The Three-Step Test, a threat to a balanced copyright law?

IIC International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law

Volumn 37, Issue 6, 2006, Pages 683-699

  Geiger, Christophe ^a,b  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INNOVATION AND COMPETITION   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

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EID: 33750046964     PISSN: 00189855     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Note

References (137)

1. See this issue of IIC at 760.
2. See the edition of "Le Monde" Friday, 3 March 2006 which leads with the title "Private copy: a ruling of the French Supreme Court causes ructions before the debate in the Assembly".
3. Decision of the French Supreme Court, 1st Civil Division, dated 28 February 2006, 2006 D. 784, comment by J. DALEAU;
4. 2006 JCP G II 10084 comment by A. LUCAS;
5. 15 RLDI 17 (2006), comment by D. MELISON and at 49 comment by C. GEIGER;
6. April 2006 Comm. com. électr. 24, comment by C. CARON;
7. 231 Légipresse 71 (2006), comment by V.-L. BENABOU;
8. 19 Propr. intell. 179 (2006), comment by A. LUCAS;
9. July-August 2006 Propr. Ind. 35, comment by J. SCHMIDT-SZALEWSKI;
10. April-June 2006, RTDcom 370, comment by F. POLLAUD-DULIAN and 400, comment by P. GAUDRAT;
11. 2 A&M 177 (2006), comment by S. DUSOLLIER.
12. On this decision see also C. VILMART, "Copie privée: il faut raison garder et appliquer la Loi!", April 2006 JCP E 148.
13. The German Constitutional Court had indeed received an action by a user arguing that the technical measure preventing the making of a copy amounted to an infringement of his property rights with respect to the medium, a right protected by Art. 14 of the German Constitution. Unfortunately, the Court did not decide on the merits of the case, dismissing the action on the grounds of inadmissibility (decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, 25 July 2005, 2005 ZUM 812). It accordingly held in a finding that is not entirely devoid of interest that "there is no need to determine if there is a right to the digital private copy or if, on the other hand, as seems probable, the legal protection of technical measures represents a lawful clarification of the contents and the limits of property rights within the meaning of Article 14(1) second sentence of the Constitution" (emphasis added). Even if it refused to decide on the matter the Court indicated that the German legislature, by protecting technical measures against circumvention (Art. 95a of the German Copyright Act) did not exceed its right to determine the content of property rights.
14. OJEC L-167, at 10 (22 June 2001).
15. The Directive ought to have been implemented by the end of December 2002. The French implementation bill has just been adopted by the National Assembly and by the Senate (Act No. 2006-961 of August 2006, OJ, 3 August 2006). However, France is not the only country running late. The status of the implementation proceedings in Spain is similar, since the bill has likewise just been finally adopted by the Assembly ("Congreso") on 22 June 2006
16. (Boletín official de las cortes generales, Congreso de los disputados, VIII legislatura, 3 de julio de 2006, No. 44-20, at 189). Similarly, Germany, which decided to implement the Directive in two stages, leaving the sensitive question of the future of the digital private copy to a second law (referred to as the "second basket"), has yet to decide on the question (the latest version of the bill dates from 22 March 2006).
17. This is not surprising, as Prof. Andersen rightly points out, because as a substitute for consensus, complex and often "political" issues in copyright law are more and more often left to courts to decide upon, so that the interpreter (in this case the court) is faced with a crucial role in copyright legislation. According to Andersen, the interpreter should therefore "be careful not to step out of the role in which they are placed by constitution or - just as important - by respect".
18. (M.B. ANDERSEN, "The Role of the Interpreter: The Harmonization Aspect", in: "Exploring the Sources of Copyright, Proceedings of the ALAI Congress 2005", (forthcoming)).
19. Paris District Court, 30 April 2004, 36 IIC 148 (2005), comment by C. GEIGER;
20. 214 Légipresse 150 (2004), comment by M. VIVANT & G. VERCKEN;
21. July-August 2004 Comm. com. électr. 24, comment by C. CARON;
22. 12 Propr. intell., 834 (2004), comment by M. VIVANT;
23. July-September 2004 RTDcom 486, comment by F. POLLAUD-DULIAN;
24. 2004 JCP G II 10135 comment C. GEIGER;
25. 2004 JCP E 1101, comment T. MAILLARD.
26. See also Brussels District Court, 25 May 2004, 5 Ing.-Cons. 549;
27. 4 A&M 338 (2004), comment by S. DUSOLLIER;
28. 14 Propr. intell. 60 (2005), comment by A. LUCAS,
29. confirmed by the Brussels Court of Appeal, 9 September 2005, 4 A&M 303 (2005);
30. 10 RLDI 11 (2005), comment by D. MELISON.
31. On this decision see also S. DUSOLLIER, 23 RDTI 71 et seq. (2005);
32. P. VAN DEN BULCK, "L'exception pour copie privée en droit belge: vers la reconnaissance d'un droit subjectif?", 13 RLDI 65 (2006).
33. Paris Court of Appeal, 22 April 2005, 37 IIC 112 (2006);
34. 207 RIDA 374 (2006);
35. 2005 D. Jur. 1573, comment by C. CASTETS-RENARD;
36. 5 RLDI 14 (2005), comment by D. MELISON;
37. 2005 JCP G II, at 10126, comment by C. GEIGER;
38. June 2005 Comm. com. électr. 26, comment by C. CARON;
39. 16 Propr. intell. 340 (2005), comment by A. LUCAS & P. SIRINELLI;
40. 227 Légipresse 233 (2005), comment by M. VIVANT & G. VERCKEN.
41. On this ruling see also C. GEIGER, "The Private Copy Exception, an Area of Freedom (Temporarily) Preserved in the Digital Environment", 37 IIC 74 (2006);
42. V.-L. BENABOU, 30 May 2005 Juriscom.net;
43. P. SIRINELLI, 2005 D. Pan. 1491;
44. C. ROJINSKY, "La copie privée, point d'équilibre du droit d'auteur", 294 Expertises 255 (2005);
45. F. GOLDSMITH, "Ombres et lumières de l'arrêt de la cour d'appel de Paris du 22 avril 2005", July-August 2005 Comm. com. électr. 16;
46. P. BOIRON, "Le consumérisme à l'assaut du droit d'auteur", July-August 2005 Comm. com. électr. 11.
47. Paris District Court, 10 January 2006, 13 RLDI 24 (2006);
48. March 2006 Comm. com. électr. 30, comment by C. CARON,
49. 14 Propr. intell. 60 (2005), comment by A. LUCAS.
50. According to the court, the private copy exception is "d'ordre public" (which means of an imperative nature) and is imposed on the rightholders "irrespective of the medium used since the legislature does not distinguish between the different media available, whether analogue or digital" (for a comment, see also C. LE STANC & P. TRÉFIGNY, "Droit du numérique: panorama 2005", 2006 D. 790;
51. E. WÉRY & P. VAN DEN BULCK, "Copie privée des uvres numériques: la jurisprudence française au milieu du gué", 15 RLDI 13 (2006).
52. If this was the intention, the initiative was crowned with success since the reporter of the implementation bill, Christian Vanneste, withdrew an amendment during the parliamentary debate that had been adopted by the Legal Committee and which provided that the number of private copies "should be at least one", relying expressly on the decision of the French Supreme Court in the present case (cf. the analytical summary of the debates in the National Assembly, first session of Wednesday, 15 March 2006, available at 〈www. assemblee-nationale.fr〉). One author, moreover, goes so far as to ask whether the Supreme Court has not discovered a taste for lobbying (X. DAVERAT, March 2006 Comm. com. é lectr. 13).
53. Unfortunately the court does not explicitly comment on the legal nature of the limits to copyright, in particular the limit for the private copy (on this question see C. GEIGER, "De la nature juridique des limites au droit d'auteur", 13 Propr. intell. 882 (2004)). At most, it argues that the private copy exception "cannot prevent the insertion in the media on which a protected work is reproduced of technical protection measures intended to prevent copying if the latter would have the effect of conflicting with the normal exploitation of the work". This would amount to arguing, by means of a contrario reasoning, that the limit can constitute an obstacle to the insertion of technical measures if the latter does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work. Certain private copies would be imperative, others not. If one recalls the vagueness that surrounds the idea of "normal exploitation" (see below), it is to be feared that this solution will lead to a highly confused legal situation that risks being the source of countless legal actions. However, it should be pointed out that the French act already mentioned clearly holds in Art. L.331-8 that the benefit of the private copy is to be preserved, but leaves it to a regulation authority to decide how this should be done.
54. Hereinafter, the term "limit" will be preferred to the more common term of "exception", since the idea of limits appears more appropriate to take into account the true legal nature of the spaces of liberty guaranteed by the law (on this subject see C. GEIGER, supra note 12). However, this approach is admittedly far from achieving unanimity (at least in France).
55. C. CARON, "Les exceptions, L'impact sur le droit français", 2 Propr. intell. 26 (2002).
56. On these uncertainties, see below.
57. ECJ, 13 November 1990 - Marleasing, C-106/89, ECR 1990, at 1-4135, para. 26. On the interpretation of national law in the light of a directive see S. VAN RAEPENBUSCH, "Droit institutionnel de l'Union européenne" 480 (Larcier, 4th ed. 2005).
58. Article 95b(1) of the German Copyright Act.
59. Article 161(1)(a) of Bill 121/000044, 3 July 2006 "Boletín Oficial de Las Cortes Generales", Núm. 44-20. However, the bill lays down the possibilities of limiting the number of copies (Art. 161(4)).
60. bis(2)(2) of the Belgian Copyright Act).
61. Article L 331-8 of the IPC (above-mentioned act). It can be asked whether this is not a subtle means for the French legislature to escape its responsibilities and to delegate to others the difficult task of regulating the question of the future of the private copy in the digital environment.
62. See below.
63. Supported in particular by M. BUYDENS, "La nouvelle directive du 22 mai 2001 sur l'harmonisation de certains aspects du droit d'auteur et des droits voisins dans la société de l'information: le régime des exceptions", 2002 A&M 442;
64. H. COHEN JEHORAM, "Restrictions on Copyright and their Abuse", 2005 EIPR 364;
65. M. BUYDENS & S. DUSOLLIER, "Les exceptions au droit d'auteur: évolutions dangereuses", September 2001 Comm. com. électr. 12;
66. S. DUSOLLIER, "Droit d'auteur et protection des œuvres dans l'univers numérique, 440 (Larcier, 2005);
67. P. SIRINELLI, "La transposition de la directive sur le droit d'auteur et les droits voisins dans la société de l'information en France, État des lieux", 15 Propr. intell. 133 (2005).
68. See also clearly in this sense the decision of the French Constitutional Court, No. 2006-540 DC, of 27 July 2006, and the comment on the decision, stating that the respect of the three-step test must be checked by the judge in every particular case (Cahiers du Conseil Constitutionnel No. 21).
69. Scepticism on the part of M. VIVANT & G. VERCKEN, comment to Paris Court of Appeal, supra note 9;
70. V-L. BENABOU, comment to Paris Court of Appeal, supra note 9;
71. K.J. KOELMAN, "Fixing the three-step test", 2006 EIPR (forthcoming).
72. Bill, statement of the grounds, Doc. Parl., Ch. Rep., sess. 2003-2004, No. 51-1137/1, commentary on Art. 4. In Germany, the preparatory works that led to the adoption of the law of 9 September 2003 clearly establish that Germany was of the opinion that Art. 5.5 of the directive address the legislature (see for example the motivations of the bill of 6 November 2002 (BT-Drs. 15/38, at 15).
73. sexies (4) within the framework of the private copy exception (introduced into the Italian legislation when the Directive was implemented by the law dated 9 April 2003).
74. Article 28(c) of the Greek Copyright Act, introduced in the implementation of the Directive by law 3057/2002, JO A/239/ of 10 October 2002.
75. The said act (supra note 6) adds a final paragraph to Art. L.122-5 providing that "the exceptions provided by the previous paragraphs shall not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work nor unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder".
76. Article 21 of the law dated 14 August 2002: "Unauthorized use of published works permitted by the relative provisions in the Copyright Act, shall not conflict normal exploitation of the work, and unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder". Thus, it is more of a two-step test, since the Chinese test does not include the first step.
77. See as an example the ruling of the German Federal Supreme Court dated 11 July 2002, 2002 GRUR 963, according to which the extension of the limit permitting press services to summarize the press in electronic format for in-company purposes is compatible, under certain conditions, with the three-step test (the ruling, admittedly, precedes the German Implementation Act of 10 September 2003).
78. It is interesting to note that a recent Dutch decision in a similar case came to the opposite conclusion (first instance court of The Hague (Rb's-Gavenhage) of 2 March 2005, 2005 Computerrecht 143, comment by K.J. KOELMAN;
79. 2005 AMI 103, comment by J. SEIGNETTE;
80. on this decision see also S. DUSOLLIER, "L'encadrement des exceptions au droit d'auteur par le test des trois étapes", 2005 I.R.D.I. 217).
81. Admittedly, in the Dutch case the press services were also licensed to purchase and archive, which suggests a greater prejudice for the rightholders. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the interpretation of the test by different national judges still varies considerably. For other examples from judicial practice see K.J. KOELMAN, "Fixing the three-step test", supra note 22.
82. Report of the Special Group dated 15 June 2000, United States, Art. 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R. On this decision see in particular Y. GAUBIAC, "Les exceptions au droit d'auteur: un nouvel avenir?", June 2001 Comm. com. électr. 12;
83. J.C. GINSBURG, "Towards supranational copyright law? The WTO Panel decision and the "three-step test" for copyright exceptions", 187 RIDA 2 (2001);
84. A. LUCAS, "Le «triple test» de l'article 13 de l'Accord ADPIC à la lumière du rapport du Groupe spécial de l'OMC « Etats-Unis Article 110 5) de la Loi sur le droit d'auteur»", in: P. GANEA, C. HEATH & G. SCHRICKER (eds.), "Urheberrecht, Gestern - Heute - Morgen, Mélanges A. Dietz" 423 (Beck, Munich 2001);
85. M. CLÉMENT-FONTAINE, in: M. VIVANT (ed.), "Les grands arrêts des la propriété intellectuelle" 169 (Dalloz, Paris 2004).
86. C. GEIGER, comment to the Paris District Court, supra note 8.
87. See also M. BUYDENS & S. DUSOLLIER, supra note 22, at 12.
88. For a more extensive summary see C. GEIGER, "Droit d'auteur et droit du public à l'information" 418 et seq. (Litec 2004).
89. For a normative approach for the second step, cf. also J.C. GINSBURG, supra note 28, at 23.
90. Such a reading would also be incompatible with the spirit of the three-step test as found in the 1996 WIPO Treaty (Art. 10), which the Directive is supposed to implement. The Agreed Statement accompanying the Treaty states that, "It is understood that the provisions of Art. 10 permit Contracting Parties to carry forward and appropriately extend into the digital environment limitations and exceptions in their national laws which have been considered acceptable under the Berne Convention. Similarly, these provisions should be understood to permit Contracting Parties to devise new exceptions and limitations that are appropriate in the digital network environment."
91. Article 30, TRIPS: "Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties." The wording of the second step is, admittedly, somewhat different and suggests that the conflict with normal exploitation may be justified, which permits a normative approach from the second step on. Article 30 thus permits a more flexible application of the test.
92. Report by the WIPO Special Group of 17 March 2000 (WT/DS114/R), No. 7.58. On this report, see the very interesting article by M. SENFTLEBEN, "Towards a Horizontal Standard for Limiting Intellectual Property Rights? WTO Panel Reports Shed Light on the Three-Step Test in Copyright Law and Related Tests in Patent and Trademark Law", 37 IIC 407 (2006).
93. Particularly, since the case concerned a copy of a DVD on a VHS cassette (hence an analogue copy) so that the film could be watched on a video recorder. It is virtually certain that the user would not have bought another copy for this purpose.
94. Cf. in particular the OECD study on the impact of peer-to-peer file sharing on the disc industry, according to which "it is very difficult to establish a basis to prove causal relationship between the size of the drop in music sales (i.e. the size of the downloading-induced sales displacement) and the rise of file-sharing" (OECD, "Working Party on the Information Economy, Digital Broadband Content: Music", 8 June 2005 DSTI/ICCP/IE (2004) 12/Final), at 78). The study concerns file sharing, which is obviously not the same thing as making private copies from a medium. But the conclusions should apply a fortiori since in the case of the private copy, the rightholders receive a fee on the sale of unrecorded media.
95. However, these fees are often shared equally amongst exploiters and authors, which explains why the latter are often opposed to the suppression of the exception in favour of technical measures, since this would deprive them in the long term of the fee provided by the law (in this sense see A. DIETZ, "Continuation of the Levy System for Private Copying also in the Digital Era in Germany", 2003 A&M 348).
96. Paris District Court, 10 January 2006, supra note 10.
97. I.e. to take into account the objectives of protection (see in this sense M. VIVANT, "La transposition de la directive sur le droit d'auteur et les droits voisins dans la société de l'information en France, Analyse critique et prospective", 15 Propr. intell. 153 (2005).
98. Which, as we have seen above, seems probable, but is far from being certain at the present stage.
99. See also M. VIVANT, supra note 38, at 151 et seq., who rightly emphasises the fact that "the art of judging is an art of balancing".
100. On this question see C. GEIGER, "L'avenir des exceptions au droit d'auteur, Observations en vue d'une nécessaire adaptation et harmonisation du système", 2005 JCP G I, at 186.
101. There are, however, changes worth noticing, such as the introduction into French law of an exception for teaching and research purposes (Art. L. 122-5, No. 3e IPC; this article, however, will not enter into force until 2009!), and an exception allowing for the reproduction of artistic or architectural works for information purposes (Art. L. 122-5, No. 9 IPC). Even if these limitations already exist in most European countries, this development in France, traditionally very reluctant to adopt such exceptions, must certainly be noted.
102. To use an expression by Professor Caron, supra note 14, at 25.
103. On the social function of copyright see C. GEIGER, supra note 30, at No 27, and by the same author, "Author's Right, Copyright and the Public's Right to Information: A Complex Relationship", in: F. MACMILLAN (ed.), "New Directions in Copyright Law" Vol. 5, (Edgar Publishing, London 2006) (forthcoming).;
104. F. SIIRIAINEN, "L'accès du lecteur àl'uvre et le droit d'auteur", in: E. DREYER & P. LE FLOCH (eds.), "Le Lecteur, Approche sociologique, économique et juridique" 184 (L'Harmattan, 2004).
105. For intellectual property see M. VIVANT, in: M. VIVANT (ed.), "Les grands arrêts de la propriété intellectuelle" notice No. 1 (Dalloz, 2004).
106. See as examples M. VIVANT, "Propriété intellectuelle et nouvelles technologies, À la recherche d'un nouveau paradigme, Université de tous les savoirs, Vol. 5: «Qu'est ce que les technologies?»" 201 (Odile Jacob, 2001);
107. R.M. HILTY, "Copyright in a Digital Dilemma", 3 Max Planck Research 48 (2003);
108. C. GEIGER, supra note 30. See also "La propriété intellectuelle en question (s), Regards croisés européens" (Litec, Paris 2006).
109. See also R.M. HILTY & C. GEIGER (eds.), "The Balance of Interests in Copyright Law", proceedings of the conference held in Berlin, 2004 (available at: «http://www.intellecprop.mpg.de»).
110. Cf. C. GEIGER, "Pour une plus grande flexibilité dans le maniement des exceptions au droit d'auteur", 2004 A&M 213, for a new equilibrium based on the application of the fundamental rights.
111. C. DU PASQUIER, "Introduction à la théorie générale et à la philosophie du Droit" 19 (Delachaux et Niestlé, 4th ed. 1967).
112. Cf. C. GEIGER, "Right to Copy v. Three-Step Test, The Future of the Private Copy Exception in the Digital Environment", 2005 Computer Law Review international (CRi) 7;
113. J.-C. GALLOUX, "Limitations et exceptions au droit d'auteur en France, Exception française ou paradoxe français?, Paper presented at the French-German Copyright Conferences organised by the Max Planck Institute and IRPI, Munich, 22 April 2005 (proceedings to be published 2006).
114. The German Federal Constitutional Court stated this very clearly in its Schoolbook decision of 7 July 1971, 1972 GRUR 481; 3 IIC 394 (1972).
115. M. SENFTLEBEN, "Copyright, Limitations and the Three-Step Test" 226 (Kluwer, The Hague 2004);
116. S. DUSOLLIER, supra note 28, at 221.
117. Let us for instance take the case were a film student copies the same DVD as part of a paper that he is preparing on the director David Lynch. The utilisation would seem to benefit from a stronger justification than if the film was being copied merely for reasons of consumption. In the absence of an exception permitting reproduction for research purposes in France, it seems to us that the information justification should be taken into account within the framework of the application of the limit for private copies.
118. Professor Sirinelli concludes his summary report to the ALAI Conference on the limits to copyright by suggesting that such a solution combining the two approaches is probably ideal ("Synthèse des Journées d'Etudes de l'ALAI", in: L. BAULCH, M. GREEN & M. WYBURN (eds.), "The Boundaries of Copyright: its proper limitations and exceptions", Proceedings of the ALAI Study Days 1998, 1999 Australian Copyright Council 136).
119. As we have already emphasised, authors and exploiters can have diverging interests, specifically concerning the implementation of technical protection measures (supra note 36). It would be important to clarify the perspective to be taken into account. If the Bern Convention and the 1996 WIPO Treaty are directed at "the author's legitimate interests", the TRIPS Agreements and the Directive are directed at "the legitimate interests of the right-holders". If the author really occupies a predominant position in the regulation, as is often argued, it should therefore be the author's interests that take priority over those of the right-holder. For a clear distinction of the interest of the author and of the exploiters in the digital world, see also A. PEUKERT, "A Bipolar Copyright System for the Digital Network Environment" 28 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 1 (2005).
120. For such a reading see also C. GEIGER, supra note 48, at 12.
121. V.-L. BENABOU, "La transposition des directives en droit interne: l'exemple du droit d'auteur", 30 Légicom 35 (2004).
122. More generally, see H. SCHEER, "The Interaction between the ECHR and EC Law, a Case Study in the Field of EC Competition Law", 2004 ZEuS 690.
123. C. GEIGER, "Fundamental Rights, a Safeguard for the Coherence of Intellectual Property Law?" 35 IIC 268 (2004).
124. See C. GEIGER, "Constitutionalising Intellectual Property Law, The Influence of Fundamental Rights on Intellectual Property in the European Union", 37 IIC 371 (2006).
125. M. SENFTLEBEN, supra note 50, at 193.
126. S. DUSOLLIER, supra note 28, at 220. This author also adds that "to argue differently would lead to the exceptions becoming pointless and gradually disappearing".
127. Such a reading proposed by K.J. KOELMAN, article op. cit., supra note 22.
128. In this context it is interesting to recall that the definitive wording of the test at the Stockholm Diplomatic Conference in 1967, which led to the inclusion of the three-step test in the Bern Convention, was proposed by the delegation of the United Kingdom, a country that permits an exception for fair dealing. Cf. M. SENFTLEBEN, supra note 50, at 50 et seq.
129. Cf. the very interesting article by D. NIMMER, "The Public Domain, Fairest of Them All, and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use", 66 Law & Contemp. Prob. 280 (2003).
130. See M. SENFTLEBEN, "Beperkingen à la carte: Waarom de Auteurrechtrichtlijn ruimte lat voor fair use", 1 AMI 10 (2003). The author shows very convincingly that the exhaustive list of the Directive does not prevent a certain openness by means of the three-step test.
131. Having said this, the uncertainty resulting from a moderate flexibility of the regulation of the limits appears to us to be less worrying than that resulting from the increasing complexity of the legal rule to be applied. The law is becoming less and less readable for the citizens who are expected to submit to it, which constitutes a large uncertainty factor as regards the state of the law (cf. J. DE CLAUSADE, "Sécurité juridique et complexité du droit, considérations générales du Conseil d'Etat", 2006 D. 737). The French bill for the implementation of the Directive seems to be an excellent illustration of this.
132. It is true that such a concept might appear to depart a little from the Continental tradition and come closer to the methods of the common law countries, where the judge has a greater leeway. Having said this, the context of Community harmonisation in which copyright is located today requires, in our opinion, a certain permeability with respect to the methods used by judges to apply the law. The Community texts depart considerably from the Continental tradition in terms of their wording. Nevertheless, they must be implemented. The result is a law that no longer has the coherence and intelligibility that it might have had in the past (cf. J. DE CLAUSADE, supra note 64).
133. It seems to us that if the legislative method changes, the judicial method can equally evolve, above all if this permits balanced solutions to be reached - or the process of the integration of the law in its entirety must be rejected (on this question see the fascinating article by K.H.T. SCHIEMANN, judge at the European Court of Justice, "Should we come together? Reflexions on different styles of judicial reasoning", 2006 ZEuS 1).
134. The most classical doctrine is unanimous on this point.
135. If it is agreed that the principle is liberty and that exclusivity is the exception, it would not be illogical. See the delightful image of Professor Vivant, according to whom intellectual property rights constitute "an archipelago where each private right, each one based on a particular intellectual creation, emerges like an island from the ocean subject to regime of liberty" (J. FOYER & M. VIVANT, "Le droit des brevets", 1991 PUF 9).
136. See also in this sense, C. GEIGER, supra note 56.
137. It should, however, be admitted that given the result adopted by the French National Assembly, returning the decision to a Regulation Authority (Arts. L. 331-8, L. 331-17 IPC), the judges would not have made much progress.