Political fragmentation and projected tax revenues: Evidence from Flemish municipalities

International Tax and Public Finance

Volumn 15, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 297-315

  Goeminne, Stijn ^a   Geys, Benny ^b   Smolders, Carine ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE GHENT   (Belgium)

^b WZB BERLIN SOCIAL SCIENCE CENTER   (Germany)

Author keywords

Flemish municipalities; Forecast accuracy; Government fragmentation; Local taxation; Revenue projections

Indexed keywords

EID: 40149101718     PISSN: 09275940     EISSN: 15736970     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10797-007-9021-4     Document Type: Article

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