Are oligarchs productive? Theory and evidence

Journal of Comparative Economics

Volumn 36, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 17-42

  Gorodnichenko, Yuriy ^a   Grygorenko, Yegor ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b Citigroup Russia ^*  (Russian Federation)

Author keywords

Firm performance; Oligarch; Property rights; Transition; Treatment effect

Indexed keywords

EID: 40649109251     PISSN: 01475967     EISSN: 10957227     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2008.01.001     Document Type: Article

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