Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 63, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 145-165

  Kirkegaard, René ^a   Overgaard, Per Baltzer ^b  

^a BROCK UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b AARHUS UNIVERSITY   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Asymmetric bidders; First price and second price auctions; Pre auction offers

Indexed keywords

EID: 41649097026     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.09.006     Document Type: Article

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