An efficient employer strategy for dealing with adverse selection in multiple-plan offerings: An MSA example

Journal of Health Economics

Volumn 19, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 513-528

  Pauly, Mark V ^a   Herring, Bradley J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Insurance

Indexed keywords

COST; EMPLOYEE; HEALTH INSURANCE; RISK MANAGEMENT; SHORT SURVEY;

CONSUMER PARTICIPATION; DECISION MAKING, ORGANIZATIONAL; EFFICIENCY, ORGANIZATIONAL; FEES AND CHARGES; HEALTH BENEFIT PLANS, EMPLOYEE; HUMANS; INSURANCE SELECTION BIAS; INSURANCE, MAJOR MEDICAL; MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS; MODELS, ECONOMETRIC; RISK ADJUSTMENT; UNITED STATES;

EID: 0034237162     PISSN: 01676296     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-6296(00)00049-7     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. American Academy of Actuaries Medical savings accounts: cost implications and design issues. AAA Public Policy Monograph. 1995.
2. Burman L. Medical savings accounts and adverse selection. Urban Institute Mimeo. 1997.
3. Cave J. The Subsidy Equilibrium in Multiple Option Insurance Markets. 1984;Rand Publication R-3015-HHS, Rand, Santa Monica.
4. Cutler D., Reber S. Paying for health insurance: the tradeoff between competition and adverse selection. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 113(2):1998;433-466.
5. Cutler, D., Zeckhauser, R., 1997. Adverse selection in health insurance. NBER Working Paper #6107.
6. Goldstein G., Pauly M. Group health insurance as a local public good. Rosett R. The Role of Health Insurance in the Health Services Sector. 1976;NBER, Cambridge.
7. Health Care Financing Administration, Office of the Actuary National health expenditures, 1996. Health Care Financing Review. 19(1):1997;161-200.
8. Nichols L.et al. Tax-Preferred Medical Savings Accounts and Catastrophic Health Insurance Plans: a Numerical Analysis of Winners and Losers. 1996;Urban Institute Mimeo.
9. Pauly M. Overinsurance and public provision of insurance: the roles of moral hazard and adverse selection. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 88(1):1974;44-62.
10. Pauly M. Health Benefits at Work: an Economic and Political Analysis of Employment-based Health Insurance. 1997;University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.
11. Rothschild M., Stiglitz J. Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: an essay on the economics of imperfect information. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 90(4):1976;630-649.
12. Thorpe K. Medical savings accounts: design and policy issues. Health Affairs. 14(3):1995;254-259.
13. Zabinski D.et al. Medical savings accounts: microsimulation results from a model with adverse selection. Journal of Health Economics. 18(2):1999;195-218.