Hijacked airplanes: May they be shot down?

New Criminal Law Review

Volumn 10, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 582-612

  Hörnle, Tatjana ^a  

^a RUHR UNIVERSITY BOCHUM   (Germany)

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EID: 40749102389     PISSN: 19334192     EISSN: 19334206     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1525/nclr.2007.10.4.582     Document Type: Article

References (197)

1. For previous security measures, see Oliver Lepsius, Liberty, Security, and Terrorism: The Legal Position in Germany, 5 German L.J. 435 (2004).
2. LuftSiG [Air-Transport Security Act] §14 III.
3. 115 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 118 (2006).
4. For an English description of the LuftSiG and the court ruling, see Oliver Lepsius, Human Dignity and the Downing of an Aircraft: The German Federal Constitutional Court Strikes Down a Prominent Anti-Terrorism Provision in the New Air-Transport Security Act, 7 German L.J. 761 (2006);
5. see also Manuel Ladiges, Comment - Oliver Lepsius' Human Dignity and the Downing of an Aircraft: The German Federal Constitutional Court Strikes Down a Prominent Anti-Terrorism Provision in the New Air-Transport Security Act, 8 German L.J. 307 (2007).
6. See art. 35 II, III Grundgesetz [GG] [German Federal Constitution];
7. 115 BVerfGE at 140-51.
8. This is under discussion. See Christian Pestalozza, Inlandstötungen durch die Streitkräfre - Reformvorschläge aus ministeriellem Hause, 60 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 492 (2007).
9. 115 BVerfGE at 160-65 I use the term "terrorists" to describe potential offenders in a succinct way, being aware of the problems defining it and the fact that, as the Frankfurt case shows, the spectrum of offenders is wider.
10. Karsten Baumann, Das Grundrecht auf Leben unter Quantifizierungsvorbehalt, 57 Die öffentliche Verwaltung 853 (2004);
11. Wolfram Höfling & Steffen Augsberg, Luftsicherheit, Grundrechtsregime und Ausnahmezustand, 60 Juristenzeitung 1080 (2005);
12. Torsten Hartleb, Der neue §14 III LuftSiG und das Grundrecht auf Leben, 58 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1397 (2005);
13. Burkhard Hirsch, Verfassungsbeschwerde gegen das Gesetz zur Neuregelung von Luftsicherheitsaufgaben, 89 Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft 3 (2006);
14. Wolf-Rüdiger Schenke, 59 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 736 (2006);
15. Lepsius, supra note 3;
16. Wolfgang Hecker, Die Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zum Luftsicherheitsgesetz, 39 Kritische Justiz 179 (2006);
17. Reinhard Merkel, §14 Abs. 3 Luftsicherheitsgesetz: Wann und warum darf der Staat töten?, 62 Juristenzeitung 373 (2007).
18. For a critical evaluation of the outcome, see Josef Isensee, Menschenwürde: Die säkulare Gesellschaft auf der Suche nach dem Absoluten, 131 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts, 173, 191-93 (2006);
19. Christian Hillgruber, Der Staat des Grundgesetzes - nur "bedingt abwehrbereit"?, 62 Juristenzeitung 209 (2007);
20. Ladiges, supra note 3, at 309-10.
21. 115 BVerfGE at 157.
22. For the sake of convenience, I will continue talking about pilots, but this includes other individuals as well.
23. Granted, it is highly unlikely that a private citizen has the means to shoot down an airborne passenger plane. The argument would, however, also apply to an air force pilot who ignores instructions.
24. See also Adil Ahmad Haque, Torture, Terrorism, and the Inversion of Moral Principles, 10 New Crim. L. Rev. 613 (2007).
25. For a more detailed analysis, see Tarjana Hörnle, Das Unwerturteil und der Schuldvorwurf - Inhalte und Adressaten, in Empirische und dogmatische Fundamente, kriminalpolitischer Impetus: Symposium für Bernd Schünemann zum 60. Gerburtstag, at 105 (Roland Hefendehl ed., 2005).
26. See Wilfried Küper, Tötungsverbot und Lebensnotstand, 21 Juristische Schulung 785, 786 n.14 (1981);
27. Günter Jerouschek, Nach dem 11. September 2001: Strafrechtliche Überlegungen zum Abschuss eines von Terroristen entführten Flugzeugs, in Strafrecht, Biorecht, Rechtsphilosophie, Festschrift für Hans-Ludwig Schreiber, 185, 189 n.21 (Knut Amelung et al. eds., 2003).
28. See Joe Simpson, Touching the Void (1988) (recounting what happened in 1985 in the Peruvian Andes).
29. This logic also applies to the separation of conjoined twins in cases where one of the children is healthy enough to survive but the other has no chance and will extinguish the former child's life as well without surgery. Therefore, conjoined twins cases can be quite different from the hijacked airplane scenario. But see Luis Ernesto Chiesa Aponte, Normative Gaps in the Criminal Law: A Reasons Theory of Wrongdoing, 10 New Crim. L. Rev. 102 (2007).
30. The minimum requirement for an attack is an action. See Claus Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, Band 1, 658 (4th ed. 2006).
31. See id. at 758. The necessity clause in the German Penal Code, §34 StGB, does not differentiate between aggressive and defensive necessity. It just contains the general instruction to evaluate whether the protected interest is considerably more important. But within this weighing of interests, the difference between aggressive and defensive necessity can be accommodated.
32. Küper, supra note 13, 792-94;
33. Kristian Kühl, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 234-35 (5th ed. 2005);
34. see also Volker Erb, in Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, § 34 Nr. 152 (2003).
35. Harro Otto, Grundkurs Strafrecht, Allgemeine Strafrechtslehre, 146 (7th ed. 2004);
36. Ulfrid Neumann, in Nomos Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch §34 Nr. 87 (2d ed. 2005);
37. Roxin, supra note 16, at 760-61;
38. Helmut Frister, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil 200 (2006).
39. Walter Gropp, Der Radartechniker-Fall - ein durch Menschen ausgelöster Defensivnotstand, 153 Goltdammer's Archiv 284, 287-88 (2006);
40. Hans Joachim Hirsch, Defensiver Notstand gegenüber ohnehin Verlorenen, in Festschrift für Wilfried Küper 149 (Michael Hettinger et al. eds., 2007);
41. Klaus Rogall, 1st der Abschuss gekaperter Flugzeuge widerrechtlich?, 28 NStZ 1 (2008).
42. Merkel, supra note 7, at 373, 384-385;
43. see also Michael Pawlik, §14 Abs. 3 des Luftsicherheitsgesetzes - ein Tabubruch?, 59 Juristenzeitung 1045, 1049 (2004).
44. Critically Erb, supra note 18.
45. Merkel, supra note 7, at 385.
46. This assumes that one could fire a gun shot precisely at the pilot. Although the pilot acted under duress, his behavior would constitute an attack which could have been averted.
47. For the agent-neutral perspective, see Jonathan Glover, It Makes No Difference Whether or Not I Do It, 49 Proc. Aristotelian SOc'y 172 (1975);
48. John Gardner, Complicity and Causality, 1 Crim. L. & Phil. 127 (2007 ).
49. For such an approach to difficult life-against-life-cases: Eric Rakowski, Taking and Saving Lives, 93 Columb. L. Rev. io63 (1993);
50. Lothar Fritze, Moralisch erlaubtes Unrecht, 51 Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 213 (2003).
51. Alan Strudler and David Wasserman argue in a similar vein that it matters if the deaths are approved by a fair procedure in which those concerned could participate (The First Dogma of Deontology: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing and the Notion of a Say, 80 Philosophical Studies 51, 64-66, 1995).
52. If the terrorists' target were different (a skyscraper, like in the September II events), the argument would be somewhat more difficult. Would the victims in the shot-down plane have agreed beforehand that deadly force against hijacked airplanes was in their own interest? See for such questions Rakowski, supra note 26, 1123-1129.
53. Model Penal Code §3.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
54. See Markus Dubber, Einführung in das US-amerikanische Straftecht 148 (2005).
55. For the less uniform legal framework in the American states, see Rakowski, supra note 26, at 1151-52.
56. Roxin, supra note 16, at 739;
57. Otto, supra note 19, at 144;
58. Kühl, supra note 19, at 223;
59. Neumann, supra note 19, §34 Nr. 74;
60. Erb, supra note 18, §34 Nr. 116;
61. Jerouschek, supra note 13, at 192;
62. Schenke, supra note 7, at 736, 738.
63. For a different outcome, see Dieter Birnbacher, Tun oder Unterlassen, 220-21 (1995).
64. For a general critique of consequentialist thinking, see Julian Nida-Rümelin, Kritik des Konsequentialismus (1993).
65. BGH, 6 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 513, 514 (1953).
66. See, e.g., Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights (1990);
67. Warren Quinn, Morality and Action (1993);
68. Frances M. Kamm, Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm (2007).
69. Hans Welzel, Zum Notstandsproblern, 63 Zeitschrift für die gesamten Straftechtswissenschaften 47, 51 (1951).
70. See Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect (1967), reprinted in Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy 19, 23 (2002) (using this problem, though with a driver steering the trolley);
71. see also Warren S. Quinn, Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, 98 Phil. Rev. 287, 304 (1989);
72. Thomson, supra note 31, at 176.
73. Supra note 29.
74. Foot, supra note 33, at 23 ("without hesitation");
75. Frances M. Kamm, Harming Some to Save Others, 57 Phil. Stud. 227, 228 (1989) ("commonly assumed that it is permissible").
76. Quinn and Thomson assume that "most people" would react this way. See Quinn, supra note 33, at 304;
77. Thomson, supra note 31, at 176.
78. See also Rakowski, supra note 26, at 1063 ("an irreproachable course").
79. Thomson, supra note 31, at 135.
80. See Kamm, supra note 35, at 227;
81. Thomson, supra note 31;
82. Rakowski, supra note 26, at 1063;
83. Birnbacher, supra note 29, at 155-57;
84. Tom Stacy, Acts, Omissions, and the Necessity of Killing Innocents, 29 Am. J. Crim. L. 481, 506-07 (2002);
85. Fritze, supra note 26, at 214;
86. Eric Blumenson, Killing in Good Conscience: What's Wrong with Sunstein's and Vermeule's Lesser Evil Argument for Capital Punishment and Other Human Rights Violations?, 10 New Crim. L. Rev. 210, 214-15 (2007).
87. Even John Harris, when examining from a utilitarian perspective the possibilities of a "survival lottery," concedes that we would think such a step to be "out of the question" and that our moral intuition tells us that there is something wrong with the survival lottery. See John Harris, The Survival Lottery, 50 Philosophy 81, 87 (1975).
88. For a discussion about the Doctrine of Double Effect, see Foot, supra note 33;
89. Warren S. Quinn, Actions, Intentions and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect, 18 Phil. & Pub. Aff, 334 (1989);
90. Frances M. Kamm, Justifications for Killing Noncombatants, Midwest Stud. Phil. 219 (2000);
91. Haque, supra note II.
92. See also Birnbacher, supra note 29, at 154.
93. Within moral philosophy, a lot of attention is paid to the difference between acts and omissions, or between doing and allowing. Foot, supra note 33;
94. Quinn, supra note 33;
95. Birnbacher, supra note 29, ch. 5;
96. Strudler & Wassermann, supra note 26.
97. There have been attempts to locate our misgivings about the transplant case within a consequentialist framework: An obvious slippery slope concern is that public trust would be destroyed if such things were to happen in hospitals. See Birnbacher, supra note 29, at 157.
98. Stacy, supra note 37, points out that the physiological benefits of transplantation are overvalued.
99. As it is no longer necessary to differentiate between passengers and crew, I will mention the passengers, but the same arguments apply to members of the crew.
100. See §323c StGB [German Penal Code] (stipulating such a duty).
101. For a critical analysis, see Henrike Morgenstern, Unterlassene Hilfeleistung, Solidarität und Recht (1997);
102. Regina Harzer, Die tatbestandsmäßige Situation der unterlassenen Hilfeleistung gemäß §323c StGB (1999).
103. One could come up with similar arguments in the train example if those who got killed belonged to the same group which profited from an agreement, see Rakowski, supra note 26.
104. In the transplant case, much depends on the likelihood of needing transplantation in one's own life. But still one could come up with constellations where it might, under a veil of ignorance, rational to agree. See Harris, supra note 37.
105. See also Fritze, supra note 26, at 220. However, although he acknowledges the victims' right not to accept an attack, he does not postulate a corresponding duty for the actor to refrain from the action.
106. Neumann, supra note 19, §34 Nr. 74.
107. 115 BVerfGE at 158.
108. Küper, supra note 13, at 792-93;
109. Roxin, note 16, at 738-39;
110. Jerouschek, supra note 13, at 193;
111. Arndt Sinn, Tötung Unschuldiger auf Grund §14 III Luftsicherheitsgesetzrechtmäßig?, 24 Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht 585, 586 (2004);
112. Höfling & Augsberg, supra note 7, at 1083-84;
113. Hirsch, supra note 7, at 8, 12;
114. Schenke, supra note 7, at 738. Again, one finds contrasting views in the American literature.
115. See, e.g., Rakowski, supra note 26, at 1136 (discussing Bernard Williams example of "Jim and the Indians" and expressing the view that of course it matters that all Indians were doomed to death anyway).
116. Hartleb, supra note 7, at 1398;
117. Schenke, supra note 7, at 738;
118. see also Pawlik, supra note 21, at 1050;
119. Höfling & Augsberg, supra note 7, at 1084.
120. For the prevalence of such an intuition, see Stefan Fluster, Zählen Zahlen? Zur Kontroverse um das Luftsicherheitsgesetz, 58 Merkur 1047, 1048-50 (2004);
121. Chiesa Aponte, supra note 15, at 103-04.
122. Huster, supra note 5o, at 1048;
123. Pawlik, supra note 21, at 1049;
124. see also Sinn, supra note 48, at 588-89;
125. Höfling & Augsberg, supra note 7, at 1085 (expressing skepticism with respect to such a moral evaluation). This moral judgment is limited to scenario 1 situations, that is, if the facts are known. It crumbles in a scenario 2 case. If the dialogue starts with "you might possibly die in five minutes," this leaves the alternative open of living one's life to its natural end. It would be an unreasonable moral demand if one were to ask Smith to accept death in spite of an unclear prognosis.
126. Erb, supra note 18, §34 Nr. 119-20;
127. Neumann, supra note 19, §34 Nr. 77.
128. See also Martin Hochhuth, Militärische Bundesintervention bei inlǧndischem Terrorakt, 44 Neue Zeitschrift für Wehrrecht 154, 165-66 (2002).
129. Quinn, supra note 33, 308-12. For the controversy over whether taking blood without consent can be justified,
130. see Thomson, supra note 31, at 168;
131. Roxin, supra note 16, at 745-46.
132. Chiesa Aponte suggests that there is a "normative gap" when there are "equally powerful reasons both in favor of performing the conduct and against performing it." However, his arguments seem somewhat inconsistent. When discussing necessity, Chiesa Aponte applies deontological arguments in the mainstream Continental European tradition and refutes utilitarian reasoning. Chiesa Aponte, supra note 15, at 121-23. It thus comes as a surprise that in a later section he sees the goal to rescue many lives as an "equally powerful" reason.
133. See BGH, 6 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 513 (1953).
134. Küper, supra note 13, at 793.
135. See art. 2 II S. 1 GG.
136. See also Blumenson, supra note 37, at 225-30.
137. See Hochhuth, supra note 52, at 166 n-44;
138. Hillgruber, supra note 7, at 217. Hillgruber does not discuss the criminal law outcome, but the constitutional legal framework, and he argues that the very short remaining time is crucial in this context.
139. See art. 2 I GG.
140. For the concept of protective rights, see Josef Isensee, Das Grundrecht auf Sicherheit (1983);
141. Gerhard Robbers, Sicherheit als Menschenrecht (1987);
142. Johannes Dietlein, Die Lehre von den grundrechtlichen Schutzpflichten (1992);
143. Wolfram Cremer, Freiheitsgrundrechte, 228-359 (2003);
144. Christian Calliess, Die grundrechtliche Schutzpflicht im mehrpoligen Verfassungsrechtsverhältnis, 61 Juristenzeitung 321 (2006).
145. For a comparison with American constitutional theory, see David F. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 864 (1986).
146. For the philosophical and historical background, see Isensee, supra note 61, at 3-26;
147. Robbers, supra note 61, at 40-120.
148. 39 BVerfGE 1, 42 (1975). Whether fetuses have rights, is of course highly contested; this can not be discussed here.
149. 46 BVcrfGE 160, 164 (1977).
150. 115 BVerfGE 160.
151. For the position which favors subjective rights, see supra note 61 and sources cited therein.
152. Ralf Poscher, Grundrechte als Abwehrrechte, 192-98 (2003).
153. Lepsius, supra note 3, at 773-74;
154. Peter-Alexis Albrecht, Menschenwürde als staatskritische Absoluthcitsregel, 89 Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft 295, 299 (20o6);
155. see also Hans Albrecht Hesse, Der Schutzstaat geht um, 46 Juristenzeitung 744 (1991).
156. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffi, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 703, 749-50 (2005).
157. See also Dietlein, supra note 61, at 173-74;
158. Calliess, supra note 61, at 327.
159. 115 BVerfGE at 152-54. The first clause in the German constitution states that "human dignity is inviolable" and that it is the state's duty to respect and protect human dignity. Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [German Federal Constitution], art. I 1.
160. Compare Christian Starck, Menschenwürde als Verfassungsgarantie im modernen Staat, 36 Juristenzeitung 457 (1981);
161. Hasso Hofmann, Die versprochene Menschenwürde, 118 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts, 353 (1993);
162. Christoph Enders, Die Menschenwürde in der Verfassungsordnung - Zur Dogmatik des Art. I GG (1997);
163. Ulfrid Neumann, Die Tyrannei der Würde, 84 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 153 (1998);
164. Isensee, supra note 7.
165. See 39 BVerfGE I, at 42;
166. Ernst Benda, Verständigungsversuche über die Würde des Menschen, 54 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2147 (2001).
167. Horst Dreier, Menschenwürdegarantie und Schwangerschaftsabbruch, 47 Die öffentliche Verwaltung 1036 (1995).
168. "Handle so, dass du die Menschheit, sowohl in deiner Person, als in der Person eines jeden anderen, jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals bloß als Mittel brauchest." Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785), in Werkausgabe Band VII 61 (Wilhelm Weischedel ed., 1968). ("Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means.").
169. 115 BVerfGE at 153-54.
170. Merkel, supra note 7, at 383-85.
171. There is one obvious exception to a prohibition against killing uninvolved persons: International law allows countries to defend themselves in war, even if this involves "collateral damages," that is, less euphemistically, to kill civilians during the course of military actions. For terrorists' attacks, authors have drawn a parallel. See Pawlik, supra note 21, at 1053-55;
172. see also Schenke, supra note 7, at 738. Our Secretary of the Interior now considers constitutional provisions allowing the use of the air force in warlike states of emergency which endanger the foundations of the state.
173. See Pestalozza, supra note 5, at 493.
174. Critics argue that this definition is highly imprecise and that even the attacks on September II, 2001, did not have an impact comparable to a situation of war. Id. at 495.
175. Tatjana Hörnle, Menschenwürde und Lebensschutz, 89 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 318 (2003).
176. For human dignity arguments in rulings by the American Supreme Court, see Maxine D. Goodmann, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional jurisprudence, 84 Neb. L. Rev. 740 (2006);
177. Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and Transnational Constitutional Discourse, 65 Mont. L. Rev. 15 (2004) (discussing the Montana Human Dignity Clause).
178. Similar arguments are also important for the debate about the death penalty. Sentencing someone to death not only condemns the offense, but also delivers a message about the worthlessness of the executed. The objective meaning the death penalty has is, in my view, more important than the difference between intention and knowing, which other authors see as crucial. See, e.g., Carol Steiker, The Ethics and Empirics of Capital Punishment, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 757-62 (2005).
179. The act of cutting a person's body into pieces without this person's consent would suffice to constitute a violation of human dignity.
180. With respect to quantitative comparisons I had previously applied a human dignity based argument, Hörnle, supra note 79, at 329, but I have subsequently developed doubts.
181. Höfling & Augsberg, supra note 7, at 1084;
182. Merkel, supra note 7, at 381.
183. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 69, at 719-24. They assume preventive effects of the death penalty, a question which cannot be discussed here.
184. See Lepsius, supra note 3, at 772;
185. Albrecht, supra note 68, at 299.
186. See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 69, at 740-41.
187. Granted, this might be somewhat difficult in detail. For example, those sitting in a taxi might or might not arrive at the airport before the crash. However, my crucial point is that it would be misleading to talk about a "mere statistical risk" when referring to the persons at the airport.
188. Birnbacher, supra note 29, ch. 5 (arguing against acknowledging such a difference);
189. Gardner, supra note 25 (same).
190. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 69, at 725.
191. With respect to the limited meaning of the act/omission distinction for the state, critics of Sunstein's and Vermeule's article have not raised fundamental objections: Blumenson, supra note 37, at 217;
192. Steiker, supra note 81, 756-57.
193. See also Hillgruber, supra note 7, at 217.
194. Arthur Kaufmann, Rechtsfreier Raum und eigenverantwortliche Entscheidung, in Festschrift für Reinhard Maurach 327 (Friedrich-Christian Schoeder & Heinz Zipf ed., 1972).
195. In my view, this is not necessary, as excuses can exempt from blame in the very rare morally intricate cases.
196. When I started working at this article, it was with the intuition that of course this must be prohibited. This intuition crumbled during the process of writing.
197. See, e.g., Ralf Poscher, Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar, 59 Juristenzeitung 756 (2004).