Using history dependence to design a dynamic tradeable quota system under market imperfections

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 39, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 447-457

  Armstrong, Claire W ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TROMSØ   (Norway)

Author keywords

History dependence; Market imperfection; Transferable quota

Indexed keywords

DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS; ECONOMIC ANALYSIS; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS;

MARKET IMPERFECTION; TRANSFERABLE QUOTA;

MARKETING;

DESIGN; HISTORY; MARKET DEVELOPMENT; MODELING; QUOTA SYSTEM;

EID: 41049113281     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-007-9135-2     Document Type: Article

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