Ackerman's higher lawmaking in comparative constitutional perspective: Constitutional moments as constitutional failures?

International Journal of Constitutional Law

Volumn 6, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 193-230

  Choudhry, Sujit ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 42049105572     PISSN: 14742640     EISSN: 14742659     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/icon/mon002     Document Type: Article

References (199)

1. Bruce Ackerman, Rooted Cosmopolitanism, 104 ETHICS 516, 517 (1994).
2. BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION (Yale Univ. Press 1992).
3. Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771, 772 (1997).
4. Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 665 (2000).
5. BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (Yale Univ. Press 2006).
6. Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984);
7. Bruce Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164 (1988);
8. Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453 (1989);
9. Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 475 (1995);
10. Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995);
11. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (Harvard Univ. Press 1995) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS
12. 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (Harvard Univ. Press 2001) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS
13. Bruce Ackerman, 2006 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737 (2007) [hereinafter Ackerman, Holmes Lectures].
14. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 59.
15. James E. Fleming, We the Unconventional American People, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1515 (1998).
16. Ackerman, supra note 3, at 772-773.
17. Id. at 773.
18. Id. at 774-775.
19. Ackerman, supra note 4, at 642.
20. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 3.
21. Id. at 33.
22. Id. at 8-16.
23. For other attempts to explore the comparative implications of the notion of the constitutional moment, see Peter Lindseth, Law, History and Memory: "Republican Moments" and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Review in France, 3 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 49 (1996/97);
24. Sanford Levinson, Transitions, 108 YALE L.J. 2215 (1999);
25. Neil Walker, After the Constitutional Moment, in A CONSTITUTION FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION: FIRST COMMENTS ON THE 2003 DRAFT OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION (Ingolf Pernice & Miguel Maduro eds., Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2004), available at http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/uploads/constitution/32_03.pdf (also published as Federal Trust Online Paper 32/03, 2003)
26. Neil Walker, The Legacy of Europe's Constitutional Moment, 11 CONSTELLATIONS 368 (2004);
27. András Sajó, Constitution without the Constitutional Moment: A View from the New Member States, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. (I·CON) 243 (2005)
28. Mark Tushnet, Misleading Metaphors in Comparative Constitutionalism: Moments and Enthusiasm, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. (I·CON) 262 (2005).
29. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
30. Terrance Sandalow, Abstract Democracy: A Review of Ackerman's We the People, 9 CONST. COMMENT 309, 310 (1992).
31. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 34-57.
32. Id. at 34.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 40.
36. Id. at 59.
37. In the most recent statement of his theory, Ackerman adds the "Civil Rights Revolution" - which he also terms the "Second Reconstruction" - to his list of constitutional moments, although not one that launched a new constitutional regime. Ackerman, Holmes Lectures, supra note 6.
38. Lawrence Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1240-1244 (1995).
39. ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 6, at 12.
40. See Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 6, for details.
41. See id. (it is rich with detail).
42. U.S. CONST. art. IV.
43. ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 6, at 99-185.
44. Id. at 270.
45. For a helpful explanation of how the constitution of a legal-political order is not its rule of recognition, see Joseph Raz, On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 152, 160-162 (Larry Alexander ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998).
46. HERBERT LIONEL ADOLPHUS (H.L.A.) HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 105-107 (Oxford Univ. Press 1961). This perspective on the ultimate root or title of a constitutional order raises a host of interesting issues that we must bracket for the moment. These include whose acceptance and what kind of acceptance must be met for a rule of recognition to "exist."
47. For a recent discussion, see Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: Whose Practices Ground U.S. Law?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 719 (2006)
48. Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 145 (Sanford Levinson ed., Univ. Chicago Press 1995).
49. See also Frederick Schauer, Deliberating About Deliberation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1187 (1992)
50. (reviewing ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6).
51. Cf. Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 621 (1987).
52. ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 6, at 16.
53. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 171.
54. ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 6, at 33.
55. Id. at 116.
56. Id. at 14.
57. Id. at 270.
58. Id. at 13.
59. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 266.
60. Id.
61. ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 6, at 18-20.
62. See, e.g., Sandalow, supra note 18;
63. Schauer, supra note 36;
64. Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 HARV. L. REV. 918 (1992)
65. Michael Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REV. 759 (1992);
66. William W. Fisher III, The Defects of Dualism, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 955 (1992);
67. Jonathan Simon, Columbus in the Twilight Zone: Bruce Ackerman's 'Discovery' of the Constitution, 17 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 501 (1992);
68. Jennifer Nedelsky, The Puzzle and Demands of Modern Constitutionalism 104 ETHICS 500 (1994);
69. Kent Greenawalt, Dualism and Its Status, 104 ETHICS 480 (1994);
70. Don Herzog, Democratic Credentials, 104 ETHICS 467 (1994 );
71. James E. Fleming, We the Exceptional American People, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 355 (1994);
72. Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 115 (1994);
73. Larry Kramer, What's a Constitution For Anyway? Of History and Theory, Bruce Ackerman and the New Deal, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 885 (1996)
74. Frank Michelman, Constitutional Fidelity/Democratic Agency, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1537 (1997);
75. Lawrence Sager, The Betrayal of Judgment, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1545 (1997);
76. Mark Tushnet, Constituting We the People, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1557 (1997);
77. Colin Gordon, Rethinking the New Deal, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 2029 (1998);
78. L.A. Powe, Jr., Ackermania or Uncomfortable Truths?, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 547 (1998);
79. Fleming, supra note 8;
80. William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1999);
81. Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Civics 2000: Process Constitutionalism at Yale 97 MICH. L. REV. 1520 (1999);
82. Michael Gerhardt, Ackermania: The Quest for a Common Law of Higher Lawmaking, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1731 (1999);
83. Symposium, Moments of Change: Transformation in American Constitutionalism, 108 YALE L.J. 1917 (1999).
84. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 44.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 6, at 124 (emphasis added).
88. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
89. ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 6, at 295-296, 303 (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 382.
91. Finally, Ackerman argues that an awareness of the higher lawmaking system was evident during the attempt of Reagan Republicans to make transformative appointments to the Supreme Court (such as Robert Bork). In describing the (contemporaneous) attempt of the Reagan Republicans to engage in constitutional politics, he suggests that the higher lawmaking system "is now at the very center of the constitutional consciousness of the American People." ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 268.
92. Looking back at the failed Bork appointment in Transformations, he reiterates that" [w]hen citizens of the modern republic made their own efforts to gain higher lawmaking authority, it offered them an established language and process within which to proceed." ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 6, at 389.
93. HART, supra note 34, at 88.
94. Ackerman's critics agree that his argument stands or falls on the historical case he makes for higher lawmaking. As Stephen Griffin puts it, "[w]ithout self-conscious understanding, Ackerman ... has an sic] historical narrative that greatly deepens our understanding of how constitutional change has occurred through essentially political means. But he does not have evidence of a legal process." Stephen Griffin, Constitutional Theory Transformed, 108 YALE L.J. 2115, 2147 (1999).
95. ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 6, at 343.
96. See Jack N. Rakove, The Super-Legality of the Constitution, or, a Federalist Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Neo-Federalism, 108 YALE L.J. 1931 (1999);
97. Michael Les Benedict, Constitutional History and Constitutional Theory: Reflections on Ackerman, Reconstruction, and the Transformation of the American Constitution, 108 YALE L.J. 2011 (1999);
98. Rogers Smith, Legitimating Reconstruction: The Limits of Legalism, 108 YALE L.J. 2039 (1999);
99. William E. Leuchtenburg, When The People Spoke, What Did They Say? The Election of 1936 and the Ackerman Thesis, 108 YALE L.J. 2077 (1999);
100. Griffin, supra note 56.
101. Rogers Smith, for example, criticizes Ackerman because his "effort to vindicate the procedural legitimacy of Reconstruction within his terms leads him to slight the understandings of American constitutional institutions and processes that many of the relevant actors publicly advanced at the time." Smith, supra note 58, at 2056.
102. U.S. 36 (1873).
103. Id. at 67.
104. ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 6, at 245.
105. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937);
106. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 58 (1937).
107. ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 6, at 360.
108. E.g., United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938);
109. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
110. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
111. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
112. 307 U.S. 433, 449-450 (1939).
113. 307 U.S. 433, 450 (1939).
114. 505 U.S. 833, 861-862 (1992).
115. E.g., Smith, supra note 58;
116. and Rakove, supra note 58.
117. ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 6, at 29.
118. Id. at 389.
119. Ackerman, Holmes Lectures, supra note 6.
120. Id. at 1743 & 1761.
121. Id. at 1748.
122. Jeremy Waldron, Judicial Review and the Conditions of Democracy, 6 J. POL. PHIL. 335 (1998).
123. Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 6, at 569-570 (emphasis added).
124. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5 (1985), §§ 58-68, 92, 92A, 93, 94A & 94 [hereinafter Constitution Act, 1867].
125. Id. §§ 5, 6, 58-63, 65-68, 71-80, 82-87.
126. Id. §§ 3, 4, 9-57, 91, 92(10), 92A(2), 94, 94A, 95, 96-101.
127. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.), §52 [hereinafter Constitution Act, 1982].
128. Id. §§ 38-47.
129. Id. §45.
130. Id.
131. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 1.
132. Id. at para. 32.
133. Id. at para. 48.
134. Id. at para. 87. The Court also referred to a "clear repudiation of the existing constitutional order and the clear expression of the desire to pursue secession by the population of a province" or "clear repudiation by the people of Quebec of the existing constitutional order."
135. Id. at para. 88.
136. Id. at para. 87.
137. Id. at para. 148. In another formulation, the Court stated that the question was one which asked Quebecers to indicate "that they no longer wish to remain in Canada."
138. Id. at para. 151.
139. The Court also used other formulations: "the unambiguous expression of a clear majority of Quebecers." Id. at para. 104.
140. See also id. at para. 150: "a clear majority vote in Quebec."
141. Id. at para. 153. What constitutes a "clear majority " and a " clear question" has generated extensive commentary in the literature; I will not address it here.
142. Id. at para. 87.
143. Id. at para. 88.
144. Id. at para. 90.
145. Id.
146. Id. at para. 91.
147. Id. at para. 92.
148. Id. at para. 93.
149. (a) "the other provinces and the federal government" (id. at paras. 88, 151
150. also see id. at paras. 92, 103)
151. (b) Quebec, the federal government, the other provinces, and "other participants"; id. at para. 92;
152. (c) Quebec and the other provincial governments, but perhaps not the federal government;
153. (d) bilateral negotiations involving "the representatives of two legitimate majorities, namely the clear majority of the population of Quebec, and the clear majority of Canada as a whole, whatever that may be" - perhaps meaning the federal government, or potentially a joint federal-provincial negotiating team. ( Id. at para. 93; also see id. at para. 152).
154. Id. at para. 88.
155. Id. at para. 90. Thus, the Court said, "[t]he negotiation process must be conducted with an eye to the constitutional principles."
156. Id. at para. 94.
157. Id. at 104.
158. Id. at para. 93;
159. see also id. at paras. 101, 153.
160. The "reconciliation" of principles connotes that principles cannot override one another. As the Court said earlier in its reasons: "These defining principles function in symbiosis. No single principle can be defined in isolation from the others, nor does any one principle trump or exclude the operation of any other." Id. at para. 49.
161. Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Invocations, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 1295 (1997).
162. Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985 ).
163. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 at para. 49.
164. Id. at para. 52.
165. Id. at para. 53.
166. Id. at para. 84.
167. Constitution Act, 1982, §46.
168. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 53
169. (quoting Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 104).
170. Constitution Act, 1867.
171. ROY ROMANOW, JOHN WHYTE & HOWARD LEESON, CANADA... NOTWITHSTANDING: THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION, 1976 - 1982 (Carswell/Methuen 1984).
172. The Balfour Declaration stated that Canada and Britain were "equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs." SESSIONAL PAPERS, 1926, [Cmd.] 2768.
173. In the interim, the power of constitutional amendment rested with Britain. Even in the Statute of Westminster enacted in 1931, whereby the imperial Parliament formally "terminated" its power to legislate for Canada and thereby recognized Canada's political independence, an exception was made for amendments to the Canadian Constitution. Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22, 23 Geo. 5, c. 4 (U.K.).
174. PETER H. RUSSELL, CONSTITUTIONAL ODYSSEY: CAN CANADIANS BECOME A SOVEREIGN PEOPLE? (2d ed., Univ. Toronto Press 1993).
175. Peter Oliver, Canada, Quebec, and Constitutional Amendment, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 519 (1999).
176. See also PETER OLIVER, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDEPENDENCE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND NEW ZEALAND (Oxford Univ. Press 2005).
177. Sujit Choudhry & Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens, Frank Iacobucci as Constitution-Maker: From the Quebec Veto Reference to the Meech Lake Accord and the Quebec Secession Reference, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 165 (2007).
178. Constitution Act, 1982, §41.
179. Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753.
180. See, generally, Documents Relating to the Constitution Act, 1982, 30 MCGILL L.J. 645 (1984/85).
181. An act respecting the process for determining the political and constitutional future of Québec, S.Q. 1991, ch. 34.
182. Motion Introducing the Referendum Question, presented by Premier Jacques Parizeau to the National Assembly of Quebec, Sept. 7, 1995.
183. Bill 1, An Act Respecting the Future of Québec, 1st Sess., 35th Leg., Quebec, 1995.
184. The case was a constitutional challenge to the precursor of Bill 1: Draft Bill, An Act Respecting the Sovereignty of Quebec, 1st Sess., 35th Leg., Quebec, 1994.
185. Motion of Attorney General of Quebec to Dismiss Mr. Bertrand's Motion for Interlocutory Measures, Bertrand v. Bégin, Aug. 24, 1995, Québec 200-05-002117-955 (Sup. Ct.) (author's translation).
186. Bertrand v. Quebec (Procureur General), [1995] J.Q. no 2484, at para. 8 (author's translation).
187. Bertrand v. Quebec (Procureur General), [1995] 127 D.L.R. (4th) 408, 417 (Que. S.C.).
188. Id. at 428.
189. Press conference with Paul Bégin, Attorney General of Quebec (Sept. 8, 1995).
190. Paul Wells & Philip Authier, Sovereignty Law Illegal, Rock Says, MONTREAL GAZETTE, Dec. 16, 1994, at A1.
191. Jim Brown, Not Our Job to Negotiate Split: PM, MONTREAL GAZETTE, Dec. 20, 1994, at A20.
192. As quoted by former Chief Justice Lamer in his question to counsel for the Attorney General of Canada in oral hearing of the Reference re Secession of Quebec (Reference re Secession of Quebec, Transcription of Cassettes, Feb. 19, 1998, at 4).
193. Id. at 9.
194. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at paras. 86-88.
195. Id. at para. 84.
196. Id. at para. 91.
197. Daniel Philpott, In Defence of Self-Determination, 105 ETHICS 352 (1995).
198. See WILL KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR: NATIONALISM, MULTICULTURALISM, AND CITIZENSHIP 113-114 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001).
199. John Finnis, Revolutions and Continuity of Law, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE: SECOND SERIES 64 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1973).