A short proof of the Bulow-Klemperer auctions vs. negotiations result

Economic Theory

Volumn 28, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 449-452

  Kirkegaard, René ^a  

^a BROCK UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Auctions; Negotiations; Rationing

Indexed keywords

EID: 23344448585     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0593-2     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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9. Wang, R.: Bidding and renegotiation in procurement auctions. European Economic Review 44, 1577-1597 (2000)