Pakistan's dangerous game

Survival

Volumn 49, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 15-32

  Jones, Seth G ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947690814     PISSN: 00396338     EISSN: 14682699     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00396330701254495     Document Type: Article

References (64)

1. Rachel Morarjee, 'NATO Force Too Weak for Early Afghan Success, Says General', Financial Times, 1 November 2006, p. 6.
2. Joseph D. Celeski, Operationalizing COIN (Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2005).
3. John Gordon et al., The Challenge of Insurgency, draft document, RAND, 2006.
4. James Fearon, testimony to US House of Representatives, Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations on 'Iraq: Democracy or Civil War?', 13 September 2006.
5. David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (St Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2005), p. 41.
6. Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 53-78.
7. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, 'Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War', American Political Science Review, vol. 97, no. 1, February 2003, pp. 75-90.
8. Quoted in Praveen Swami, 'Covert Contestation', Frontline, vol. 22, no. 19, September 2005.
9. David C. Mulford, Afghanistan has made a Remarkable Transition (New Delhi: US Department of State, February 2006)
10. Amin Tarzi, 'Afghanistan: Kabul's India Ties Worry Pakistan', Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 16 April 2006.
11. Border Roads Organisation, Vision, Mission, Role (Delhi: Border Roads Organisation, 2006).
12. Eric Schmitt and David S. Cloud, 'U.S. May Start Pulling Out of Afghanistan Next Spring', New York Times, 14 September 2005, p. 3.
13. Author interviews with Afghan and Pakistani government officials, 2006.
14. Interviews with US, UN, NATO and Afghan government officials, Afghanistan, 2006 and 2007.
15. Barnett R. Rubin, Afghanistan and the International Community: Implementing the Afghanistan Compact (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006), p. 24.
16. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Books, 2004)
17. Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990)
18. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000)
19. William Maley (ed.), Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban (New York: New York University Press, 2001)
20. Byman, Deadly Connections, pp. 194-8.
21. See, for example, Peace Pact North Waziristan, 5 September 2006. This agreement was negotiated by a political agent from North Waziristan representing Governor N.W.F.P Federal Government, and tribal representatives from North Waziristan, Local Mujahideen N.W.F.P, Atmanzai Tribe.
22. Author interview with Afghan Foreign Minister Rangin Dadfar Spanta, Washington DC, July 2006;
23. Lieutenant-General David W. Barno, Afghanistan: The Security Outlook (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004)
24. Ranger Observations From OEF and OIF: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2005), p. 21
25. David L. Buffaloe, Conventional Forces in Low-Intensity Conflict: The 82nd Airborne in Firebase Shkin (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, Institute of Land Warfare, 2004), pp. 16-17.
26. Ahmed Rashid, 'Who's Winning the War on Terror?' YaleGlobal, 5 September 2003.
27. Author interview with officials from several Western government agencies, 2005 and 2006.
28. Ali Jalali, 'The Future of Afghanistan', Parameters, vol. 36, no. 1, Spring 2006, p. 8.
29. 'Outgoing U.S. Envoy Enthusiastic about Afghanistan's Future', Sherberghan Jowzjan Aina Television, 18 June 2005. Ambassador Khalilzad's comments were supported by President Karzai's office in 'Afghan Spokesman Calls on Pakistan to Curb Taliban Activities', Kabul Tolu Television, 21 June 2005.
30. 'Pakistan Strikes Suspected al Qaeda Camp', Associated Press, 1 March 2006.
31. There have been some notable exceptions, such as the Pakistani government's capture of Taliban spokesman Abdol Latifollah Hakimi in October 2005. The Pakistani government has also closed a few businesses owned by Taliban-linked traders. In January 2006, for example, the Pakistani government closed Haji Abdul Bari's Special Company in Peshawar and the Maria Food Company in Islamabad, and froze $5 million in their accounts, because the owners helped finance Taliban fighters.
32. Intikhab Amir, 'Waziristan: No Man's Land', The Herald (Pakistan), April 2006, p. 78.
33. Alex Alexiev, 'Tablighi Jamaat: Jihad's Stealthy Legions', Middle East Quarterly, vol. 12, no. 1, Winter 2005.
34. On zakat and jihad, also see Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennyslvania Press, 2004).
35. Author interviews with Afghan, US, European and Pakistani government officials, 2004, 2005 and 2006.
36. Author interviews with European, Afghan and Pakistani government officials, 2004, 2005 and 2006. Also see Ali Jalali, 'The Future of Afghanistan', Parameters, vol. 36, no. 1, Spring 2006, p. 8.
37. Author interviews with US government officials in Shkin, Afghanistan, April 2006. Al-Jazeera interview with Mullah Dadullah, July 2005. Also see such press accounts as Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, 'Unholy Allies', Newsweek, 26 September 2005, pp. 40-42.
38. Author interviews with Afghan government officials, Kabul, Afghanistan, August 2006. Al-Jazeera interview with Dadullah, July 2005. Also see such press accounts as Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, 'Unholy Allies', Newsweek, 26 September 2005, pp. 40-42.
39. In what appeared as a forced confession, Saeed Allah Khan stated: 'I worked as a spy for the Americans along with four other people. The group received $45,000 and my share is $7,000.' Hekmat Karzai, Afghanistan and the Globalisation of Terrorist Tactics (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, January 2006), p. 2.
40. On the rationale for suicide bombers, see al-Jazeera interview with Dadullah, February 2006.
41. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Knights under the Prophets Banner, December 2001, part 11.
42. Hekmat Karzai, Afghanistan and the Logic of Suicide Terrorism (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, March 2006)
43. 'Taliban Claim Responsibility for Suicide Bomb Attack in Afghan Kandahar Province', Peshawar Afghan Islamic Press, 9 October 2005
44. 'Pajhwok News Describes Video of Afghan Beheading by "Masked Arabs", Taliban', Kabul Pajhwok Afghan News, 9 October 2005
45. 'Canadian Soldier Dies in Suicide Attack in Kandahar', Afghan Islamic Press, 3 March 2006
46. 'Taliban Claim Attack on Police in Jalalabad, Nangarhar Province', Kabul National TV, 7 January 2006.
47. See, for example, Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005)
48. Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005)
49. Christoph Reuter, My Life is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004)
50. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).
51. Hekmat Karzai and Seth G. Jones, 'How to Curb Rising Suicide Terrorism in Afghanistan', Christian Science Monitor, 18 July 2006.
52. In its public rhetoric, the Taliban has tended to identify the suicide bombers as Afghans, since it suggests there is a significant indigenous component of the insurgency.
53. Author interview with US government officials, Kabul, Afghanistan, December 2005.
54. This finding is consistent with the testimony of key US officials, such as Defense Intelligence Agency Director Lieutenant-General Michael D. Maples. See Lieutentant-General Michael D. Maples, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Statement for the Record, Senate Armed Services Committee, 28 February 2006.
55. Amrullah Saleh, Strategy of Insurgents and Terrorists in Afghanistan (Kabul: National Directorate for Security, 2006), p. 4.
56. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, pp. 11-12, 78-9.
57. Fearon and Laitin, 'Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War', pp. 75-90
58. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, pp. 35-7.
59. Stephen T. Hosmer, The Army's Role in Counterinsurgency and Insurgency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1990), pp. 30-31
60. Daniel Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001)
61. Byman, Deadly Connections.
62. Author interviews with US and European intelligence officials, Kabul, Afghanistan, 2004, 2005 and 2006.
63. Celeski, Operationalizing COIN.
64. Mulford, Afghanistan Has Made a Remarkable Transition.