Forging the vacancy chain: Law enforcement efforts and mobility in criminal economies

Crime, Law and Social Change

Volumn 41, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 53-77

  Friman, H Richard ^a  

^a Marquette University   (United States)

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EID: 4043092116     PISSN: 09254994     EISSN: 15730751     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/B:CRIS.0000015328.82955.f0     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (146)

1. The author would like to thank Jan Rath and Robert Kloosterman for their suggestions and comments, Li Sha and Weian Zahn for their research assistance; and the Japan-United States Education Commission (JUSEC) and Social Science Research Council for their financial support of the larger project upon which this article is based. Syndicates React to New Anti-Gang Law, The Japan Law Journal, April 1992, 3.
2. nd Session (1990).
3. Daniel Bell, "Crime as an American Way of Life," The Antioch Review 1953 (13:2), 131-154. Criminal economies are distinguished by the production and distribution of illicit goods and services. By contrast, informal economies are distinguished by licit goods and services produced and distributed in an illicit manner. See, Manuel Castells and Alejandro Portes, "World Underneath: The Origins, Dynamics, and Effects of the Informal Economy," in Alejandro Portes, Manuel Castells and Lauren Benton (eds.), The Informal Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less Developed Countries (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins, 1989) pp. 11-37.
4. Daniel Bell, "Crime as an American Way of Life," The Antioch Review 1953 (13:2), 131-154. Criminal economies are distinguished by the production and distribution of illicit goods and services. By contrast, informal economies are distinguished by licit goods and services produced and distributed in an illicit manner. See, Manuel Castells and Alejandro Portes, "World Underneath: The Origins, Dynamics, and Effects of the Informal Economy," in Alejandro Portes, Manuel Castells and Lauren Benton (eds.), The Informal Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less Developed Countries (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins, 1989) pp. 11-37.
5. See discussion in Ivan Light and Carolyn Rosenstein, Race, Ethnicity, and Entrepreneurship in Urban America (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1995).
6. See review in James M. O'Kane, The Crooked Ladder: Gangsters, Ethnicity, and the American Dream (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1992).
7. See Harrison C. White, Chains of Opportunity: System Models of Mobility in Organizations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970) and Ivan D. Chase, "Vacancy Chains," Annual Review of Sociology 1991 (17), 133-154.
8. See Harrison C. White, Chains of Opportunity: System Models of Mobility in Organizations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970) and Ivan D. Chase, "Vacancy Chains," Annual Review of Sociology 1991 (17), 133-154.
9. Chase, "Vacancy Chains," 134.
10. Where White (Chains of Opportunity) turned to vacancy chains to explore the mobility of clergy within religious institutions, other scholars have extended the analysis to businesses, sectors, broader labor markets. For example, see the literature review in Chase, "Vacancy Chains"; and Lawrence T. Pinfield, The Operation of Internal Labor Markets: Staffing Practices and "Vacancy Chains" (New York and London: Plenum Press, 1995).
11. Where White (Chains of Opportunity) turned to vacancy chains to explore the mobility of clergy within religious institutions, other scholars have extended the analysis to businesses, sectors, broader labor markets. For example, see the literature review in Chase, "Vacancy Chains"; and Lawrence T. Pinfield, The Operation of Internal Labor Markets: Staffing Practices and "Vacancy Chains" (New York and London: Plenum Press, 1995).
12. Chase, "Vacancy Chains," 135.
13. For example, see Pinfield, The Operation of Internal Labor Markets, 19; and Light and Rosenstein, Race, Ethnicity and Entrepreneurship, 230.
14. For example, see Pinfield, The Operation of Internal Labor Markets, 19; and Light and Rosenstein, Race, Ethnicity and Entrepreneurship, 230.
15. For example, see White, Chains of Opportunity; Chase, "Vacancy Chains," 137-141; and Pinfield, The Operation of Internal Labor Markets, 18-21.
16. For example, see White, Chains of Opportunity; Chase, "Vacancy Chains," 137-141; and Pinfield, The Operation of Internal Labor Markets, 18-21.
17. For example, see White, Chains of Opportunity; Chase, "Vacancy Chains," 137-141; and Pinfield, The Operation of Internal Labor Markets, 18-21.
18. Chase, "Vacancy Chains," 146.
19. White, Chains of Opportunity, 2-7. For an overview of the methodologies used to trace vacancy chains, see Chase, "Vacancy Chains," 138-146.
20. White, Chains of Opportunity, 2-7. For an overview of the methodologies used to trace vacancy chains, see Chase, "Vacancy Chains," 138-146.
21. White, Chains of Opportunity (2), 268-269; and Chase, "Vacancy Chains," 134.
22. White, Chains of Opportunity (2), 268-269; and Chase, "Vacancy Chains," 134.
23. As summarized in Chase, "Vacancy Chains," 135-136.
24. Chase, "Vacancy Chains," 149-152.
25. For example, see Phil Williams, "Transnational Criminal Organization and International Security," in Michael Klaare and Yogech Chandrani (eds.), World Security: Challenges for a New Century (New York: St. Martin's 1998) pp. 249-272.
26. For example, see Patrick J. Ryan and George E. Rush, Understanding Organized Crime in Global Perspective: a Reader (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1997).
27. Peter A. Lupsha, "Organized Crime in the United States," in Robert J. Kelly (ed.), Organized Crime: A Global Perspective (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1986), 32-57 [33-34].
28. Bell, "Crime as an American Way of Life," 148-151. Though skeptical of ethnic succession arguments, Peter Reuter (1994: 109-12) observes that "newer ethnic groups with weak ties to the dominant political culture . . . provide the base for organized crime." They do so through the disproportionate presence of younger males facing blocked "avenues of economic progress" and a community "more likely to be supportive of at least some gang activities" (e.g. protection from outsiders). Peter Reuter, "Research on American Organized Crime," in Robert J. Kelly, Ko-Lin Chin, and Rufus Schatzberg Handbook of Organized Crime in the United States (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), 91-120 [109-112].
29. Bell, "Crime as an American Way of Life," 148-151. Though skeptical of ethnic succession arguments, Peter Reuter (1994: 109-12) observes that "newer ethnic groups with weak ties to the dominant political culture . . . provide the base for organized crime." They do so through the disproportionate presence of younger males facing blocked "avenues of economic progress" and a community "more likely to be supportive of at least some gang activities" (e.g. protection from outsiders). Peter Reuter, "Research on American Organized Crime," in Robert J. Kelly, Ko-Lin Chin, and Rufus Schatzberg Handbook of Organized Crime in the United States (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), 91-120 [109-112].
30. Bell, "Crime as an American Way of Life," 151. Despite the earlier waves of Chinese migration, Chinese crime gangs tend to be overlooked in the literature on ethnic succession during this period. As one possible explanation, O'Kane (The Crooked Ladder, 61-62) observes that Chinese gangs in the late 1800s and early 1900s tended to focus their operations in Chinatowns rather than challenging other ethnic gangs for broader turf control.
31. Bell, "Crime as an American Way of Life," 151. Despite the earlier waves of Chinese migration, Chinese crime gangs tend to be overlooked in the literature on ethnic succession during this period. As one possible explanation, O'Kane (The Crooked Ladder, 61-62) observes that Chinese gangs in the late 1800s and early 1900s tended to focus their operations in Chinatowns rather than challenging other ethnic gangs for broader turf control.
32. See discussion in O'Kane, The Crooked Ladder; and William Kleinknecht, The New Ethnic Mobs: The Changing Face of Organized Crime in America (New York: The Free Press, 1996).
33. See discussion in O'Kane, The Crooked Ladder; and William Kleinknecht, The New Ethnic Mobs: The Changing Face of Organized Crime in America (New York: The Free Press, 1996).
34. See Lupsha, "Organized Crime in the United States," 38; O'Kane, The Crooked Ladder; Reuter, "Research on American Organized Crime," 109; and Kleinknecht, The New Ethnic Mobs, 7, 58-74, 210.
35. See Lupsha, "Organized Crime in the United States," 38; O'Kane, The Crooked Ladder; Reuter, "Research on American Organized Crime," 109; and Kleinknecht, The New Ethnic Mobs, 7, 58-74, 210.
36. See Lupsha, "Organized Crime in the United States," 38; O'Kane, The Crooked Ladder; Reuter, "Research on American Organized Crime," 109; and Kleinknecht, The New Ethnic Mobs, 7, 58-74, 210.
37. See Lupsha, "Organized Crime in the United States," 38; O'Kane, The Crooked Ladder; Reuter, "Research on American Organized Crime," 109; and Kleinknecht, The New Ethnic Mobs, 7, 58-74, 210.
38. Kleinknecht, The New Ethnic Mobs, 7.
39. One possible explanation is the tendency of this literature to explore the interaction between ethnic groups and political machines with law enforcement as one component of the machine (e.g., Bell, "Crime as an American Way of Life"). In this context, law enforcement reinforces the illicit ladder rather than distorting its effects. In contrast, scholars have noted the impact of state lotteries as displacing illicit gambling as a traditional revenue source for organized crime.
40. For example, Lupsha, "Organized Crime in the United States", 38.
41. Paul B. Stares, Global Habit: The Drug Problem in a Borderless World (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1996). As applied to the heroin trade, see Matthew Brzezinski, "Re-Energizing the Drug Business," New York Times Magazine 2002 (June 23), 24-39, 46, 54-55.
42. Paul B. Stares, Global Habit: The Drug Problem in a Borderless World (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1996). As applied to the heroin trade, see Matthew Brzezinski, "Re-Energizing the Drug Business," New York Times Magazine 2002 (June 23), 24-39, 46, 54-55.
43. ndSession 1990, 14; and Thomas Constantine, "Testimony to Senate Appropriations Subcommittee: Overview of DEA Activities and Narcotics Problems" 1997 (April 10).
44. ndSession 1990, 14; and Thomas Constantine, "Testimony to Senate Appropriations Subcommittee: Overview of DEA Activities and Narcotics Problems" 1997 (April 10).
45. ndSession 1990, 14; and Thomas Constantine, "Testimony to Senate Appropriations Subcommittee: Overview of DEA Activities and Narcotics Problems" 1997 (April 10).
46. ndSession 1990, 14; and Thomas Constantine, "Testimony to Senate Appropriations Subcommittee: Overview of DEA Activities and Narcotics Problems" 1997 (April 10).
47. Chase, "Vacancy Chains."
48. Stares, Global Habit.
49. nd sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1988); and James B. Jacobs with Christopher Panarella and Jay Worthington, Busting the Mob: United States v. Cosa Nostra (New York and London: New York University Press, 1994).
50. nd sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1988); and James B. Jacobs with Christopher Panarella and Jay Worthington, Busting the Mob: United States v. Cosa Nostra (New York and London: New York University Press, 1994).
51. H. Richard Friman, Narco Diplomacy: Exporting the U.S. War on Drugs (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996);
52. H. Richard Friman, "Gaijinhanzai: Immigrants and Drugs in Contemporary Japan," Asian Survey 36, 10 (October 1996), 964-77.
53. U.S. Senate, Hearings: Organized Crime; see also U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Report: The Federal Government's Use of the RICO Statute and other Efforts against Organized Crime (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1990), 43.
54. U.S. Senate, Hearings: Organized Crime; see also U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Report: The Federal Government's Use of the RICO Statute and other Efforts against Organized Crime (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1990), 43.
55. Other unintended effects lie in the greater propensity for violence as rival enterprises vie over the newly opened distribution networks, and the difficulty of enforcement efforts numerous smaller organizations step into the gap (e.g., Kleinknecht, The New Ethnic Mobs, 253-266).
56. President's Commission, Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, 110; and Committee on the Judiciary and the Caucus on International Narcotics Control, U.S. International Drug Policy, 114.
57. President's Commission, Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, 110; and Committee on the Judiciary and the Caucus on International Narcotics Control, U.S. International Drug Policy, 114.
58. For example, see Patrick L. Clawson and Rensselaer W. Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); Constantine, "Testimony,"; and Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (Available at www.state.gov).
59. For example, see Patrick L. Clawson and Rensselaer W. Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); Constantine, "Testimony,"; and Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (Available at www.state.gov).
60. For example, see Patrick L. Clawson and Rensselaer W. Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); Constantine, "Testimony,"; and Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (Available at www.state.gov).
61. Scott H. Decker et al., "A Tale of Two Cities: Gangs as Organized Crime Groups," Justice Quarterly 1998 (September), 395-425.
62. Andrew A. Bruce, "Introduction to Survey of Organized Crime," in John Landesco, Organized Crime in Chicago: Part III of the Illinois Crime Survey (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 1-7 [3-4]; and Robert M. Lombardo, "The Organized Crime Neighborhoods of Chicago," in Robert J. Kelly, Ko-Lin Chin, and Rufus Schatzberg, eds., Handbook of Organized Crime in the United States (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), 166-187.
63. Andrew A. Bruce, "Introduction to Survey of Organized Crime," in John Landesco, Organized Crime in Chicago: Part III of the Illinois Crime Survey (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 1-7 [3-4]; and Robert M. Lombardo, "The Organized Crime Neighborhoods of Chicago," in Robert J. Kelly, Ko-Lin Chin, and Rufus Schatzberg, eds., Handbook of Organized Crime in the United States (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), 166-187.
64. John, Landesco, Organized Crime in Chicago: Part III of the Illinois Crime Survey 1929 (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 25-37.
65. Landesco, Organized Crime, 85-95; and Lombardo, "The Organized Crime Neighborhoods," 172-176. The sources of vacancy chains during the height of the bootlegging wars from September 1923 to the truce of October 1926, were a mixture of police enforcement efforts (amputation and elimination) and gang warfare. John Landesco (Organized Crime, 97-98) observes that in Cook County, 215 gangsters were killed in warfare, 163 were killed by the police. From January to October 1926 alone, the gap decreased as 54 gang members died in gang warfare and 60 were killed by the police.
66. Landesco, Organized Crime, 85-95; and Lombardo, "The Organized Crime Neighborhoods," 172-176. The sources of vacancy chains during the height of the bootlegging wars from September 1923 to the truce of October 1926, were a mixture of police enforcement efforts (amputation and elimination) and gang warfare. John Landesco (Organized Crime, 97-98) observes that in Cook County, 215 gangsters were killed in warfare, 163 were killed by the police. From January to October 1926 alone, the gap decreased as 54 gang members died in gang warfare and 60 were killed by the police.
67. Landesco, Organized Crime, 85-95; and Lombardo, "The Organized Crime Neighborhoods," 172-176. The sources of vacancy chains during the height of the bootlegging wars from September 1923 to the truce of October 1926, were a mixture of police enforcement efforts (amputation and elimination) and gang warfare. John Landesco (Organized Crime, 97-98) observes that in Cook County, 215 gangsters were killed in warfare, 163 were killed by the police. From January to October 1926 alone, the gap decreased as 54 gang members died in gang warfare and 60 were killed by the police.
68. Landesco, Organized Crime; and Joseph Spillane, "The Making of an Underground Market: Drug Selling in Chicago 1900-1949," Journal of Social History 1998 (32:1), 27-47.
69. Landesco, Organized Crime; and Joseph Spillane, "The Making of an Underground Market: Drug Selling in Chicago 1900-1949," Journal of Social History 1998 (32:1), 27-47.
70. Spillane, "The Making of an Underground Market", 27-47.
71. HIDTA, Chicago: High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Fact Sheet (Chicago: Chicago HIDTA, 2000), 1; and ONDCP, Chicago, Illinois: Profile of Drug Indicators. Washington, DC: Office of National Drug Control Policy, Drug Policy Information Clearinghouse, 2000).
72. HIDTA, Chicago: High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Fact Sheet (Chicago: Chicago HIDTA, 2000), 1; and ONDCP, Chicago, Illinois: Profile of Drug Indicators. Washington, DC: Office of National Drug Control Policy, Drug Policy Information Clearinghouse, 2000).
73. Roger Waldinger, "Immigration and Urban Change," Annual Review of Sociology 1989 (15), 211-232.
74. For example, Alex Kotlowitz, There are No Children Here: The Story of Two Boys Growing Up in the Other America (New York: Double Day, 1991); and Rui Kaneya, "As City Celebrates Drop in Crime, Drug Offenses Soar," Chicago Reporter, 2000 (Available at www.chicagoreporter.com)
75. For example, Alex Kotlowitz, There are No Children Here: The Story of Two Boys Growing Up in the Other America (New York: Double Day, 1991); and Rui Kaneya, "As City Celebrates Drop in Crime, Drug Offenses Soar," Chicago Reporter, 2000 (Available at www.chicagoreporter.com)
76. See, Lombardo, "The Organized Crime Neighborhoods"; Kirsten Lindberg et al., The New Faces of Organized Crime (Chicago, Ill.: Chicago Crime Commission, 1997), 8-9; and Robert J. Kelly, Encyclopedia of Organized Crime in the United States: From Capone's Chicago to the New Urban Underworld (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), 60.
77. See, Lombardo, "The Organized Crime Neighborhoods"; Kirsten Lindberg et al., The New Faces of Organized Crime (Chicago, Ill.: Chicago Crime Commission, 1997), 8-9; and Robert J. Kelly, Encyclopedia of Organized Crime in the United States: From Capone's Chicago to the New Urban Underworld (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), 60.
78. See, Lombardo, "The Organized Crime Neighborhoods"; Kirsten Lindberg et al., The New Faces of Organized Crime (Chicago, Ill.: Chicago Crime Commission, 1997), 8-9; and Robert J. Kelly, Encyclopedia of Organized Crime in the United States: From Capone's Chicago to the New Urban Underworld (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), 60.
79. The post war transition of the Chicago Outfit was facilitated by leaders including Paul Ricca (dies suicide 1972), Anthony Accardo (retires 1958, dies 1992), Sam Giancana, and Joseph Aiuppa. See Kelly, Encyclopedia, 3, 47-54; 257; and "Mob Lite: The New and Improved Chicago Outfit," Chicago Magazine (Available at www.ipsu.org).
80. The post war transition of the Chicago Outfit was facilitated by leaders including Paul Ricca (dies suicide 1972), Anthony Accardo (retires 1958, dies 1992), Sam Giancana, and Joseph Aiuppa. See Kelly, Encyclopedia, 3, 47-54; 257; and "Mob Lite: The New and Improved Chicago Outfit," Chicago Magazine (Available at www.ipsu.org).
81. The list includes Sam Giancana (to Mexico 1966-74), Joseph Aiuppa (1986), Albert Tocco (1989), and Joseph Ferriola (1992). See, Lombardo, "The Organized Crime Neighborhoods", 182; U.S. Senate, Report: The Federal Government's Use of the RICO Statute (6); and Kelly Encyclopedia, 138.
82. The list includes Sam Giancana (to Mexico 1966-74), Joseph Aiuppa (1986), Albert Tocco (1989), and Joseph Ferriola (1992). See, Lombardo, "The Organized Crime Neighborhoods", 182; U.S. Senate, Report: The Federal Government's Use of the RICO Statute (6); and Kelly Encyclopedia, 138.
83. The list includes Sam Giancana (to Mexico 1966-74), Joseph Aiuppa (1986), Albert Tocco (1989), and Joseph Ferriola (1992). See, Lombardo, "The Organized Crime Neighborhoods", 182; U.S. Senate, Report: The Federal Government's Use of the RICO Statute (6); and Kelly Encyclopedia, 138.
84. U.S. Senate, Hearings: Organized Crime.
85. By the late 1980s, the estimated structure of the Outfit included four senior statesmen, 6 street bosses, 181 made members, and 1,500 associates (down from 3000 in the 1960s). By the late 1990s, the estimates noted only 50 made members and three street crews. See, Robert M. Lombardo, "The Social Organization of Organized Crime in Chicago," in Patrick J. Ryan and George E. Rush (eds.), Understanding Organized Crime in Global Perspective: A Reader (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1997) pp. 91-106 [94]; and "Mob Lite."
86. By the late 1980s, the estimated structure of the Outfit included four senior statesmen, 6 street bosses, 181 made members, and 1,500 associates (down from 3000 in the 1960s). By the late 1990s, the estimates noted only 50 made members and three street crews. See, Robert M. Lombardo, "The Social Organization of Organized Crime in Chicago," in Patrick J. Ryan and George E. Rush (eds.), Understanding Organized Crime in Global Perspective: A Reader (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1997) pp. 91-106 [94]; and "Mob Lite."
87. Lindberg, The New Faces of Organized Crime, 13; and Kelly, Encyclopedia, 61.
88. Lindberg, The New Faces of Organized Crime, 13; and Kelly, Encyclopedia, 61.
89. Kleinknecht, The New Ethnic Mobs, 60-64; Lindberg, The New Faces of Organized Crime, 70-77; Kelly, Encyclopedia, 212-215; and National Drug Intelligence Center, National Drug threat Assessment 2001 - The Domestic Perspective (Available at www.usdoj.gov).
90. Kleinknecht, The New Ethnic Mobs, 60-64; Lindberg, The New Faces of Organized Crime, 70-77; Kelly, Encyclopedia, 212-215; and National Drug Intelligence Center, National Drug threat Assessment 2001 - The Domestic Perspective (Available at www.usdoj.gov).
91. Kleinknecht, The New Ethnic Mobs, 60-64; Lindberg, The New Faces of Organized Crime, 70-77; Kelly, Encyclopedia, 212-215; and National Drug Intelligence Center, National Drug threat Assessment 2001 - The Domestic Perspective (Available at www.usdoj.gov).
92. Kleinknecht, The New Ethnic Mobs, 60-64; Lindberg, The New Faces of Organized Crime, 70-77; Kelly, Encyclopedia, 212-215; and National Drug Intelligence Center, National Drug threat Assessment 2001 - The Domestic Perspective (Available at www.usdoj.gov).
93. To date Asian street gangs have established only a small presence in the Chicago drug trade. The small Chicago affiliate of New York's Flying Dragons, comprised of Fukien Chinese, has been reputed to be facilitating the transshipment of heroin from the West Coast and Canada to the major cities on the East Coast. See, Robert L. Davidson, "Asian Gangs and Asian Organized Crime in Chicago," in Patrick J. Ryan and George E. Rush (eds.), Understanding Organized Crime in Global Perspective: A Reader (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1997), 107-114 [112-123]; and Lindberg, The New Faces of Organized Crime, 55-56.
94. To date Asian street gangs have established only a small presence in the Chicago drug trade. The small Chicago affiliate of New York's Flying Dragons, comprised of Fukien Chinese, has been reputed to be facilitating the transshipment of heroin from the West Coast and Canada to the major cities on the East Coast. See, Robert L. Davidson, "Asian Gangs and Asian Organized Crime in Chicago," in Patrick J. Ryan and George E. Rush (eds.), Understanding Organized Crime in Global Perspective: A Reader (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1997), 107-114 [112-123]; and Lindberg, The New Faces of Organized Crime, 55-56.
95. These histories often tend to overlook the long history of street gangs among the Polish, Jewish and other immigrant populations that moved out of areas such as those on the West side in the 1950s and early 1960s.
96. The sources of the transition are complex and include the impact of the Chicago race riots of the late 1960s, the ebb and flow of support for the Black Muslim movement within the gangs, the experiences of the gangs in attracting (and in some cases mismanaging) support from federal and other funding sources for community development activities, inter-gang tensions, law enforcement crackdowns, and the like. For example, see R. Lincoln Keiser, The Vice Lords: Warriors of the Streets (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969); Kotlowitz, There are No Children Here; and David Dawley, A Nation of Lords: The Autobiography of the Vice Lords (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1992).
97. The sources of the transition are complex and include the impact of the Chicago race riots of the late 1960s, the ebb and flow of support for the Black Muslim movement within the gangs, the experiences of the gangs in attracting (and in some cases mismanaging) support from federal and other funding sources for community development activities, inter-gang tensions, law enforcement crackdowns, and the like. For example, see R. Lincoln Keiser, The Vice Lords: Warriors of the Streets (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969); Kotlowitz, There are No Children Here; and David Dawley, A Nation of Lords: The Autobiography of the Vice Lords (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1992).
98. The sources of the transition are complex and include the impact of the Chicago race riots of the late 1960s, the ebb and flow of support for the Black Muslim movement within the gangs, the experiences of the gangs in attracting (and in some cases mismanaging) support from federal and other funding sources for community development activities, inter-gang tensions, law enforcement crackdowns, and the like. For example, see R. Lincoln Keiser, The Vice Lords: Warriors of the Streets (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969); Kotlowitz, There are No Children Here; and David Dawley, A Nation of Lords: The Autobiography of the Vice Lords (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1992).
99. The People (or People Nation) included major gangs such as the Black P. Stone Rangers, Vice Lords, Latin Kings, and El Rukns. The Folks (or Folk Nation) included major gangs such as the Black Gangster Disciples, Black Disciples, Gangster Disciples, Maniac Latin Disciples, and Latin Disciples (e.g., FDOC, "Street Gangs - Chicago Based or Influenced," Gang and Security Threat Awareness (Florida Department of Corrections, n.d.. Available at www.dc.state.fl.us).
100. Kleinknecht, The New Ethnic Mobs, 231-233; and Kelly, Encyclopedia, 116-117.
101. Kleinknecht, The New Ethnic Mobs, 231-233; and Kelly, Encyclopedia, 116-117.
102. For example, see FDOC, Gang and Security Threat Awareness; Keiser, The Vice Lords; Kotlowitz, There are No Children Here; and Dawley, A Nation of Lords.
103. For example, see FDOC, Gang and Security Threat Awareness; Keiser, The Vice Lords; Kotlowitz, There are No Children Here; and Dawley, A Nation of Lords.
104. For example, see FDOC, Gang and Security Threat Awareness; Keiser, The Vice Lords; Kotlowitz, There are No Children Here; and Dawley, A Nation of Lords.
105. For example, see FDOC, Gang and Security Threat Awareness; Keiser, The Vice Lords; Kotlowitz, There are No Children Here; and Dawley, A Nation of Lords.
106. Ralph Cintron, Angels' Town: Chero Ways, Gang Life, and Rhetorics of the Everyday (Boston: Beacon Press, 1997), 21; Kelly, Encyclopedia, 188-189; and Reymundo Sanchez, My Bloody Life: The Making of Latin King (Chicago: Chicago Review Press, 2000). These conflicts eased slightly with the formation of the People and Folks but the intergang rivalries were reflected in the membership of the two supergangs: with the Latin Kings and Spanish Lords in the People, and the Latin Disciples and Latin Cobras in the Folks.
107. Ralph Cintron, Angels' Town: Chero Ways, Gang Life, and Rhetorics of the Everyday (Boston: Beacon Press, 1997), 21; Kelly, Encyclopedia, 188-189; and Reymundo Sanchez, My Bloody Life: The Making of Latin King (Chicago: Chicago Review Press, 2000). These conflicts eased slightly with the formation of the People and Folks but the intergang rivalries were reflected in the membership of the two supergangs: with the Latin Kings and Spanish Lords in the People, and the Latin Disciples and Latin Cobras in the Folks.
108. Ralph Cintron, Angels' Town: Chero Ways, Gang Life, and Rhetorics of the Everyday (Boston: Beacon Press, 1997), 21; Kelly, Encyclopedia, 188-189; and Reymundo Sanchez, My Bloody Life: The Making of Latin King (Chicago: Chicago Review Press, 2000). These conflicts eased slightly with the formation of the People and Folks but the intergang rivalries were reflected in the membership of the two supergangs: with the Latin Kings and Spanish Lords in the People, and the Latin Disciples and Latin Cobras in the Folks.
109. For recent example, see "Drug War Nets Smaller Fish in City," Chicago Tribune 2001 (February 25).
110. Such as Jeff Fort (El Rukns), and Larry Hoover (Gangster Disciples).
111. This pattern appears well before the large-scale shift by the gang federations into the drug trade. For example, Jeff Fort emerged as leader of the Blackstone Rangers in 1968 with the arrest of the gang's president Eugene Hairston, was arrested himself in the early 1970s, and established the El Rukns upon his release in the mid-1970s. See O'Kane, The Crooked Ladder; and Kleinknecht, The New Ethnic Mobs.
112. This pattern appears well before the large-scale shift by the gang federations into the drug trade. For example, Jeff Fort emerged as leader of the Blackstone Rangers in 1968 with the arrest of the gang's president Eugene Hairston, was arrested himself in the early 1970s, and established the El Rukns upon his release in the mid-1970s. See O'Kane, The Crooked Ladder; and Kleinknecht, The New Ethnic Mobs.
113. O'Kane, The Crooked Ladder, 103; Kleinknecht, The New Ethnic Mobs, 231-233; and HIDTA. As noted on Chicago's HIDTA web site, the program was introduced in 1995 to "assist local, state and federal law enforcement agencies in dismantling the Gangster Disciple street gang." According to the Governor's Commission on Gangs Final Report (Commission Resolutions, 1999. Available at www.gcpc.state.il.us), the four primary supergangs in Chicago were the Gangster Disciples, Vice Lords, Latin Kings, and Maniac Latin Disciples.
114. O'Kane, The Crooked Ladder, 103; Kleinknecht, The New Ethnic Mobs, 231-233; and HIDTA. As noted on Chicago's HIDTA web site, the program was introduced in 1995 to "assist local, state and federal law enforcement agencies in dismantling the Gangster Disciple street gang." According to the Governor's Commission on Gangs Final Report (Commission Resolutions, 1999. Available at www.gcpc.state.il.us), the four primary supergangs in Chicago were the Gangster Disciples, Vice Lords, Latin Kings, and Maniac Latin Disciples.
115. O'Kane, The Crooked Ladder, 103; Kleinknecht, The New Ethnic Mobs, 231-233; and HIDTA. As noted on Chicago's HIDTA web site, the program was introduced in 1995 to "assist local, state and federal law enforcement agencies in dismantling the Gangster Disciple street gang." According to the Governor's Commission on Gangs Final Report (Commission Resolutions, 1999. Available at www.gcpc.state.il.us), the four primary supergangs in Chicago were the Gangster Disciples, Vice Lords, Latin Kings, and Maniac Latin Disciples.
116. For example, see Clark Staten, "Los Angeles Gang Attempts to Take Over Chicago Streets," Los Angeles Times 1991 (November 12); and Amy Grant, "Rising Gang Violence the Result of Turf Wars," Emergencynet News Service 1992 (February 18), (Available at www.emergency.com).
117. For example, see Clark Staten, "Los Angeles Gang Attempts to Take Over Chicago Streets," Los Angeles Times 1991 (November 12); and Amy Grant, "Rising Gang Violence the Result of Turf Wars," Emergencynet News Service 1992 (February 18), (Available at www.emergency.com).
118. As Sanchez (My Bloody Life, 232) observes, the Latin Kings are "not just a street gang run by local thugs; they were a drug empire run by adults ['penitentiary leaders and their generals'] who were rarely seen." In 1997, for example, Federal authorities indicted Gustavo Colon just prior to his release from prison, for directing, along with 23 others, a $6 million drug trafficking network during the mid-1990s. See, Dirk Johnson, "A Jailed Chicago Gang Leader is Charged as a Drug Criminal," New York Times 1997 (September 21).
119. As Sanchez (My Bloody Life, 232) observes, the Latin Kings are "not just a street gang run by local thugs; they were a drug empire run by adults ['penitentiary leaders and their generals'] who were rarely seen." In 1997, for example, Federal authorities indicted Gustavo Colon just prior to his release from prison, for directing, along with 23 others, a $6 million drug trafficking network during the mid-1990s. See, Dirk Johnson, "A Jailed Chicago Gang Leader is Charged as a Drug Criminal," New York Times 1997 (September 21).
120. Sanchez, My Bloody Life, 217.
121. Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan: The Story of a Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), 59, 73; David E. Kaplan and Alec Dubro, Yakuza (New York: Collier Books, 1986), 158; and Asahi Shimbun, Japan Almanac (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 1999) p. 60, 281.
122. Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan: The Story of a Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), 59, 73; David E. Kaplan and Alec Dubro, Yakuza (New York: Collier Books, 1986), 158; and Asahi Shimbun, Japan Almanac (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 1999) p. 60, 281.
123. Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan: The Story of a Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), 59, 73; David E. Kaplan and Alec Dubro, Yakuza (New York: Collier Books, 1986), 158; and Asahi Shimbun, Japan Almanac (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 1999) p. 60, 281.
124. Kaplan and Dubro, Yakuza, 90-92, 96-99. 127-28. See also, Hiroaki Iwai, "Organized Crime in Japan," in Robert J. Kelly, Organized Crime: A Global Perspective (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1986), 208-233.
125. Kaplan and Dubro, Yakuza, 90-92, 96-99. 127-28. See also, Hiroaki Iwai, "Organized Crime in Japan," in Robert J. Kelly, Organized Crime: A Global Perspective (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1986), 208-233.
126. Taoka's immediate successor, Kenichi Yamamoto (nicknamed Yamaken), died of illness in prison in 1982. His replacement, Masahisa Takenaka, was killed in 1985 in internal dispute by an offshoot of the syndicate, the Ichiwa-kai. Kazuo Nakanishi became the fourth leader of the syndicate in 1985 but lost his position in 1989 (shifted to senior advisor) to Yoshinori Watanabe (1989-on). See, Kaplan and Dubro, Yakuza; and Japan Times 1999 (July 20).
127. Taoka's immediate successor, Kenichi Yamamoto (nicknamed Yamaken), died of illness in prison in 1982. His replacement, Masahisa Takenaka, was killed in 1985 in internal dispute by an offshoot of the syndicate, the Ichiwa-kai. Kazuo Nakanishi became the fourth leader of the syndicate in 1985 but lost his position in 1989 (shifted to senior advisor) to Yoshinori Watanabe (1989-on). See, Kaplan and Dubro, Yakuza; and Japan Times 1999 (July 20).
128. Kaplan and Dubro, Yakuza, 127-139. According to the National Police Agency, the number of yakuza stood at over 83,000 members by 2000, of which slightly more than half were associate members. The Yamaguchi-gumi's regular membership stood at 17,500. See Keisatsucho, Keisatsu Hakusho [White Paper on Police] (Tokyo: National Police Agency, 2000) p. 158, 166.
129. Kaplan and Dubro, Yakuza, 127-139. According to the National Police Agency, the number of yakuza stood at over 83,000 members by 2000, of which slightly more than half were associate members. The Yamaguchi-gumi's regular membership stood at 17,500. See Keisatsucho, Keisatsu Hakusho [White Paper on Police] (Tokyo: National Police Agency, 2000) p. 158, 166.
130. Japan Times 1999 (July 20).
131. Kaplan and Dubro, Yakuza, 134-138; and Mainichi Daily News 1999 (November 17).
132. Kaplan and Dubro, Yakuza, 134-138; and Mainichi Daily News 1999 (November 17).
133. Kaplan and Dubro (Yakuza, 91, 98, 145) note that Yamaguchi-gumi absorbed the Korean Meiyu-kai in Osaka during the late-1940s/early 1950s, and turned to linkages with the Tokyo-based Tosei-kai during the 1960s. The authors also posit that, in addition to Koreans, 70 percent of the syndicate's members are drawn from the burakumin (the descendants of lower class Japanese who worked in tanneries, slaughterhouses, and the like). The sources of these unofficial estimates, however, remain a matter of great speculation in the Japanese law enforcement community (Author interviews, Tokyo and Osaka, Japan 1995).
134. The Osaka region accounts for roughly 30 percent of the total Korean population in Japan (roughly 700,000). For example, see Saskia Sassen, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: The New Press, 1998), 65.
135. Sassen, Globalization and Its Discontents, 65; Judicial System and Research Department, Ministry of Justice, Annual Report of Statistics on Legal Migrants (Tokyo: Ministry of Justice, 1999), 196-205.
136. Sassen, Globalization and Its Discontents, 65; Judicial System and Research Department, Ministry of Justice, Annual Report of Statistics on Legal Migrants (Tokyo: Ministry of Justice, 1999), 196-205.
137. H. Richard Friman, "Obstructing Markets: Organized Crime Networks and Drug Control in Japan," in H. Richard Friman and Peter Andreas (eds.), The Illicit Global Economy and State Power (Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 173-97.
138. For example, see JICA, Anti Drug Activities in Japan (Tokyo: Japan International Cooperation Agency, National Police Agency, 1999).
139. Author interviews with police and narcotics enforcement agents in Osaka, Japan (1995-1996).
140. Kaplan and Dubro (Yakuza, 134) note that police did turn to "decapitation" strategies in 1981, arresting many of the top leaders of the Yamaguchi-gumi immediately after Taoka's death in an effort to disrupt the organization. The National Police Agency posits three waves of "crush the leadership campaigns" waged by the police in the mid-1960s, early 1970s, and mid-1970s as well as more recent efforts under a new set of anti-gang laws. See, National Police Agency, White Paper on Police 1999 (Excerpt) (Tokyo: National Police Agency, 1999), 68-69.
141. Kaplan and Dubro (Yakuza, 134) note that police did turn to "decapitation" strategies in 1981, arresting many of the top leaders of the Yamaguchi-gumi immediately after Taoka's death in an effort to disrupt the organization. The National Police Agency posits three waves of "crush the leadership campaigns" waged by the police in the mid-1960s, early 1970s, and mid-1970s as well as more recent efforts under a new set of anti-gang laws. See, National Police Agency, White Paper on Police 1999 (Excerpt) (Tokyo: National Police Agency, 1999), 68-69.
142. The literature here is extensive, see, for example Peter Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).
143. Iwai, "Organized Crime in Japan." One major exception was the large-scale drug crack-down in the early 1950s. The problem was that when many of the top leaders reemerged from prison in the 1960s and 1970s they played a central role in Japan's next wave of drug problems. See Masayuki Tamura, "The Yakuza and Amphetamine Abuse in Japan," in Harold H. Traver and Mark S. Gaylord (eds.), Drugs, Law and the State (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1992), 99-120 [102-103].
144. Iwai, "Organized Crime in Japan." One major exception was the large-scale drug crack-down in the early 1950s. The problem was that when many of the top leaders reemerged from prison in the 1960s and 1970s they played a central role in Japan's next wave of drug problems. See Masayuki Tamura, "The Yakuza and Amphetamine Abuse in Japan," in Harold H. Traver and Mark S. Gaylord (eds.), Drugs, Law and the State (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1992), 99-120 [102-103].
145. NPA, White Paper on Police.
146. NPA, White Paper on Police, 67-76.