Political entrepreneurship and the democratic allocation of economic resources

Review of Austrian Economics

Volumn 15, Issue 2-3, 2002, Pages 143-159

  Holcombe, Randall G ^a  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Democracy; Entrepreneurship; Public choice

Indexed keywords

EID: 4043159554     PISSN: 08893047     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1015758419984     Document Type: Article

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