Rent-seeking and quota regulation of a renewable resource

Resource and Energy Economics

Volumn 24, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 263-279

  Bergland, Harald ^a   Clark, Derek J ^a,b   Pedersen, Pål Andreas ^c,d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TROMSØ   (Norway)

^b BI NORWEGIAN BUSINESS SCHOOL   (Norway)

^c Bodø School of Business   (Norway)

^d UNIVERSITY OF KENT   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Quota regulation; Renewable resources; Rent seeking

Indexed keywords

NATURAL RESOURCES;

RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR;

RENEWABLE ENERGY RESOURCES;

QUOTA SYSTEM; REGULATORY APPROACH; RENT SEEKING; RESOURCE MANAGEMENT; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0036609715     PISSN: 09287655     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0928-7655(01)00056-2     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. Rent-seeking and the regulation of a natural resource
2. Comparative analysis of alternative policy instruments
3. Rent-seeking in natural resource quota allocations
4. Interest group competition over policy outcomes: Dynamics, strategic behavior, and social costs
5. Multimarket oligopoly: Strategic substitutes and complements
6. Restricted access to common-property fishery resources: A game-theoretic analysis
7. The economics of fishing and modern capital theory: A simplified approach
8. The complete fish wars: Biological and dynamic interactions
9. The economic theory of a common property resource: The fishery
10. From common fish to rights-based fishing. Fisheries management and the evolution of exclusive rights to fish
11. Fishing as a supergame
12. Norwegian: EF's fiskeripolitikk og norsk fiskerinæring
13. The political economy of the rent-seeking society
14. The great fish war: An example using a dynamic Cournot-Nash solution
15. Game-theoretic resource modelling
16. The economics of fisheries management
17. Analysis of a highly migratory fish stocks fishery: A game theoretic approach
18. The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft