Applying the Rome Statutes complementarity principle: Drawing lessons from the prosecution of core crimes by states acting under the universality principle

Criminal Law Forum

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 153-180

  Ryngaert, Cedric ^a  

^a Public International Law   (Netherlands)

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EID: 41149129214     PISSN: 10468374     EISSN: 15729850     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10609-007-9053-6     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (94)

1. See inter alia J.K. KLEFFNER & G. KOR (eds.), Complementary views on complementarity: Proceedings of the International Roundtable on the Complementary Nature of the International Criminal Court, Amsterdam, 25-26 June 2004, The Hague, TMC Asser Press, xvi + 181 p.;
2. C. STAHN, "Complementarity, Amnesties and Alternative Forms of Justice: Some Interpretative Guidelines for the International Criminal Court", 3 J.I.C.J. 695 (2005);
3. L. YANG, "On the Principle of Complementarity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court", 4 Chinese J. Int'l. L. 121 (2005);
4. E. CARNERO ROJO, "The Role of Fair Trial Considerations in the Complementarity Regime of the International Criminal Court : from "No Peace without Justice" to "No Peace with Victor's Justice?", 18 Leiden J. Int'l. L. 829 (2005);
5. M. BENZING, "The complementarity regime of the International Criminal Court: International Criminal Justice Between State Sovereignty and the Fight Against Impunity", 7 Max Planck Yb. UN Law 591 (2004);
6. J.K. KLEFFNER, "The Impact of Complementarity of National Implementation of Substantive International Criminal Law", 1 J.I.C.J. 86 (2003);
7. M.M. EL ZEIDY, "The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement International Criminal Law", 23 Mich. J. Int'l. L. 869 (2002).
8. See also W.W. BURKE-WHITE, "A. Community of Courts: Toward a System of International Criminal Law Enforcement", 24 Mich. J. Int'l. L. 2002-2003, 1, 86-94.
9. Article 17 (2) of the ICC Statute: " In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall consider, having regard to the principles of due process recognized by international law, whether one or more of the following exist, as applicable: (a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in article 5; (b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice; (c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice."Article 17 (3) of the ICC Statute: "In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings."
10. C. RYNGAERT, "Universal Jurisdiction in an ICC Era: A Role to Play for EU Member States with the Support of the European Union", Eur. J. Crime, Crim. L. & Crim. Justice 46 (2006).
11. The risk of international tension caused States to scrap or contemplate scrapping victims' rights of initiation. Belgium scrapped the possibility of civil party petition in 2003 (see new Article 10bis and 12bis of the Preliminary Title to the Code of Criminal Procedure, PT CCP). France contemplates scrapping it in its pending ICC implementing legislation. See Draft Law Adapting French Legislation to the International Criminal Court Statute and Amending Provisions of the Criminal Code, Military Justice Code, the Press Freedom Law of 29 July 1881 and the Criminal Procedure Code. The United Kingdom contemplates scrapping the possibility for victims of applying for a warrant for the arrest of a presumed perpetrator of an international crime, after on September 10, 2005, a Senior District Judge issued, at the request of a number of Palestinian victims, a warrant for the arrest of Israeli Major General (retired) Doron Almog on suspicion of committing a grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention 1949 in the occupied Palestinian Territory. See V. DODD, "UK Considers Curbing Citizens' Right to Arrest Alleged War Criminals", The Guardian, February 3, 2006. Spain's 'popular action' has so far withstood criticism.
12. §153 (f) of the German Code of Criminal Procedure (StPO).
13. Belgium: Article 10,1°Ws, 2° PT CCP; Article 12WJ, 2° PT CCP (providing that a prosecutor's decision not to prosecute is not amenable to appeal). See however Constitutional Court, judgment nr. 62, 23 March 2005, § B.9, available at www.arbitrage.be (annulled the 2003 act concerning the prosecution of grave violations of international humanitarian law, insofar as it provided that there was no recourse against certain decisions of the federal prosecutor); new Articles 10, 1°bis and 12bis of the PT CCP after modification by act of 22 May 2006, Moniteur belge, 7 July 2006 (providing that if the complaint is clearly without merit, if the facts listed in the complaint do not correspond to a definition of the international offenses, or if the complaint cannot give rise to an admissible criminal prosecution, the federal prosecutor should seize the Court of Appeals of Brussels). Germany: § 172 (2) StPO; OLG Stuttgart, Beschl. 13 September 2005, 5 Ws 109/05, NStZ 2006, 117, 119, § 25 ("Die eigentliche Ermessensentscheidung, d.h. das Ermessen im engeren Sinne, ist im Rahmen des § 153 f StPO nicht justiziabel."); Denmark: § 724 (1) of the Adminis-Footnote 7 continued tration of Justice Act (providing for an administrative appeal with the director of public prosecution).
14. It may be noted that the drafters of the authoritative Restatement (Third) of U.S. Foreign Relations Law (1987), which purportedly reflects international law, did not believe that the jurisdictional rule of reason, which they set forth in § 403, applied to the exercise of universal jurisdiction (§ 404). The Princeton Principles on universal jurisdiction however rightly put a high premium on reasonableness, where they provide for a mechanism to resolve competing claims of jurisdiction. See Article 8 of the Princeton Principles on universal jurisdiction on the resolution of competing national jurisdiction (reprinted in S. MACEDO (ed.), Universal Jurisdiction, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p. 23)
15. C. RYNGAERT, "Universal Jurisdiction in an ICC Era: A Role to Play for EU Member States with the Support of the European Union", Eur. J. Crime, Crim. L. & Crim. Justice at 60-63 (2006).
16. In the law of federal systems or integrated international organizations, subsidiarity has a different, although not entirely unrelated meaning. It implies that the federal entity or the international organization may only take action if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the entities of the federation or the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the federal entity or the international organization. See in particular Article 5, § 2 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community.
17. The principle of subsidiarity dovetails well with the historical rationale of universal jurisdiction - the exceptional exercise of jurisdiction supplementing other national jurisdictions - as well with the undeniable advantages in terms of effectiveness that territorial jurisdiction enjoys. See M. INAZUMI, Universal Jurisdiction in Modern International Law: Expansion of National Jurisdiction for Prosecuting Serious Crimes under International Law, Antwerp-Oxford, Intersentia, 2005, at 219.
18. See also A. SANCHEZ LEGIDO, "Spanish Practice in the Area of Universal Jurisdiction", 8 Spanish Yb. Int'l. L. 17, 38, 41 (2001-2002) ("[The] stance, taken in Spanish practice, based on recognition of the priority of the judge in the place where the crime was committed, is fully coherent with the foundation upon which [...] the universality principle is based."); H
19. .F.A. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, Les principes modernes du droit pénal international, Paris, Sirey, 1928, at 169 (arguing in favor of a rigorous hierarchy of criminal jurisdiction, with the territorial State and the State of the nationality of the perpetrator having priority over the bystander State);
20. N. STRAPATSAS, "Universal Jurisdiction and the International Criminal Court", 29 Manitoba L. J. 1, 31 (2002) (arguing that a national court exercising universal jurisdiction should be a venue of last resort "in order to respect the principle of territoriality which is also jus cogens").
21. INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Resolution of the 17th Commission on universal criminal jurisdiction with regard to the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, Krakow Session, 2005, nr. 3 (c) ("Any State having custody over an alleged offender should, before commencing a trial on the basis of universal jurisdiction, ask the State where the crime was committed or the State of nationality of the person concerned whether it is prepared to prosecute that person, unless these States are manifestly unwilling or unable to do so. It shall also take into account the jurisdiction of international criminal courts."), nr. 3 (d) ("Any State having custody over an alleged offender, to the extent that it relies solely on universal jurisdiction, should carefully consider and, as appropriate, grant any extradition request addressed to it by a State having a significant link, such as primarily territoriality or nationality, with the crime, the offender, or the victim, provided such State is clearly able and willing to prosecute the offender.").
22. See ICJ, Arrest Warrant, Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, § 54 ("A State contemplating bringing criminal charges based on universal jurisdiction must first offer to the national State of the prospective accused person the opportunity itself to act upon the charges concerned"); Principle 8 of the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction (2001),
23. reprinted in S. MACEDO (ed.), Universal Jurisdiction, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p. 23 (stating that "[w]here more than one state has or may assert jurisdiction over a person and where the state that has custody of the person has no basis for jurisdiction other than the principle of universality, that state or its judicial organs shall, in deciding whether to prosecute or extradite, base their decision on an aggregate balance" of a number of criteria, including (f) "the likelihood, good faith, and effectiveness of the prosecution in the requesting State, and (g) "the fairness and impartiality of the proceedings in the requesting State".
24. Contra A, POELS, "Universal Jurisdiction In Absentia", 23 Neth. Q. Hum. Rts. 65, 83 (2005) (arguing that priority should be given to the State exercising universal jurisdiction in absentia, "as the subsequent commencement of investigations and prosecutions by the other State on the basis of the territoriality or personality principle will probably be concurrent with political pressure and judicial bias").
25. See D.F. ORENTLICHER, "Whose Justice? Reconciling Universal Jurisdiction with Democratic Principles", 92 Georgetown L. J. 1057, 1132 (2004) ("If consent that takes the form of pre-commitment validates the exercise of foreign jurisdiction, courts that can exercise universal jurisdiction should nonetheless respect the right of the "home state" to prosecute offenders if its courts are willing and able to bring them to justice. By averting or dispelling a culture of impunity, in-country justice provides the surest guarantee that human rights will be respected in the future, provided there are sufficient guarantees of fair process. Moreover, justice at home can more surely advance a wounded nation's recovery in the wake of mass atrocity than the remote justice dispensed by foreign courts. Provided that they enjoy legitimacy, trials in the state most affected by human rights abuses are more likely than prosecutions conducted a world away to inspire ownership by societies that have endured mass atrocity. Thus, unless there is reason to doubt the fairness or capacity of their courts, the claims of states that endured such crimes should be honored.").
26. See also ICJ, Arrest Warrant, individual opinion Judge Rezek, § 4.
27. See A.K. SHORT, "IS the Alien Tort Statute Sacrosanct? Retaining Forum Non Conveniens in Human Rights Litigation", 33 N.Y.U. J. Int'l. L. & Pol. 1001, 1072-1077 (2001).
28. The enhanced domestic accountability effect may ironically reduce the possibility of effective prosecution in the home State, because the home State may tend not to investigate crimes on the ground that a bystander State is investigating them. See also N. ROHT-ARRIAZA, The Pinochet Effect, Philadelphia, PA, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, 195.
29. There does indeed not seem to be a logical correlation between the legal source of the subsidiarity principle and the level of strictness of its application.
30. See National Criminal Court, Pinochet, Rulings of 4 and 5 November 1998, available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/arg/espana/juri.html ("[Article 6 of the Genocide Convention] imposes subsidiarity status upon actions taken by jurisdictions different from those envisioned in the precept. Thus, the jurisdiction of a State should abstain from exercising jurisdiction regarding acts constituting a crime of genocide that are being tried by the courts of the country in which said acts were perpetrated or by an international court.")
31. (as translated by A. SANCHEZ LEGIDO, "Spanish Practice in the Area of Universal Jurisdiction", 8 Spanish Yb. Int'l. L. 17, 38, 39 (2001-2002).
32. Supreme Court of Spain, Peruvian Genocide, 42 I.L.M. 1200 (2003).
33. See also N. ROHT-ARRIAZA, "Universal Jurisdiction: Steps Forward, Step Back", 17 Leiden J. Int'l. L. 375 (2004).
34. In the Peruvian Genocide Case, the Supreme Court derived the principle of necessity of jurisdictional intervention from the "nature and the finality of universal jurisdiction" ("la propia naturaleza y finalidad de la jurisdicción universal").
35. The Spanish principle of necessity of jurisdictional intervention appeared to be stricter than the ICCs complementarity principle, in that it may not require a genuine quality judgment of the foreign State's effective prosecution, See also N. ROHT-ARRIAZA, The Pinochet Effect: Transnational Justice in the Age of Human Rights, Philadelphia, PA, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, at 194;
36. N. ROHT-ARRIAZA, "Universal Jurisdiction: Steps Forward, Step Back", 17 Leiden J. Int'l. L. 375, 383 (2004).
37. Constitutional Court Spain (Second Chamber), Guatemala Genocide case, judgment No. STC 237/2005, available at http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/ stc2005/stc2005-237.htm.
38. Id., at II.4.
39. See also N. ROHT-ARRIAZA, comment Spanish Constitutional Court, Guatemala Genocide case, 100 A.J.I.L. 207, 213 (2006) ("Spain's Constitutional Tribunal helped to clarify that such accommodations [deference to the home State] are neither jurisdictional nor required - the International Criminal Court's "unable or unwilling" requirement does not apply to national courts.").
40. Constitutional Court Spain (Second Chamber), Guatemala Genocide case, at II.4.
41. Id. (... "por cuanto seria precisamente la inactividad judicial del Estado donde tuvieron lugar los hechos, no dando respuesta a la interposicion de una denuncia e impidiendo con ello la prueba exigida por la Audiencia Nacional, la que bloquearia la jurisdiccion internacional de un tercer Estqdo y abocaria a la impunidad del genocidio").
42. A.M. SLAUGHTER, « A Global Community of Courts », 44 Harv. Int'l. L.J. 191 (2003).
43. See email conversation with Professor RODRIGUEZ- PINZON, visiting professor, American University, Washington College of Law, April 10, 2006.
44. See email conversation with Professor ROHT-A RRIAZA, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, April 19, 2006 (on file with the author).
45. N. ROHT-ARRIAZA, comment Spanish Constitutional Court, Guatemala Genocide case, 100 A.J.I.L. 207, 212-213 (2006).
46. Compare A. POELS, "Universal Jurisdiction In Absentia", 23 Neth. Q. Hum. Rts. 65, 83 (2005) (arguing that "the subsequent commencement of investigations and prosecutions by the other State on the basis of the territoriality or personality principle will probably be concurrent with political pressure and judicial bias").
47. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Universal Jurisdiction in Europe: The State of the Art, Vol. 18, No. 5(D), June 2006, p. 89, available at http://hrw.org/reports/2006/ij0606/(noting, on the basis of an interview with a Spanish official that "[t]he position of the national prosecution office concerning universal jurisdiction cases generally reflects the position of the national government").
48. National Court, Criminal Chamber, January 10, 2006, Roll of Appeal No 196/05 (Spanish text on file with the author).
49. Id., legal consideration nr. 9 (c). Under Article 17 of the Rome Statute, the International Criminal Court may only exercise its jurisdiction if other States, including bystander States, are unable and unwilling to genuinely investigate and prosecute. Under the Rome Statute, States have primary jurisdiction and the International Criminal Court has complementary jurisdiction. The National Court however seems to believe that the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court prevails over the jurisdiction of bystander States, such as Spain in the Guatemala Genocide case. The Court in effect opines that only when the ICC is unavailable may Spain bring its universal jurisdiction legislation to bear. It may be submitted that this is an incorrect understanding of the role of the ICCs complementarity principle, which, informed as it is by considerations of State sovereignty, requires deference to any State's investigations and prosecutions.
50. Id., legal consideration nr. 9 (d) ("Por ultimo, en relacion a las posibilidades de que el pueblo tibetano pueda hacer valer la pretension de justicia que aqui ejercita frente a los tribunals chinos, dadas las circunstancias del caso, el lapso de tiempo desde que los hechos tuvieron lugar y las innumerables gestiones realizadas por parte de las autoridades del Tibet segun se acredita en la aportacion documental unida a la querella, hacen innecesario cualquier otra peticion en defense de sus derechos en el territorio en el que los hechos denunciados ocurrieron").
51. Id., legal consideration nr. 10 juncto nr. 7 in fine (arguing that "debera examinerse ... si se aprecia en el case un ejercicio racional del derecho al presenter en Espana la querella origen de estas actuaciones").
52. Appeal nr. 329/2007, to be retrieved from http://www.poderjudicial.es/ eversuite/GetRecords).
53. ICJ, Certain Criminal Proceedings in France, Republic of Congo v. France, documents of proceedings available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ idocket/icof/icoforder/icof_iapplication_20020209.pdf. This case concerns the legality of the exercise of universal jurisdiction over torture offences committed in States non-Parties to the UN Torture Convention under Article 5, § 2 of that Convention. The Republic of Congo advanced as a subsidiary argument that States are obliged to apply a subsidiarity principle when exercising universal jurisdiction (stating that Article 5, § 2 of the Convention « implique le caractère subsidiaire de la compétence qu'elle prévoit par rapport à celles des Etats mentionnés au paragraphe 1, et, au premier chef, de celle de l'Etat territorialement souverain. Il s'en déduit que si l'un de ces Etats a engagé une procédure à raison des faits litigieux, l'Etat visé au paragraphe 2 est incompétent, quand bien même l'auteur présumé se trouverait sur son territoire et n'aurait pas fait l'object d'une demande d'extradition »).
54. Ordonnance of the Juge d'instruction de Montpellier, May 25, 2001 (ruling that "quelle que soit la légitimité d'une telle amnistie [granted by the Mauritanian authorities on June 14, 1993], dans le cadre d'une politique locale de réconciliation, cette loi n'a d'effet que sur le territoire de l'Etat concerné et n'est pas opposable aux pays tiers, dans le cadre de l'application du droit international. Elle n'a par conséquent aucune incidence sur l'action publique pour l'application de la loi en France"; stating that "[il] appartient donc à la France, comme Etat signataire de la Convention de New York [i .e., the UN Torture Convention], de se saisir des faits non prescrits ni amnistiés en France susceptibles d'entrer dans le champ d'application de cette convention, quels que puissent être, en Mauritanie, les incriminations existantes en matière de torture, leur délai de prescription ou leur amnistie".).
55. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Universal Jurisdiction in Europe: The State of the Art, Vol. 18, No. 5(D), June 2006, pp. 58-59.
56. Although French courts and prosecutors have universal jurisdiction over torture, such jurisdiction may, in accordance with Article 689-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, only be exercised if the suspect is present in France. The Court of Appeals of Paris construed the presence requirement extremely strictly in the Congo Beach case, precisely the case which sparked the ICJ proceedings initiated by the Republic of Congo, by holding that before any investigation could be initiated, the presumed offender should be named in the réquisitoire introductif i.e., the act initiating the investigation, so as to ascertain his presence in France. The presence requirement should thus be met before the investigation starts, although often only an investigation could conclusively establish that the presumed offender is present in France. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is not published. The main arguments of the Court's reasoning can however be retrieved from the website of the Fédération Internationale des Droits de l'Homme (FIDH), one of the civil parties in the case.
57. See FIDH, Groupe d'action judiciaire, "France. Compétence universelle", June 2005, pp. 1.8-24, available athttp://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/cufrance29juin.pdf.
58. See also Jeune Afrique L'Intelligent/AFP, November 22, 2004.
59. See on this case at length: C. RYNGAERT, "Universal Criminal Jurisdiction over Torture: A State of Affairs After 20 Years UN Torture Convention", Neth. Q. Hum. Rts. 571, 594-600 (2005).
60. Whilst general French criminal law does not provide for universal jurisdiction over crimes against international humanitarian law, two ad hoc laws explicitly confer universal jurisdiction upon French courts for war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity committed in the territory of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Law No. 96-432 of 22 May 1996 adapting French legislation to the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 955 establishing the International Criminal Tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for acts of genocide or other serious violations of international law committed in 1994 in Rwanda and, for Rwandan citizens, in neighbouring states, Journal Officiel, 23 May 1996, English translation available at http://www.u-j.info/index/99335,79779.;
61. Law No. 95-1 of 2 January 1995 adapting French legislation to the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 establishing an international criminal tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1.99.1 (amended by Law No. 96-432 of 22 May 1996 and by Law no. 2002-268 of 26 February 2002 on cooperation with the International Criminal Court), Journal Officiel, 3 January 1995, English translation available at http://www.u-j.info/index/99260,79779.
62. Act of 5 August 2003, Moniteur belge 7 August 2003.
63. See Article 10, 1°bis PT CCP (prosecution of crimes against international humanitarian law on the basis of the passive personality principle) and. Article 12bis PT CCP (prosecution of international crimes under the universality principle).
64. English translation available in 42 I.L.M. 1258, 1267 (2003).
65. Terms used inter alia by E. DAVID, «La compétence universelle en droit belge», Ann. Dr. Louvain 2004, 125.
66. Parl. St. Kamer, B.Z. 2003, nr. 0103/003, p. 45.
67. "U.S. Threatens NATO Boycott over Belgium War Crimes Law", The Guardian, June 13, 2003, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/nato/ story/0,12667,976499,00.html
68. A refusal to initiate proceedings on this ground is not taken by a judge, unlike a refusal to initiate proceedings on other grounds. See Belgian Constitutional Court, Judgment nr. 62/2005, March 23, 2005, available at http://www.arbitrage.be. New Articles 10, 1°bis and 12bis, 7th and 8th al. of the PT CCP, inserted by the act of May 22, 2006, Moniteur belge, July 7, 2006.
69. There is, to be fair, not much room left for cases to be initiated under the universality principle in Belgium. Article 12bis of the Preliminary Title of the Code of Criminal Procedure only confers universal jurisdiction on Belgian courts provided that a norm of international law obliges Belgium to exercise universal jurisdiction. Belgian courts may not entertain universal jurisdiction if a norm of international law merely authorizes Belgium to do so. Under the transitory regime of Article 29 §3 of the Act of 5 August 2003, some cases that were initiated under the previous legislation could go forward, however (e.g., the case against Hissène Habré).
70. § 153 (f) of the Code of Criminal Procedure counsels against prosecution of a crime against international humanitarian law if the offence is being prosecuted before an international court or by a State on whose territory the offence is committed or whose national was harmed by it.
71. Explanations on the Draft of an Act to Introduce the Code of Crimes against International Law, http://www.iuscrim.mpg.de/forsch/legaltext/ VStGBengl.pdf, p. 82.
72. A copy of the decision is available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/ september_11th/docs/German_Prosecutors_Decision2_10_05.pdf. See also Juristenzeitung 2005, p. 311.
73. The Oberlandesgericht of Stuttgart declared the motion for a court decision relating to the Abu Ghraib case inadmissible on September 13, 2005, Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht 2006, p. 117, pointing to the "eigentliche Ermessensentscheidung", i.e., the discretion of the federal prosecutor. The federal prosecutor's decision not to prosecute is, accordingly, not amenable to judicial review. This was criticized by Ambos, who argued that "the legislator did not spend any thought on possible legal remedies" and that judicial review should be admissible "with the claim that the legal requirements for discretion did not exist",
74. e.g., when complementarity required the exercise of jurisdiction by the German prosecutor if impunity were not to prevail. K. AMBOS, "Völkerrechtliche Verbrechen, Weltrechtsprinzip und § 153 f StPO", Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht 2006, 434, 437-38;
75. "International Core Crimes, Universal Jurisdiction and § 153f of the German Criminal Procedure Code", 18 CRIM L. FORUM43 (2007)
76. C. RYNGAERT, "Universal Jurisdiction in an ICC Era: A Role to Play for EU Member States with the Support of the European Union", Eur. J. Crime, Crim. L. & Crim. Justice 46, 63 (2006).
77. See in this sense also K. AMBOS, "Völkerrechtliche Verbrechen, Weltrechtsprinzip und § 153 f StPO", Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht 2006, 434, 436 (arguing that it is necessary "to prosecute particular persons for particular acts", and that "Article 17 ICC Statute as quoted by the Federal Prosecutor General does not base itself on a general situation but rather on a concrete "case" which follows from the reference to the "person concerned" in art. 17 (1) (c) ICC Statute.").
78. See http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/GermanCase2006/germancase.asp
79. Oberste Gerichtshof Wien, 13 July 1994, 15 Os 99/94-6 at 5 and 6; appeal from Oberlandesgericht Linz, 1 June 1994, AZ 9 Bs 195/94 (GZ 26 Vr 1335/94-30). Jurisdiction was premised on Section 65 (1) (2) of the Austrian Penal Code, the provision providing for representational jurisdiction over crimes. Interestingly, the Supreme Court also reviewed the legality of exercising universal representational jurisdiction over Cvjetkovic in light of international law. It held that the Genocide Convention does not oppose universal jurisdiction, but that universal jurisdiction over genocide was, pursuant to the convention, self-evident.
80. Landesgericht Salzburg, 31 May 1995, 38 Vr 1335/94, 38 Hv 42/94.
81. Oberste Gerichtshof Wien, 13 July 1994, 15 Os 99/94-6 at 5 and 6.
82. See in a German context: K. AMBOS, "Vö lkerrechtliche Verbrechen, Weltrechtsprinzip und § 153 f StPO", Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht 2006, 434, 437.
83. Compare K. AMBOS, "Völkerrechtliche Verbrechen, Weltrechtsprinzip und § 153 f StPO", Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht 2006, 434, 438 (English version in CLF), pointing out, in a German context, that the requirement relating to the subsidiary exercise of German jurisdiction "does not... constitute a discretionary element but a strict legal one as part of the normative structure of § 153 f subs. 2 StPO", and thus emphasizing the role of the subsidiarity principle as a legal principle that may have a rights-guaranteeing character for core crimes victims whose legitimate claims are not honored by the State with the strongest nexus to the case.
84. CASSESE, however, seems to believe that the principle of subsidiarity does represent customary international law.
85. See A, CASSESE, "IS the Bell Tolling for Universality? A Plea for a Sensible Notion of Universal Jurisdiction?", 1 J.I.C.J. 589, 593 (2003) (submitting that "it would seem that, at least at the level of customary international law, universal jurisdiction may only be exercised to substitute for other countries that would be in a better position to prosecute the offencer, but from, some reason do not...").
86. See also C. KRESS, "Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes and the Institut de Droit international', 4 J.I.C.J. 561, 580 (2006) (submitting that "the opinio juris is based not only on considerations of procedural economy but also on the recognition of a legitimate primary interest of those states that are directly connected with the crime", and that, thus, "it would now seem to be possible, despite the relative scarcity of practice to argue, that the subsidiarity principle has grown into a principle of customary international law supplementing the principle of universal jurisdiction over crimes under international law."). Scepticism as to the customary international law character of the principle of subsidiarity could also be gleaned from the European Commission's amicus curiae brief in the Sosa case before the U.S. Supreme Court (2004). In its brief, the Commission stated that "[t]here is some support for the proposition that the same approach [as the approach taken by the Article 17 of the ICC Statute, which sets forth the complementarity principle] should be taken to the exercise of universal criminal jurisdiction", thus implying that the subsidiarity principle is not settled international law. See European Commission, amicus curiae brief, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 23 January 2004, p. 25. The Commission's amicus curiae brief is available at http://www.nosafehaven. org/_legal/atca_oth_EurCom.SupportingSosa.pdf.
87. See however M. COSNARD, "La compétence universelle en matière pénale", in C TOMUSCHAT & J.-M. THOUVENIN (eds.), The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order. Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes, Leiden, Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 2006, 355, 359 ("un accord semble se dégager pour que, à tout le moins la compétence universelle soit considerée comme seconde par rapport aux trois autres [compétences]").
88. By an Order of 11 January 2006, the Court fixed 11 July 2006 and 11 August 2008 as the respective time-limits for the filing of these pleadings. See http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icof/icofframe.htm.
89. A. principle of reasonableness, as introduced by § 403 of the Restatement (Third) of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, may be said to be underlying the entire system of jurisdiction in international law. A State that could invoke a legitimate ground of jurisdiction, should only exercise its jurisdiction if a balancing of all relevant interests and connections indeed points to that State as the State having the closest nexus to the case. In case of a crime against international law, the international community may be assumed to have per se a close nexus. It then remains to be seen what State is, from, a practical and political perspective, in the best position to adjudicate the crime. It is not an easy undertaking to define "reasonableness" a priori in the context of core crimes. What is nevertheless undeniable, is that, given the heinous and international nature of core crimes, non-prosecution is not an option for a State, even if that State has the strongest national or territorial nexus to the case, unless - exceptionally - non-prosecution of certain high-raking perpetrators may ensure long-term political reconciliation. Assuming that different States are willing and able to exercise jurisdiction over core crimes, reasonableness demands that deference is granted to the State with the strongest national or territorial nexus.
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988).
91. The local remedies rule in international law has its origins in the law of diplomatic protection. It may be assumed to be a general principle of international law. See C.F. AMERASINGHE, Local Remedies in International Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, 2nd ed. (electronic reproduction).
92. "Recalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes ..."
93. Ordonnance of the Juge d'instruction de Montpellier, May 25, 2001.
94. The possible peace agreement between Uganda and the indicted leaders of Uganda's Lord Resistance Army (LRA), an agreement which may grant amnesty to LRA members, will probably present the first opportunity for the ICC prosecutor to clarify his prosecutorial policy on the subject of amnesties.