Commitment and diffusion: How and why national constitutions incorporate international law

University of Illinois Law Review

Volumn 2008, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 201-237

  Ginsburg, Tom ^a   Chernykh, Svitlana ^a   Elkins, Zachary ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

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EID: 40949122477     PISSN: 02769948     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (239)

1. Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment and International Law, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 707 (2006).
2. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 36-111 (1979);
3. STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 134-77 (1995) [hereinafter HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT];
4. Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988) [hereinafter Holmes, Paradox of Democracy].
5. For other theories of this phenomenon, see Tom Buergenthal, Modern Constitutions and Human Rights Treaties, in POLITICS, VALUES AND FUNCTIONS 197, 200 (Johnathan I. Charney et al. eds., 1997) ("Countries that had lived under non-democratic regimes in the past were especially eager to endow their courts with the legal power not to give effect to national laws or executive decisions in conflict with the states' international human rights obligations.");
6. see also John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 310, 335 (1992).
7. For a conceptual review of the diffusion of policy ideas and institutions, see Zachary Elkins & Beth Simmons, On Waves, Clusters and Diffusion: A Conceptual Framework, 598 ANNALS AM. ACAD, OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 33, 39-40 (2005).
8. Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process, 45 DUKE L.J. 364, 369-70 (1995).
9. Id. at 366-67.
10. Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1285-1301 (1999) (discussing the concept of bricolage).
11. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 31-33 (5th ed. 1998);
12. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 213-17 (2d ed. 2005);
13. Jackson, supra note 3, at 313-15;
14. see also Richard Frimpong Oppong, Re-Imagining International Law: An Examination of Recent Trends in the Reception of International Law into National Legal Systems in Africa, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 296, 297-98 (2007).
15. LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 64 (1995).
16. But see CASSESE, supra note 8, at 213-14 (noting another early view of monism that put domestic law as primary).
17. Id. at 214.
18. BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 32. The high point of monist thinking is found in the Permanent Court of International Justice opinion in Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations (Greece v. Turk), Advisory Opinion, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 10, at 20 (Feb. 21) at 20 (states which have entered into international obligations have a duty to modify national law so as to satisfy the obligations promised).
19. GRONDWET [GW.] [Constitution] art. 91(3) (Neth.) (providing for approval of treaties that conflict with the constitution by two-thirds vote);
20. id. at art. 94 (statutes in conflict with treaties are inapplicable). For an explanation, see CASSESE, supra note 8, at 229 n.30 (discussing several countries' methods of determining treaties' precedence);
21. see also Jackson, supra note 3, at 332-34.
22. The Constitution does not mention customary international law per se.
23. CASSESE, supra note 8, at 225, 229-30.
24. Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] art. 15(4). An interesting variant is found in Article 11 of the 1992 Slovak Constitution, stating that "International instruments on human rights and freedoms ratified by the Slovak Republic and promulgated under statutory requirements shall take precedence over national laws provided that the international treaties and agreements guarantee greater constitutional rights and freedoms." ÚSTAVA SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY [Constitution] art. 11 (Slovk.). For a discussion, see Vladlen S. Vereshchetin, New Constitutions and the Old Problem of the Relationship between International Law and National Law, 7 EUR. J. INT'L L. 29 (1996).
25. CASSESE, supra note 8, at 228;
26. HENKIN, supra note 9, at 73;
27. Dominique Remy-Granger, The Ambiguities of the State Based on the Rule of Law: A Unitary System à la Française, in AMBIGUITY IN THE RULE OF LAW: THE INTERFACE BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 53, 53-54 (Thomas A.J.A. Vandamme & Jan-Herman Reestman eds., 2001).
28. Constitution fédérale de la Confédération Suisse [Cst] April 18, 1999, art. 194, ¶ 2 (Switz.).
29. E.g., CONST, OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC art. 16 § 2; C.E. [Constitution] pt. I, § 10, cl.2 (Swed.); CONST, OF ROMANIA art. 20, § 1; S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 233.
30. Jackson, supra note 3, at 319. But see Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 635-36 (2007) (arguing that courts are engaged in creeping monism in the UK and other common law jurisdictions).
31. ALBERT V. DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 3-4 (8th ed. 1915).
32. Case C-213/89, The Queen v. Sec'y of State for Transp. Exparte Factortame Ltd., 1990 E.C.R. 1-2433.
33. BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 42-43;
34. see also INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS 3 (Thomas D. Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds., 1996).
35. Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., (1977) Q.B. 529, 553-54.
36. See Trendtex Trading Corp., (1977) Q.B. at 553-54;
37. BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 43-46 (discussing case law);
38. see also discussion in Waters, supra note 20.
39. Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529, 530-31 (1999).
40. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 822 (1997);
41. Harold Hongju Koh, Commentary, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1825-26 (1998);
42. Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371, 371-72 (1997);
43. Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law and Human Rights Treaties are Law of the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 301, 301 (1999).
44. U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
45. The sole exception may be the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C § 1350 (2000). For a recent discussion, see William S. Dodge, After Sosa: The Future of Customary International Law in the United States (Nov. 11, 2006) (unpublished working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 944245. See also LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 68 (2d ed. 1996) (noting the power "has been little used, and its purport has not been wholly clear");
46. Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power To "Define And Punish... Offenses Against the Law of Nations," 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 523 (2000).
47. HENKIN, supra note 29, at 211-12;
48. Julian G. Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule in Treaties and Federal Statutes, 80 IND. L.J. 319, 333-35 (2005).
49. Arguably, treaties have slightly higher status in that the Charming Betsy interpretive canon places the burden on Congress to be explicit when overriding treaties. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804);
50. Yuval Shany, How Supreme is the Supreme Law of the Land? Comparative Analysis of the Influence of International Human Rights Treaties Upon the Interpretation of Constitutional Texts by Domestic Courts, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 341, 364 (2006).
51. See Comparative Constitutions Project, http://netfiles.uiuc.edu/ zelkins/constitutions/index. htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2007).
52. Our threshold for what constitutes incorporation, as opposed to a mere reference to a treaty, is relatively high. We focus on explicit language that makes the treaty clearly enforceable or an integral part of a constitution. We did not consider general statements about the respect for and observation of "principles" of particular treaties to be full incorporation.
53. Constitutión Política de la República de Nicaragua [Cn.] [Constitution] art. 46, La Gaceta [L.G.] 9 January 1987;
54. see also, CONST. ARG., ch. IV, § 75.22 (referencing American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man;
55. Universal Declaration of Human Rights; American Convention of Human Rights; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
56. See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE) pmbl.;
57. see also CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BENIN, pmbl. (referencing Charter of the United Nations of 1945, Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, African Charter on Human and People's Rights of 1981).
58. Unfortunately, our current sample does not allow us to draw definitive conclusions about these trends, since we do not yet have a complete sample of coded constitutions from before 1944. However, our current sample is, for present purposes, randomly selected, and we believe our results are strongly suggestive.
59. All the human rights treaties coded in our data were written after 1945, which makes it impossible to assess the trends over time for the periods of analysis.
60. HENKIN, supra note 9, at 169, 173 (1995).
61. See id.
62. ELSTER, supra note 2, at 36-111;
63. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS 129-41, 157-62 (2000);
64. HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT, supra note 2, at 134-77;
65. JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 129-30 (2001);
66. Holmes, Paradox of Democracy, supra note 2.
67. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, STRATEGIES OF COMMITMENT AND OTHER ESSAYS 1 (2006).
68. See Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure Markets, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 286, 288 (1993);
69. Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 245, 259 (1997);
70. Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments - Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 519 (1983).
71. See generally GEORGE W. DOWNS & DAVID M. ROCKE, OPTIMAL IMPERFECTION? DOMESTIC UNCERTAINTY AND INSTITUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1997).
72. CASS SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 241 (2001);
73. see also F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 179 (1960) ("[The reason for constitutions] is that all men in the pursuit of immediate aims are apt - or, because of the limitation of their intellect, in fact bound - to violate rules of conduct which they would nevertheless wish to see generally observed. Because of the restricted capacity of our minds, our immediate purposes will always loom large, and we will tend to sacrifice long-term advantages to them.");
74. HOLMES, supra note 2, at 153;
75. A.C Pritchard & Todd J. Zywicki, Finding the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of Tradition's Role in Constitutional Interpretation, 77 N.C L. REV. 409, 447-49 (1999).
76. Jon Elster, Intertemporal Choice and Political Thought, in CHOICE OVER TIME 35 (George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992).
77. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 48, 49 (James Madison).
78. Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 111, 123-26 (1993) (amendment processes);
79. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 892 (1975).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
81. We do not assert that the potential cost suffered is necessarily high.
82. See generally Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421 (2000);
83. Steven R. Ratner, Precommitment Theory and International Law: Starting a Conversation, 81 TEX. L. REV. 2055 (2003).
84. Ratner, supra note 50, at 2070-72.
85. Technically, a dynamic inconsistency problem.
86. RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF U.S. ENTERPRISES 46-53 (1971).
87. Tom Ginsburg, International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Governance, 25 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 107, 113 (2005);
88. Andrew Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 651-58 (1998);
89. Zachary Elkins, Andrew Guzman & Beth Simmons, Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000,2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 265, 277-79.
90. Cf. DOWNS & ROCKE, supra note 43, at 56-75;
91. Rachel Brewster, The Domestic Origins of International Agreements, 44 VA. J. INT'L. L. 501, 511-13 (2004) (both focusing on elections as the primary source of uncertainty).
92. Voigt and Salzberger provide one of the few attempts to think through tradeoffs in delegation to international and domestic institutions. Stefan Voigt & Eli M. Salzberger, Choosing Not to Choose: When Politicians Choose to Delegate Powers, 55 KYKLOS 289, 289-310 (2002). In later work, Voigt and coauthors find support for some of these hypotheses. See, e.g., Stefan Voigt, Membership has its Privileges - On the Effects of Delegating Powers Internationally (Univ. of Kassel, Inst, of Econ., Discussion Papers in Economics No. 73/05, 2005), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/kas/ wpaper/2005-73.html; Stefan Voigt, Michael Ebeling & Lorenz Blume, Improving Credibility by Delegating Judicial Competence - the Case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (Univ. of Kassel, Inst. of Econ., Discussion Papers in Economics No. 07/04, 2004), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/kas/wpaper/2004-67.html.
93. For a similar observation focused on the tensions with democratic theory, see Terence Daintith, Is International Law the Enemy of National Democracy?, in AMBIGUITY IN THE RULE OF LAW: THE INTERFACE BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 115, 119 (Thomas A.J.A. Vandamme & Jan-Herman Reestman eds., 2001);
94. see also Stefan Voigt, The Interplay between National and International Law - Its Economic Effects Drawing on Four New Indicators 12-18 (August 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=925796.
95. Cf. Pritchard & Zywicki, supra note 44, at 446-51 (discussing the precommitment and agency roles of constitutions).
96. On NGOs, see Eugene Kontorovich, Inefficient Customs in International Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 859, 914-15 (2006);
97. see also MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS 89-120 (1998).
98. ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 93-94 (1984).
99. See Brewster, supra note 55, at 535-37;
100. Helen V. Milner, Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements, 56 INT'L ORG. 477 (2002).
101. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
102. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6136 (Dec. 16, 1966).
103. Lovelace v. Canada, Communication No. R 6/24, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40) at 166 (July 30, 1981) (declaring Canada responsible for continuing violation of individual rights of aboriginal women and their children);
104. Nicholas Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994);
105. see also HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 745 (2d ed. 2000). In the case of Australia, the Australian national government welcomed the decision as providing leverage against a recalcitrant provincial government that had continued to criminalize homosexual sovereignty. Id. at 748.
106. One can characterize this as a solution whereby principals - the voters and interest groups in a domestic political environment - are able to reduce their agency costs. For more on principal-agent models, see Eric A. Posner, Agency Models in Law and Economics, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 225 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000) (discussing principal-agent models);
107. Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987) (applying principal-agent model to the administrative state);
108. and Pablo T. Spiller & Emerson H. Tiller, Decision Costs and the Strategic Design of Administrative Process and Judicial Review, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 347, 361-62 (1997) (applying principal-agent model to judicial review).
109. Robert Scott & Paul B. Stephan, Self-Enforcing International Agreements and the Limits of Coercion, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 551, 581-82 (2004) [hereinafter Scott & Stephan, Self-Enforcing International Agreements];
110. see also ROBERT SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN 110-11 (2006).
111. See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229, 1324 (2004).
112. ROBERT O. KEOHANE, supra, note 60, at 75-78;
113. see ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 123 (1984).
114. Scott & Stephan, Self-Enforcing International Agreements, supra note 66, at 590-93.
115. Id. at 570-71.
116. Note that we are not asserting or assuming perfect compliance with international obligations, or that all violations of international obligations will lead to costs. So long as there is some positive probability of an international cost, the function of enhancing commitment can be effective.
117. See HENKIN, supra note 9, at 63-64;
118. JACOB ROBINSON ET AL., WERE THE MINORITIES TREATIES A FAILURE? 3-4 (1943);
119. Fred L. Morrison, Between a Rock and Hard Place: Sovereignty and International Protection, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 31, 35-38 (2005);
120. John R. Valentine, Toward a Definition of National Minority, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 445, 450-51 (2004). See generally L.P. MAIR, THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES: THE WORKING AND SCOPE OF MINORITIES TREATIES UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1928).
121. MAIR, supra note 72, at v.
122. Id.
123. Treaty of Poland, Aug. 23, 1919, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 82 (1919);
124. Treaty Between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Czechoslovakia, Sept. 10, 1919, 226 Consol. T.S. 170;
125. see also Declaration Concerning the Protection of Minorities in Albania, Oct. 2, 1921, 9 L.N.T.S. 173;
126. Treaty of Trianon, June 4, 1920, 6 L.N.T.S. 187.
127. See generally MAIR, supra note 72.
128. HENKIN, supra note 9, at 169-70.
129. See Amir N. Licht, Cross-Listing and Corporate Governance: Bonding or Avoiding?, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 141, 145-48 (2003) (discussing bonding for international companies engaged in security cross-listing);
130. Larry E. Ribstein, Cross-listing and Regulatory Competition, 1 REV. L. ECON. 97, 104-05 (2005) (discussing bonding in security markets).
131. See generally Jon C. Pevehouse, Democratization, Credible Commitments, and Joining International Organizations, in LOCATING THE PROPER AUTHORITIES: THE INTERACTION OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 25, 25-26 (Daniel Drezner ed., 2003).
132. See also Ratner, supra note 50, at 2065-66 (discussing uti possidetis principle in postcolonial Africa along similar lines).
133. Elizabeth F. Defeis, Minority Protections and Bilateral Agreements: An Effective Mechanism, 22 HASTINGS INT'L AND COMP. L. REV. 291, 292-301 (1999);
134. Csaba K. Zoltani & Frank Koszorus, Group Rights Defuse Tensions, 20 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 133, 137-38 (1996).
135. Defeis, supra note 81, at 297-98;
136. Zoltani & Koszorus, supra note 81, at 137.
137. Defeis, supra note 81, at 298;
138. Zoltani & Koszorus, supra note 81, at 138.
139. Indeed, Austria did bring a complaint to the General Assembly in 1960. Defeis, supra note 81, at 299-300.
140. Siegfried Weissner, The Movement Toward Federalism in Italy: A Policy-Oriented Perspective, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 301, 316 n.75 (2002).
141. See Milner, supra note 61, at 480.
142. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marakesh Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
143. Id.
144. Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 67, at 1311-12. See generally Richard McAdams, The Expressive Power of Adjudication, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043 (developing expressive theory of adjudication).
145. See Brewster, supra note 55, at 515.
146. THE ARGENTINE CRISIS AT THE TURN OF THE MILLENNIUM: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND EXPLANATIONS 4 (Flavia Fiorucci & Marcus Klein eds., 2004).
147. Id.
148. John O. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 16 NW. U. L. REV. 303, 309 (2006). But see Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 104 (2006).
149. Stefan Voigt, The Interplay Between National and International Law: Its Economic Effects Drawing on Four New Indicators 6 (unnumbered working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=925796. Note that constitutional amendment ought also be taken into account in developing an economic model of the tradeoffs among law-making devices. Even if treaties are more difficult to entrench than legislation, they will be less reliable as entrenchment devices where the constitution is easier to amend because amendment can override treaty commitments. The French experience with the European Union illustrates this story. French courts found several new commitments of the European Union to be incompatible with the French constitution, which was promptly amended. Remy-Granger, supra note 17, at 53.
150. Brewster, supra note 55, at 513;
151. see also Ratner, supra note 50, at 2061.
152. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 43, 47 (Sept. 25);
153. Eyal Benvenisti, Domestic Politics and International Resources: What Role for International Law"), in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 109, 114 n.21 (Michael Byers ed., 2000).
154. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 45.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 49 (noting new political situation and rejecting argument that changed circumstances modifying treaty obligations).
157. Barbara Koremenos, Contracting Around International Uncertainty, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 549, 550 (2005).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 551-52.
162. PETER M. HAAS, SAVING THE MEDITERRANEAN: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 7-8 (1990);
163. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 10-11 (2000) [hereinafter SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER];
164. Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 INT'L ORG. 1, 3 (1992);
165. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Accountability of Government Networks, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 347, 347 (2001);
166. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies and Disaggregated Democracy, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1041 (2003).
167. See McGinnis, supra note 93, at 319.
168. See Voigt, supra note 95, at 14-15;
169. supra Figure 1. In reality, the distinction between CIL and treaties is also overstated. For example, many investment treaties explicitly or implicitly invoke customary international law as the standard for expropriation.
170. See, e.g., Andrea Bjorklund, Reconciling State Sovereignty and Investor Protection in Denial of Justice Claims, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 809, 891-92 (2005) (discussing the United States' Model Bilateral Investment Treaty and NAFTA).
171. MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 192 (1998).
172. See id. at 13.
173. Id.
174. Id.;
175. Kontorovich, supra note 59, at 875.
176. See Kontorovich, supra note 59, at 877.
177. See Koremenos, supra note 100, at 549.
178. Of course, if enough states find themselves in this position, the rule of CIL can change. In practice, however, examples of CIL change seem to indicate that strong and powerful states have an inordinate influence on the process. Thus a state of middling power can not anticipate much future control over the international legal system.
179. See generally Laurence R. Helfer, Not Fully Committed? Reservations, Risk and Treaty Design, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 367 (2006).
180. But see Joost Pauwelyn, How Strongly Should We Protect and Enforce International Law? 14 (Duke Law Sch. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 44, 2006), available at http:/lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? article=1044&context=duke/fs (arguing that CIL obligations are alienable).
181. All this assumes that CIL agreements will be enforced. See Scott & Stephan, Self-Enforcing International Agreements, supra note 66, at 552-53.
182. BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 50 (noting that "many rules of [CIL] do not provide precise guidance for their application on the national plane"). Of course, this might explain why states tolerate it. Since the obligations are not precise, states can shift their positions on the interpretation of particular rules in different situations, to a certain degree.
183. See Julian G. Ku, Structural Conflicts in the Interpretation of Customary International Law, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 857, 862-64 (2005) (characterizing Executive as primary in the U.S. allocation of powers with regard to CIL). This is likely true notwithstanding the formal position of Article I of the U.S. Constitution noted supra at note 28. The executive primacy in customary international lawmaking is even more pronounced in parliamentary systems, in which the government is formed out of the legislature. In these systems the executive predominates both in reacting to statements of custom, as well as domestic lawmaking. Cf. Joanna Harrington, Scrutiny and Approval: The Role for Westminster-style Parliaments in Treaty-making, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 121, passim (2006) (discussing various parliamentary systems' adjustments to potential executive dominance).
184. See Ku, supra note 119, at 862.
185. Our analysis is consistent with John Setear, Treaties, Custom, Iteration and Public Choice, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 715, 728-30 (2005).
186. Of course, if the violation of CIL injures a particular state, that state will have an incentive to incur the costs of enforcement and publicity. Many CIL norms, however, concern the treatment of a state's own citizens. No particular external state has the incentive to take the lead to enforce and publicize violations of these norms. See Eugene Kontorovich, A Positive Theory of Universal Jurisdiction 39-42 (The Berkeley Elec. Press, Working Paper No. 211, 2004), available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/ viewcontent.cgi?article=1515&context=espresso.
187. Id.;
188. cf. Samuel Estreicher, Rethinking the Binding Effect of Customary International Law, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 5 (2003) (illustrating the problems of incorporating CILs into the framework of domestic laws);
189. J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 449, 452 (2000).
190. Jeffrey Frieden & Lisa L. Martin, International Political Economy: Global and Domestic Interactions, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 118, 124 (Ira Katznelson & Helen V. Milner eds., 2002);
191. Lisa Martin, The United States and International Commitments: Treaties as Signaling Devices, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 440 (2005) (showing the choice between executive agreements and treaties is a signal of intention to comply);
192. see also Helen V. Milner, The Interaction of Domestic and International Politics: The Anglo-American Oil Negotiations and the International Civil Aviation Negotiations, 1943-1947, in DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS 207, 208-18 (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1993) (noting that shifting an oil accord from an executive agreement to a treaty subject to Senate ratification prevented the ultimate acceptance of the accord).
193. Of course, the precise distinction between treaty and custom used in this article is overstated. Sometimes, treaties will serve as evidence of custom, and some treaties will incorporate customary international law into the treaty. They are complements as well as substitutes. For ease of explication, however, we consider the choice between treaty and custom to be a binary one.
194. See Edward T. Swaine, Reserving, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 307, 331-32 (2006 );
195. see also Laurence R. Helfer, supra note 115.
196. The incentive is relative to the decentralized regime of CIL enforcement.
197. To be sure, one can identify some of the same problems with the broad international human rights conventions, such as the International Covenants for Civil and Political Rights, and for Economic and Social Rights. Nevertheless, there is at least the possibility of concluding human rights treaties with specific counter-parties, as the earlier discussion of the Minorities Regimes and the Gasperi-Gruber treaty showed. See supra text accompanying notes 72-85.
198. See SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 105, at 31-35;
199. Brewster, supra note 55;
200. Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 INT'L ORG. 513, 544 (1997);
201. Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 581, 585 (2005).
202. Some constitutions limit the application of customary international law to interstate relations or human rights. For instance, Article nine of the Constitution of Ecuador (1967) accepts the norms of international law as "the standard of conduct for states in their relations with one another" but the constitution does not mention human rights. However, constitutions in our sample rarely make the above distinction.
203. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
204. Some constitutions distinguish certain types of treaties. Romania's 1991 Constitution, for example, makes human rights treaties superior to domestic law as opposed to other international treaties, which are made equal to domestic law. CONST. OF ROMANIA arts. 11, 20 (1991). This is very unusual in our current sample.
205. This assumption is heroic, of course, but serves the present discussion.
206. See discussion supra Part III.E.
207. The voluminous literature on the Democratic Peace begins with IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE (1795). See generally PAUL K. HUTH & TODD L. ALLEE, THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE AND TERRITORIAL CONFLICT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2002);
208. CHARLES LIPSON, RELIABLE PARTNERS: HOW DEMOCRACIES HAVE MADE A SEPARATE PEACE (2003);
209. R.J. Rummel, Democratic Peace Bibliography Version 3.0, http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/BIBLIO.HTML (last visited Nov. 9, 2007). Note that democracies do go to war with autocracies, so democracies cannot be characterized as generally peaceful.
210. Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner & B. Peter Rosendorff, Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements, 56 INT'L ORG. 477, 479 (2002).
211. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907 (1992);
212. Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 503, 508 (1995). But see Xinyuan Dai, Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism, 59 INT'L ORG. 363, 379 n.16 (2005) (democracies do not comply more);
213. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 240, 252 (2000) (only more likely to comply with international dispute resolution).
214. See Elkins, Guzman & Simmons, supra note 54, at 274.
215. Elkins & Simmons, supra note 4, at 36.
216. Id. at 39.
217. Id. at 42.
218. Id. at 43.
219. See, e.g., Julian Go, A Globalizing Constitutionalism? Views from the Postcolony, 1945-2000, 18 INT'L SOC. 71, 71 (2003) (noting that a majority of postcolonial states have redrafted their original constitutions).
220. Elkins & Simmons, supra note 4, at 39.
221. Id. at 39-40.
222. Id. at 41.
223. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131, 160-64 (2006).
224. Id. at 141.
225. Beth A. Simmons & Zachary Elkins, The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 171, 178 (2004).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Comparative Constitutions Project, supra note 32.
229. There are a half dozen current countries not included in the sample because of difficulties characterizing exactly which documents ought be considered the constitution. These include countries that have no formal written constitution such as Israel, United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Saudi Arabia, and others for whom the precise scope of constitutional text is not fully agreed upon by scholars, such as Canada and Sweden.
230. The current sample is randomly drawn in the sense that our coders selected them without accord to any specific criteria.
231. Polity is a widely used database in political science that measures the level of democracy and autocracy on a twenty point scale. Center for International Development and Conflict Management, http://www.cidcm.umd.ed/ polity/about (last visited Aug. 18, 2007).
232. ADAM PRZEWORSKI ET AL., DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND WELL-BEING IN THE WORLD, 1950-1990, at 15-32 (2000).
233. Bivariate regressions confirms this analysis. AUTDEM predicts Directly Applicable Customary International Law, with a positive coefficient of .01, at the 99% confidence level.
234. The World Bank Group, World Development Indicators (2006), available at http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006/contents/cover.htm.
235. Id.
236. It is also possible that authoritarian constitution-writers adopt more internationalist constitutions as "cheap talk," designed to signal to the international community that the country takes international law seriously. This story is not tested here, but is similar to that told by Professor Hathaway with regard to international human rights treaties. Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 2022 (2002) (arguing that some countries sign human rights treaties with no intention of improving their human rights performance).
237. Ratner, supra note 50, at 2072 (citing CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL 68-69 (1996)) (describing the postjunta Argentine President's plans for ratifications of international human rights treaties);
238. see also Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT'L ORG. 217, 243-44 (2000) (concluding that newly democratizing states choose to enter treaties to "lock in" human rights). But see Beth Simmons, Why Commit? Explaining State Acceptance of International Human Rights Obligations (unpublished working paper 2002) (finding limited empirical support for lock-in by many states).
239. Arguably, this pattern describes the United States' approach, as we have become less internationalist than at the founding. The founders assumed that international law applied and constrained their actions. Cleveland, supra note 93, at 51. We now see more public and academic skepticism about international law. Bradley, supra note 26, at 566. Letter from John Bolton, U.S. Under Sec'y of State, to Sec'y Gen. Kofi Annan (May 6, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/pres/ps/2002/9968.htm.