Death spiral or euthanasia? The demise of generous group health insurance coverage

Inquiry

Volumn 44, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 412-427

  Pauly, Mark V ^a   Mitchell, Olivia S ^a   Zeng, Yuhui ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; CONTROLLED STUDY; EMPLOYEE; EMPLOYER; EUTHANASIA; HEALTH CARE COST; HEALTH CARE PLANNING; HEALTH CARE POLICY; HEALTH INSURANCE; HUMAN; MEDICAL INFORMATICS;

EID: 39649106886     PISSN: 00469580     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5034/inquiryjrnl_44.4.412     Document Type: Article

References (19)

1. Ai, C., and E. C. Norton. 2003. Interaction Terms in Logit and Probit Models. Economics Letters 80(1):123-129.
2. Barringer, M., and O. S. Mitchell. 1994. Workers' Preferences among Company-Provided Health Insurance Plans. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 48:141-152.
3. Beaulieu, N. 2002. Quality Information and Consumer Health Plan Choices. Journal of Health Economics 21(1):43-63.
4. Buchmueller, T. C., and J. DiNardo. 2002. Did Community Rating Induce an Adverse Selection Death Spiral? Evidence from New York, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut. The American Economic Review 92(1):280-294.
5. Buchmueller, T. C., and P. J. Feldstein. 1997. The Effect of Price on Switching among Health Plans. Journal of Health Economics 16(2):231-247.
6. Cutler, D., and S. Reber. 1998. Paying for Health Insurance: The Tradeoff between Competition and Adverse Selection. Quarterly Journal of Economics 113:433-466.
7. Cutler, D., and R. Zeckhauser. 1998. Adverse Selection in Health Insurance. Forum for Health Economics & Policy: Vol. 1. (Frontiers in Health Policy Research), Article 2. http://www.bepress.com/fhep/1/2.
8. _. 2000. The Anatomy of Health Insurance. In Handbook of Health Economics, Vol. 1A, A. Culyer and J. P. Newhouse, eds. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
9. Enthoven, A. 1980. Health Plan: The Only Practical Solution to the Soaring Cost of Medical Care. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
10. Feldman, R., M. Finch, B. Dowd, and S. Cassou. 1989. The Demand for Employment-Based Health Insurance Plans. Journal of Human Resources 24:115-142.
11. Herring, B., and M. Pauly. 2006. Incentive-Compatible Guaranteed Renewable Premiums for Health Insurance. Journal of Health Economics 25(3):395-417.
12. Martin, K., D. Rogal, and S. Arnold. 2004. Health-Based Risk Assessment: Risk Adjusted Payments and Beyond. Washington, D.C.: AcademyHealth.
13. Pauly, M. 1996. Health Benefits at Work. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
14. Pauly, M., and B. Herring. 1999. Pooling Health Insurance Risk. Washington, D.C.: AEI Press.
15. _. 2000. An Efficient Employer Strategy for Dealing with Adverse Selection in Multiple-Plan Offerings: An MSA Example. Journal of Health Economics 19(4):513-528.
16. Price, J. R., and J. W. Mays. 1985. Biased Selection in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program. Inquiry 22(1):67-77.
17. Robinson, J. C., H. S. Luft, L. B. Gardner, and E. M. Morrison. 1991. A Method for Risk-Adjusting Employer Contributions to Competing Health Insurance Plans. Inquiry 28:107-116.
18. Swartz, K., and D. Garnick. 2000. Lessons from New Jersey. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 25(1):45-70.
19. Zabinski, D., T. M. Selden, J. F. Moeller, and J. S. Banthin. 1991. Medical Savings Accounts: Microsimulation Results from a Model with Adverse Selection. Journal of Health Economics 18(2):195-218.