizzy Gillespie on parallel origins of bebop at Minton's in Harlem in the early forties: "[O]n afternoons before a session, Theolonius Monk and I began to work out some complex variations on chords and the like, and we used them at night to scare away the no-talent guys. After a while, we got more and more interested in what we were doing as music, and, as we began to explore more and more, our music evolved.").
80. For counter-examples, namely of interactive conversions, including the reworking of Van Gogh's studies of Hiroshige, see Lillian F. Schwartz, Computers and Appropriation Art: The Transformation of a Work or Idea for a New Creation, LEONARDO, 1996, no. 1, at 43.
81. Of course, as software improves, it can accomplish more and more routines, allowing interactively participating authors to focus more and more on creative input. For further issues, see infra note 123.
82. ECO, supra note 62, at 274. Cf. DERRIDA, supra note 64, at 106-07, 137-43 (waxing ironic over a hypothetical project to computerize Joyce studies worldwide).
83. See e.g., Gary Giddins et al., liner notes, in CHARLIE PARKER, THE COMPLETE "BIRTH OF THE BEBOP" (Stash Records CD 1991) (indicating some of these tunes).
84. Cf. 1 GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, supra note 26, § 2.3.2.1, at 2:33-2:35 (proposing to analyze merger in terms of options available at the time of the later work).
85. For further analysis, see infra text accompanying notes 120-36.
86. See J.H. Reichman, Goldstein on Copyright Law: A Realist's Approach to a Technological Age, 43 STAN. L. REV. 943, 963-64 (1991) (critiquing any unified theory of infringement and contemplating only practically distinct standards).
87. See generally NELSON GOODMAN, LANGUAGES OF ART: AN APPROACH TO A THEORY OF SYMBOLS 113-122 (2d ed. 1976) (distinguishing between "allo-graphic" and "autographic" works).
88. For further analysis and examples, see 1 GÉRARD GENETTE, L'OEUVRE DE L'ART: IMMANENCE ET TRANSCENDANCE 129-81 passim (1994).
89. See NICHOLAS COOK, MUSIC, IMAGINATION AND CULTURE 71-83, 122-52 passim (1990) (explaining that scores provide necessary, but not sufficient, instructions for musical performances).
90. See Arthur Cooper, Introduction, in LI PO AND TU FU: POEMS 76-100 passim (Arthur Cooper trans., 1973); also OSVALD SIRÉN THE CHINESE ON THE ART OF PAINTING: TRANSLATIONS AND COMMENTS 44, 90 (Schocken Books, 1963) (1936) (quoting Sung art treatises: "There is no difference between the study of painting and the study of calligraphy." "Poetry and painting follow the same laws.").
91. See Arthur Cooper, Introduction, in LI PO AND TU FU: POEMS 76-100 passim (Arthur Cooper trans., 1973); also OSVALD SIRÉN THE CHINESE ON THE ART OF PAINTING: TRANSLATIONS AND COMMENTS 44, 90 (Schocken Books, 1963) (1936) (quoting Sung art treatises: "There is no difference between the study of painting and the study of calligraphy." "Poetry and painting follow the same laws.").
92. Compare, e.g., DASHIELL HAMMETT, THE MALTESE FALCON 40-41, 112-16, 195-97 (Vintage Crime/Black Lizard 1992) (1930) (having the hero in the novel, Sam Spade, meet face-to-face with his lawyer, once in an ethically dubious conversation, and later force the heroine to strip naked to see if she was hiding stolen money on her person), with THE MALTESE FALCON (Warner Brothers 1941) (replacing meetings with telephoning the lawyer and deleting the strip scene).
93. GOODMAN, supra note 73, at 229.
94. For example, manually faking art works might well entail knowledgeable reworking For further analysis and authorities, see RICHARD PRICE & SALLY PRICE, ENIGMA VARIATIONS 67-88, 160-61 (1995). For the basic reason for rejecting any "pattern" test, see supra note 49.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 62-70.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 4-5.
97. BERGER, supra note 14, at 131-32.
98. See FORRER, HIROSHIGE, supra note 4, at 21-22.
99. BERGER, supra note 14, at 131. See also Schwartz, supra note 66, at 45 (noting that, in "appropriating Japanese woodcuts," Van Gogh changed his "style of painting").
100. For sources, see supra notes 3-4.
101. BERGER, supra note 14, at 132.
102. See Guido Calebresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1091-93, 1106-10 (1972).
103. See J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2504-58 passim (1994). It has been argued that rights to injunctions, rather than damages, from the optimal framework for negotiating licenses. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655 passim (1994) (making this argument, albeit with caveats). Counter-examples abound, however, showing that reliable prospects for judicial remedies are but some of the miscellany of factors on which any readiness to license might depend. See, e.g., Peter C. Grindley & David J. Teece, Managing Intellectual Capital: Licensing and Cross-Licensing in Semiconductors and Electronics, 39 CALIF. MGMT. REV. 8 passim (1997) (examining one field in the context of technology licensing over the century).
104. See J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2504-58 passim (1994). It has been argued that rights to injunctions, rather than damages, from the optimal framework for negotiating licenses. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655 passim (1994) (making this argument, albeit with caveats). Counter-examples abound, however, showing that reliable prospects for judicial remedies are but some of the miscellany of factors on which any readiness to license might depend. See, e.g., Peter C. Grindley & David J. Teece, Managing Intellectual Capital: Licensing and Cross-Licensing in Semiconductors and Electronics, 39 CALIF. MGMT. REV. 8 passim (1997) (examining one field in the context of technology licensing over the century).
105. See J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2504-58 passim (1994). It has been argued that rights to injunctions, rather than damages, from the optimal framework for negotiating licenses. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655 passim (1994) (making this argument, albeit with caveats). Counter-examples abound, however, showing that reliable prospects for judicial remedies are but some of the miscellany of factors on which any readiness to license might depend. See, e.g., Peter C. Grindley & David J. Teece, Managing Intellectual Capital: Licensing and Cross-Licensing in Semiconductors and Electronics, 39 CALIF. MGMT. REV. 8 passim (1997) (examining one field in the context of technology licensing over the century).
106. See supra text accompanying note 20.
107. At the time of the French Revolution, when the legislators spoke of author's rights as "sacred" property rights, it was not admitted that any injunction based on such property could lie against derivative works. See supra text accompanying note 31. Thus these Revolutionary legislators ignored the doctrinal conflict raised here in its remedial consequences, and their legislative record indicates that they recognized copyright mainly to assure authors of "some fruit of their labors," that is, monetary rewards. See Le Chapelier, Le Moniteur universel, Jan. 15, 1791, quoted in STROWEL, supra note 8, at 90.
108. See, e.g., LINDLEY, supra note 35, chs. 9-15 passim (giving a wealth of examples from U.S. case law in the first half of the twentieth century); Marci A. Hamilton, Appropriation Art and the Imminent Decline in Authorial Control over Copyrighted Works, 42 J. CORP. SOC'Y 93, 115-25 (1994) (analyzing different mixes of property and liability approaches in recent U.S. case law).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 33-60.
110. For further analysis, see DAVID VAVER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: COPYRIGHT, PATENTS, TRADE-MARKS 255-68 (1997).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 62-70.
112. This assumption benefits from hindsight. More recent transformations might require closer scrutiny. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 66, at 45-47 (reworking Van Gogh's study by computer).
113. For the delimma, see supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
114. See, e.g., Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Carabio, 203 U.S.P.Q. 124 (E.D. Mich., 1979) (allowing the release of defendant's work with certain portions redacted after close comparison with plaintiff's work).
115. EUGÈNE POUILLET, TRAITÉ THÉORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ LITTÉRAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE ET DU DROIT DE REPRÉSENTATION 601 (3d éd. 1908).
116. Compare Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520-30 (9th Cir. 1992) (judicially allowing research copies as fair use), with Council Directive 91/250 of 14 May 1991 on the Legal protection of Computer Programs, 1991 J.O. (L 122) 42 (requiring, in article 6, statutory provisions to exempt decompilation).
117. Compare MAI-MAI SZE, THE WAY OF CHINESE PAINTING: ITS IDEAS AND TECHNIQUE 54-63, 115 (Random House, 1959) (1956) (explaining Chinese tradition: "Copying is a proved way of acquiring the necessary technical means of expression and, for many, a helpful steppingstone to creative results."), with EGBERT HAVERKAMP-BEGEMANN & CAROLYN LOGAN, CREATIVE COPIES: INTERPRETATIVE DRAWINGS FROM MICHELANGELO TO PICASSO 16-20 (1998) (explaining European tradition from Renaissance to modern, "more inventive forms of imitation").
118. Compare MAI-MAI SZE, THE WAY OF CHINESE PAINTING: ITS IDEAS AND TECHNIQUE 54-63, 115 (Random House, 1959) (1956) (explaining Chinese tradition: "Copying is a proved way of acquiring the necessary technical means of expression and, for many, a helpful steppingstone to creative results."), with EGBERT HAVERKAMP-BEGEMANN & CAROLYN LOGAN, CREATIVE COPIES: INTERPRETATIVE DRAWINGS FROM MICHELANGELO TO PICASSO 16-20 (1998) (explaining European tradition from Renaissance to modern, "more inventive forms of imitation").
119. See supra text accompanying notes 94-96.
120. Compare 2 GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, supra note 26, § 11.0, at 11:2 (contemplating such orders to stop "wholesale piracy" but not infringers who "borrow a few protected elements" to make "original" works of their "own"), with LUCAS & LUCAS, supra note 41, at 608, n. 68 (noting French orders to seize copies in cases of "flagrant" infringement).
121. Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (leaving untouched the appellate court's remedial analysis).
122. See, e.g., Herman Cohen Jehoram, Netherlands § 8[5][a][i], in 2 INTERNAT'L CORP. LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 22, at NETH-77 (noting expedited Dutch kort geding procedure).
123. See generally Mark Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998) (arguing that overriding rights of free expression may preclude preliminary injunctions in many U.S. copyright cases).
124. Remedies for the violation of moral rights, which lay beyond the scope of the analysis proposed here, require quite different perspectives than do remedies for the economic interests considered here. For further analysis, see II:1 STIG STRÖMHOLM, LE DROIT MORAL DE L'AUTEUR EN DROIT ALLEMAND, FRANÇAIS ET SCANDINAVE AVEC UN APERÇU DE L'ÉVOLUTION INTERNATIONALE: ÉTUDE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 9-53 passim (1967).
125. For examples, see Miguel A. Emery. Argentina § 8[5][a], in 1 INTERNAT'L COPR. LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 22, at ARG-56 to ARG-57; James Lahore, Australia § 8[5][a], in 1 INTERNAT'L COPR. LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 22, at AUS-108; David Nimmer. United States § 8[5][a][i], in 2 INTERNAT'L COPR. LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 22, at USA-165 to USA-166.
126. For examples, see Miguel A. Emery. Argentina § 8[5][a], in 1 INTERNAT'L COPR. LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 22, at ARG-56 to ARG-57; James Lahore, Australia § 8[5][a], in 1 INTERNAT'L COPR. LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 22, at AUS-108; David Nimmer. United States § 8[5][a][i], in 2 INTERNAT'L COPR. LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 22, at USA-165 to USA-166.
127. For examples, see Miguel A. Emery. Argentina § 8[5][a], in 1 INTERNAT'L COPR. LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 22, at ARG-56 to ARG-57; James Lahore, Australia § 8[5][a], in 1 INTERNAT'L COPR. LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 22, at AUS-108; David Nimmer. United States § 8[5][a][i], in 2 INTERNAT'L COPR. LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 22, at USA-165 to USA-166.
128. For the suggestion that the TRIPs Agreement requires special damages to "constitute a deterrent to further infringements," ostensibly in cases of just such piracy, see Thomas Dreier, Damages for Copyright Infringement in Germany, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF COHEN JEHORAM. supra note 20, 129, at 134-36.
129. For examples, see David Vaver, Canada § 8[5][a][ii][B], in 1 INTERNAT'L COPR. LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 22, at CAN-123 to CAN-124; Joshua Weisman. Israel § 8[5][a][ii], in 2 INTERNAT'L COPR. LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 22, at ISR-32 to ISR-34.
130. For examples, see David Vaver, Canada § 8[5][a][ii][B], in 1 INTERNAT'L COPR. LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 22, at CAN-123 to CAN-124; Joshua Weisman. Israel § 8[5][a][ii], in 2 INTERNAT'L COPR. LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 22, at ISR-32 to ISR-34.
131. Compare 2 GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, supra note 26, § 12.1.1.1, at 12:7 (distinguishing between U.S. measures of actual losses in markets already occupied by claimant and of royalties or profits in other markets), with Dreier, supra note 108, at 130-133 (critically analyzing comparable German measures).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 32-38.
133. Cf. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) (Hand, J.) (speaking in terms of the "aesthetic appeal" of the works).
134. See supra text accompanying notes 62-70.
135. See supra text accompanying note 77.
136. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45, 50-51 (2d Cir., 1939), aff'd, 309 U.S. 390 (1940) (granting plaintiff only that portion of defendant's profits due to adapting protected parts of his play into a film, but not profits due to exploiting purely cinematic parts of the film).
137. Quaere how to disentangle essentially copyright-related from publicity-right and trademark-related contributions to market appeal, for example, making and showing the work at issue from advertising well-known authors, stars, etc.?
138. Compare United States Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1994) (authorizing awards of litigation expenses in copyright statute), with Germany, ZPO, § 91 (authorizing them in general procedural code).
139. See generally Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Tel., Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998) (holding that juries also assess statutory damages).
140. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946). But see id. at 480 (Clark, J., dissenting) (warning that the majority was substituting "chaos, judicial as well as musical," for prior precedents); also Latman, supra note 30, at 1191-92 (noting that Arnstein was one of a series of unsuccessful infringement actions brought by the same composer); LINDEY, supra note 35, at 267-71 (critiquing Judge Frank's opinion for lowering the barrier of summary judgment to the then-current wave of "plagiarism racketeers" holding up successful authors with meritless suits).
141. See e.g., VAVER, supra note 93, at 80-82 (noting that Canadian judges may apply audience test); Loewenheim, supra note 41, at 134-36 (indicating that German judges may refer to the perspective of "the average observer [Durchschnittsbetrachters] in the relevant "circle" [Verkehrskreise] for factfinding purposes in appropriate cases).
142. See e.g., 2 GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, supra note 26, § 7.3.1, at 7:32-7:34 (noting that finders of fact tend to ignore doctrines limiting copyright scope, such as the idea-expression distinction, in attending only to average audience response).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
144. Quaere whether the author of the conversion algorithm may be deemed to transform the work at issue creatively, albeit indirectly? For further analysis see Jerome H. Reichman, Electronic Information Tools: The Outer Edge of World Intellectual Property Law, 24 IIC 446, 468-72 (1993).
145. See e.g., Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 737-38 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990) (holding it improper to submit recordings to lay-listener test, without benefit of expertise, in case of written scores of specialized music).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 120-121.
147. Cf 2 GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, supra note 26, § 12.1.2.2, at 12:25 ("In cases where the defendant's work literally copies the copyrighted work and adds nothing original of its own, to permit the copyright owner to recover all of the defendant's profits gives the copyright owner no more than its due.").
148. Rogers v. Koons, 751 F.Supp. 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), amended on reh'g, 777 F.Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd, 960 F. 2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992), cert, denied, 506 U.S. 934 (1992).
149. see Martha Buskirk, Appropriation Under the Gun, ART IN AMERICA, 1992, vol. 80, no 6, at 37. Quaere who knowledgeably reworked the photograph, Koons and/or the personnel at the art studio? This issue, of course, does not affect infringement analysis.
150. Injunctive relief was granted, and plaintiff claimed defendant's profits in six figures. Koons, 751 F.Supp. at 480-81.
151. See Rotstein, supra note 34, at 779-88; also Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aeathetic Theory, 71 SO. CAL. L. REV. 247, 290-97 (1998) (also analyzing the audience test in the light of recent critical theory).
152. The appellate court continued to restrict the audience to that without "any special skills other than to be a reasonable and average lay person. Koons, 960 F. 2d at 308.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 122-26.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 127-30.
155. However once it realized that both royalty and profit measures might leave plaintiff with a negligible award, the appellate court jumped remedial tracks, approving the trial court's order to turn over defendant's sculptures and proposing "enhanced statutory damages." But it gave no thought to the risk that taking sculptures off the market might undercut any award of royalties or profits, much less that such remedies might burden access to new art. Koons, 960 F. 2d at 312-14.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 112-16.